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Reductionism  about  personal  identity  is  the  view  that  facts  about  personal 
identity  reduce  to  lower­level  facts  about  things  like  psychological  or  physical 
connectedness.  In  this  dissertation,  I  give  arguments  for  reductionism  and  for 
Derek  Parfit’s  “Extreme  Claim”  that  reductionism  requires  a  radical  revision  of 
our  ordinary  normative  thought.  After  detailing  the  extent  of  this  revision,  I 
introduce  and  describe  a  special  sort  of  self­alienation  that  is  likely  to  be 
engendered  by  a  genuine  belief  in  Extreme  Claim  Reductionism.  I  argue  that  this 
alienation  cannot  and  should  not  be  eliminated,  and  consider  existing  attempts 
to  eliminate  similar  sorts  of  alienation  and  note  where  they  seem  to  fall  short  of 
their  aim.  I  then  outline  a  practical  strategy  for  living  with  Extreme  Claim 
Reductionism  and  the  alienation  that  accompanies  it.   
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Chapter  One  –  Why  People  Don’t  Matter 
 
Why  and  in  what  sense  is  the  person  writing  this  sentence  the  same 
person  as  the  one  who  convinced  his  mom  to  let  him  watch  Jurassic  Park  in  a 
theater  for  his  ninth  birthday?  Or,  for  that  matter,  the  same  person  as  the  one 
who  made  tacos  for  lunch  a  few  hours  ago?  These  are  questions  about  personal 
identity,  and  they  are  deceptively  difficult.  One  popular  family  of  views,  which 
we  can  call  reductionism,  holds  that  questions  about  personal  identity  reduce  to 
questions  about  such  things  as  the  psychological  or  physical  features  of  and 
connections  between  the  two  people  in  question. 
Derek  Parfit’s  1984  book  Reasons  and  Persons  advocates  an  extreme 
reductionist  view  of  personal  identity  that,  he  argues,  has  radical  implications  for 
practical  ethics.  As  far  as  I  can  tell,  the  book  marks  the  furthest­out  he  ever  got. 
His  earlier  1971  paper  “Personal  Identity”  is  largely  concerned  with  the  view  that 
what  matters  about  personal  survival  is  not  identity  but  certain  psychological 
relations  which  come  in,  and  matter  in,  degrees.   These  relations  don’t  matter  in 1
the  way  that  we  might  have  thought  heavyweight  numerical  personal  identity 
would  matter,  but  they  do  seem  to  matter.  By  2011’s  colossal  On  What  Matters 
(which  is  a  work  in  ethical  theory  that  doesn’t  get  into  questions  of  personal 
identity)  he  takes  it  as  intuitive  and  unproblematic  that  we  have  some  reasons  to 
1  E.g.  p.  26 
1 
value  our  own  present  and  future  good  and  the  good  of  people  we  care  for  over 
the  good  of  strangers.  But  in  Reasons  and  Persons ,  Parfit  entertains,  but  remains 
agnostic  about,  the  “Extreme  Claim”  that  on  the  reductionist  view  we  have  no 
reason  to  care  any  more  about  our  own  futures  than  other  people’s.  2
I’m  going  to  defend  the  Extreme  Claim.  In  fact,  I’m  going  to  defend  a  very 
strong  version  of  the  claim:  If  reductionism  is  true,  then  nothing  matters  in 
anything  like  the  way  in  which  personal  identity  is  ordinarily  taken  to  matter.  3
Combining  the  Extreme  Claim  with  reductionism,  as  I  believe  we  should,  yields 
what  I  will  call  Extreme  Claim  Reductionism,  or  ECR  for  short.  In  holding  to 
ECR,  I  am  willing  to  bite  all  the  bullets  that  need  to  be  bit.  I  will  have  to  admit, 
for  instance,  that  I  would  have  more  reason  to  save  two  strangers  from  drowning 
than  my  closest  friend.  
This  may  seem  unhinged.  If  it  does,  it  would  not  always  have  been  so. 
2  Reasons  and  Persons — henceforth  RP — pp.  307 – 312.  Parfit  characterizes  the  Extreme 
Claim  in  several  (perhaps  incompatible)  ways.  Initially,  the  Extreme  Claim  is  that  “we 
have  no  reason  to  be  concerned  about  our  own  futures”  (p.  307). 
   But  Parfit  also  counts  Perry’s  view  that  he  has  some  reason  to  prevent  his  own  future 
pains,  but  no  more  than  he  would  have  to  prevent  a  stranger’s,  as  a  version  of  the 
Extreme  Claim  (p.  308). 
   Swinburne’s  claim  that  psychological  connectedness  and  continuity  do  not  matter  on 
their  own  also  counts  (p.  308 — note  that  Swinburne  believes  that  there  is  a  further 
identity  fact,  so  it  is  untroubling  that  connectedness  and  continuity  do  not  matter  on 
their  own). 
   The  version  of  the  Extreme  Claim  that  I  will  be  defending  seems  to  me  most  similar  to 
the  one  attributed  to  Swinburne:  Neither  psychological  connectedness  and  continuity 
nor  any  of  the  other  relations  that  we  might  think  identity  reduces  to  matter  in  an 
identity­like  way  in  the  absence  of  a  deep  further  fact.  But  unlike  Swinburne,  and  like 
Parfit,  I  believe  that  there  is  no  deep  further  fact.  
3  My  version  of  the  claim,  like  Swinburne’s  but  unlike  some  that  Parfit  considers,  is  thus 
explicitly  a  conditional. 
2 
Before  the  rise  of  virtue  ethics,  intuitionism,  particularism,  care  ethics,  and  the 
like  over  the  course  of  the  twentieth  century,  impartialist  ethical  systems  like 
utilitarianism,  Moorean  consequentialism,  and  Kantianism  reigned  supreme. 
There  seems  to  me  to  be  an  undeniable  truth  in  these  grim,  impersonal, 
uncompromising  theories.  With  Parfit  (or  at  least  with  the  Parfit  of  Reasons  and 
Persons )  I  believe  that  reflection  on  the  nature  of  persons  supports  an  impartialist 
view.  For  instance,  Kant’s  command  that  we  never  make  exceptions  of  ourselves 
seems  particularly  plausible  when  temporally  extended  selves  disappear  or 
dissolve  under  scrutiny.  Could  anything  be  more  arbitrary  than  making  an 
exception  of  something  that  can  hardly  be  said  to  exist? 
My  basic  argument  for  Extreme  Claim  Reductionism  will  take  this  form: 
Parfit’s  own  reasoning  suggests  a  highly  permissive  view  of  which  other  people 
should  matter  for  us  in  the  way  that  our  ordinary  future  and  past  selves  do, 
which  would  even  include  such  persons  as  causally  unconnected  duplicates.   If 4
causally  unconnected  duplicates  matter  for  us  in  the  same  ways  that  our  past  and 
future  selves  do,  and  if  causally  unconnected  duplicates  can  ground  none  of  the 
special  reasons  that  we  ordinarily  take  our  past  and  future  selves  to  ground,  then 
ECR  is  true.  I  will  argue  that  causally  unconnected  duplicates  do  not,  in  fact, 
ground  any  of  these  special  reasons.  ECR  threatens  the  justificatory  foundations 
4  A  paradigm  case  of  a  causally  unconnected  duplicate,  if  the  notion  is  confusing:  A 
person  on  a  far­off  planet  who,  by  sheer  chance,  is  exactly  microphysically  and 
psychologically  like  me. 
3 
of  partial  reasons,  responsibility,  desert,  and  the  intrinsic  value  of  things  like 
survival  and  friendship  even  more  than  the  view  Parfit  explicitly  adopts.  But  all 
this  comes  later.  First,  I  need  to  give  my  reading  of  Parfit’s  view  and  of  how  he 
gets  to  it. 
 
Parfitian  Reductionism 
So:  Why  and  in  what  sense  is  the  person  writing  this  sentence  the  same 
person  as  the  one  who  convinced  his  mom  to  let  him  watch  Jurassic  Park  in  a 
theater  for  his  ninth  birthday?  The  Reasons  and  Persons  view  is  that,  once  we 
know  all  the  physical  and  psychological  facts  about  two  people  (or,  if  you  like, 
two  person­stages)  there  is  no  deep  “further  fact”   as  to  whether  they  are,  in  fact, 5
the  same  person  (or,  if  you  like,  stages  of  the  same  person).   We  can  say  that  they 6
inhabit  the  same  biologically  continuous  body  and  that  they  share  various 
personality  traits  and  links  of  memory  and  intention.  If  we  want  to  say,  as  a 
further  matter,  that  they  are  the  same  person ,  we’re  reporting  something  like  a 
conventional  fact.   He  calls  his  view  (a  form  of)  reductionism  and  notes  that,  at 7
5  The  “further  fact”  language  is  Parfit’s.  He  uses  it,  e.g.  in  Reasons  and  Persons  p.  210, 
“Personal  Identity”  pp.  3 – 4,  and  “Is  Personal  Identity  What  Matters”  p.  13. 
6  Parfit  seems  to  be  loose  when  talking  about  what  sort  of  entities — persons  or 
person­stages  or  whatever  else — we  ought  to  be  comparing  when  we  ask  questions 
about  personal  identity.  We  might  think,  with  Lewis  (“Survival  and  Identity”)  that  these 
details  matter  for  the  sorts  of  metaphysical  claims  that  Parfit  is  entitled  to  make.  But  I  do 
not  think  that  they  should  matter  for  the  sorts  of  practical  ethical  considerations  that  I 
am  focusing  on. 
7  “Experiences,  Subjects,  and  Conceptual  Schemes”  p.  218:  “We  can  imagine  cases  in 
which  questions  about  our  identity  would  be  indeterminate:  having  no  answers.  These 
4 
least  at  this  broad  level  of  specificity,  it  is  shared  by  a  number  of  others.  8
Of  course,  in  ordinary  cases,  people’s  physical  and  psychological  features 
usually  behave  in  relatively  predictable  ways,  and  it’s  easy  to  give 
non­controversial  verdicts  about  personal  identity.  But  this  needn’t  always  be  so. 
Parfit  considers  cases  in  which  people  undergo  brain  transplants  and 
personality­altering  surgeries,  split  like  amoebas,  live  for  centuries,  or  put 
themselves  through  teletransporters  that  reconstruct  perfect  copies  of  their  brains 
and  bodies  out  of  new  matter  in  distant  locations.  9
I’ll  rehearse  two  of  his  arguments  from  cases  as  illustrative  examples  of 
how  the  arguments  go.  
First,  The  Combined  Spectrum :   A  surgeon  intends  to  perform  a 10
procedure  that  alters  your  brain  and  body.  At  the  end  of  the  procedure,  all  that’s 
questions  would  also  be  in  the  following  sense  empty:  they  would  not  be  about  different 
possibilities,  but  only  about  different  descriptions  of  the  same  course  of  events.”  Parfit 
explicitly  means  this  statement  to  be  compatible  with  earlier  expositions  of  his  view  (p. 
217). 
   Another  example  from  “Is  Personal  Identity  What  Matters?”  pp.  6 – 7:  “According  to 
Constitutive  Reductionism,  the  fact  of  personal  identity  is  distinct  from  these  facts  about 
physical  and  psychological  continuity.  But,  since  it  just  consists  in  them,  it  is  not  an 
independent  or  separately  obtaining  fact.  It  is  not  a  further  difference  in  what  happens. 
To  illustrate  that  distinction,  consider  a  simpler  case.  Suppose  that  I  already  know  that 
several  trees  are  growing  together  on  some  hill.  I  then  learn  that,  because  that  is  true, 
there  is  a  copse  on  this  hill.  That  would  not  be  new  factual  information.  I  would  have 
merely  learnt  that  such  a  group  of  trees  can  be  called  a  ‘copse’.  My  only  new  information 
is  about  our  language.  That  those  trees  can  be  called  a  copse  is  not,  except  trivially,  a  fact 
about  the  trees.” 
8  In  note  43  to  RP  part  three  (p.  518)  he  names  Grice,  Ayer,  Mackie,  Perry,  Lewis,  and 
Shoemaker.  By  now,  there  are  more  names  that  we  could  add  to  the  list. 
9  These  cases  are  spread  across  part  three  of  RP . 
10  RP  pp.  437­443. 
5 
left  will  be  a  duplicate  of  a  different  person.  (In  Parfit’s  case  it’s  Greta  Garbo.)  If 
the  surgeon  only  barely  begins  the  procedure,  perhaps  changing  your  hair  color 
and  removing  a  few  memories,  it  seems  clear  that  the  resulting  person  is  you.  If 
she  completes  the  procedure,  or  stops  just  short  of  completion  so  that  all  that 
remains  of  you  are  a  few  moles  and  the  apparent  memory  of  watching  Jurassic 
Park ,  it  seems  clear  that  the  resulting  person  is  not  you  in  the  ordinary  sense.  If 
there  is  an  all­or­nothing  further  fact  about  personal  identity,  then  there  must  be 
some  critical  point  in  the  procedure  where  a  few  cells  are  replaced  and  you  go 
out  of  existence,  even  though  there  could  perhaps  never  be  any  evidence  for 
where  this  point  is.  Moreover,  if  the  further  fact  is  what  matters,  then  it  is 
presumably  a  catastrophe  to  replace  those  few  critical  cells,  and  not  only  a  very 
little  bit  worse  than  stopping  the  operation  a  second  earlier.  Rather  than  accept 
these  conclusions,  Parfit  argues  that  we  should  be  reductionists. 
Second,  Fission :   Consider  a  surgery  that  would  split  you,  like  an 11
amoeba,  into  two  bodies.  Both  of  the  resulting  people  would  have  apparent 
memories  of  your  life.  It  makes  little  sense  to  say  that  you  would  be  identical 
with  both  resulting  people,  since  they  are  not  identical  with  one  another.  It  is  also 
bad  to  say  that  you  will  be  identical  to  either  one  over  the  other,  since  neither  has 
a  stronger  claim  to  being  you  than  the  other  does.  Parfit  claims  that  it  is  best  to 
say  that  ordinary  identity  concepts  fail  and  that — if  we  have  to  say  anything  at 
11  There  are  versions  of  this  argument  in  RP  pp.  253 – 266  and  “Personal  Identity”  pp. 
4­14. 
6 
all  about  personal  identity — we  should  say  that  you  are  identical  with  neither. 
This  means  that  you  do  not  survive  the  operation  in  the  usual  sense,  since  after 
the  operation  there  will  be  no  one  alive  who  is  you,  as  survival  would  seem  to 
require.  But  surely  this  strange  double­survival  is  not  as  bad  as  death,  and  so 
personal  identity  is  not  what  matters. 
There  seem  to  be  no  clear  answers  about  personal  identity  in  cases  like 
fission  and  the  combined  spectrum,  and  certainly  none  that  respect  the  notion 
that  personal  identity  is  a  normatively  significant,  all­or­nothing  further  fact. 
And  so,  says  Parfit,  we  ought  to  reject  heavyweight  further  fact  personal  identity 
and  talk  only  about  the  physical  and  psychological  relations  between  persons  or 
person  stages.  That  is:  We  ought  to  be  reductionists. 
  But  what  sort  of  reductionists?  Jettisoning  personal  identity  does  not 
immediately  reveal  the  answers  to  the  practical  questions  one  might  have  about 
Parfit’s  imagined  cases.  Should  you  fear  the  fission  operation  as  being  as  bad  as 
death,  given  that  you  will  not  be  either  of  the  resulting  people?  Is  it  prudent  to  go 
through  the  teletransporter?  What  if  conventional  travel  is  riskier?  (How  much 
riskier  would  it  have  to  be  before  teletransportation  became  preferable?)  Should 
it  matter  to  you  now  which  of  your  post­fission  duplicates  will  suffer  some 
misfortune,  if  you  know  that  one  of  them  has  to?  And  so  on. 
Anti­reductionists  can  say  about  these  cases:  What  matters  is  whether  the 
teletransported  copy,  or  the  surgically­altered  person  on  the  operating  table,  or 
7 
the  amoeba­like  copy,  or  whatever  else,  is  you .  They  can  say  this  even  if  we  do 
not  (or  cannot)  know  whether  these  people  are  you.  The  reductionist  cannot 
appeal  to  such  identity  facts.  But  if  they  are  a  Parfitian  reductionist,  there  are 
other  facts  they  can  appeal  to  in  deciding  how  teletransportation,  division,  etc. 
stack  up  against  ordinary  survival. 
Parfit’s  positive  practical  view  is  this:  What  actually  matters  in  the  way  in 
which  personal  identity  is  ordinarily  taken  to  matter,  if  anything  does  in  fact 
matter  in  that  way,  is: 
 
Relation  R :  “psychological  connectedness  and/or  psychological 
continuity,  with  the  right  kind  of  cause.”  12
 
We  can  ask:  What  is  psychological  connectedness?  What  is  psychological 
continuity?  And  what  is  the  right  kind  of  cause?  Parfit  defines  connectedness  as 
“the  holding  of  particular  direct  psychological  connections,”   where  direct 13
psychological  connections  include  such  things  as  experiential  memory  and 
intention  as  well  as  persistent  beliefs,  desires,  and  other  psychological  features.  14
None  of  the  sorts  of  connection  that  R  comprises  are  meant  to  presuppose 
personal  identity.  Where  they  seem  to,  as  perhaps  in  the  case  of  memory,  we  are 
12  He  gives  this  definition  several  times,  e.g.  on  RP  p.  215,  p.  262,  and  p.  271. 
13  RP  p.  206 
14  RP  p.  205 
8 
to  substitute  analogues  that  do  not.  So  rather  than  experiential  memory,  which 
might  require  that  the  subject  of  a  remembered  experience  be  the  same  person  as 
the  rememberer,  we  can  talk  about  experiential  “quasi­memory,”  which  requires 
only  that  the  remembered  experience  did  happen  and  that  it  is  causally  linked,  in 
the  right  way,  to  the  quasi­rememberer.  15
Continuity  is  defined  in  terms  of  connectedness:  It  is  “the  holding  of 
overlapping  chains  of  strong  connectedness”  and  is,  in  theory  and  practice,  less 
important  than  connectedness.  16
Crucially,  the  right  sort  of  cause  of  psychological  connectedness  and 
continuity  for  Parfit  is  any  cause  whatsoever.  17
So,  Parfitian  reductionism  makes  two  claims:  First,  that  reductionism  is 
true — that  is,  that  there  are  no  deep  further  facts  about  personal  identity.  Second, 
that  what  matters  in  the  way  that  identity  is  ordinarily  taken  to  matter,  if 
anything  does,  is  R. 
Ultimately,  Parfit  claims  that  R  probably  cannot  matter  in  exactly  the  way 
15  RP  p.  220.  Quasi­memory,  quasi­intention,  etc.  are  introduced  to  handle  the  charge 
that  analysing  personal  identity  in  terms  of  psychological  relations  is  circular.  E.g. 
Butler:  “And  one  should  really  think  it  Self­evident,  that  consciousness  of  personal 
Identity  presupposes,  and  therefore  cannot  constitute,  personal  Identity;  any  more  than 
Knowledge,  in  any  other  Case,  can  constitute  Truth,  which  it  presupposes”  (“Of 
Personal  Identity”  p.  305 – 306).  Galen  Strawson  argues  that  arguments  like  Butler’s,  at 
least  insofar  as  they  are  meant  as  objections  to  Locke’s  original  psychological  account  of 
personal  identity,  rest  on  a  misunderstanding  of  Locke’s  view  and  of  his  “forensic” 
notion  of  personhood  (“The  Secrets  of  All  Hearts…”). 
16  RP  p.  206 
17  RP  pp.  283­287 
9 
that  we  take  heavyweight  further­fact  identity  to  matter.  As  I  mentioned  above, 
he  even  entertains  the  “Extreme  Claim”  that  R  does  not  matter  at  all.  But  he 
remains  agnostic  between  the  Extreme  Claim  and  the  Moderate  Claim  that  R 
simply  matters  less  or  differently  than  further  fact  identity  might.   I  will  be 18
arguing  that  the  Extreme  Claim  is  true,  because  R  does  not,  and  could  not,  matter 
in  at  all  the  right  way. 
 
The  Any­Cause  Claim  and  the  No­Cause  Claim 
What  does  Parfit  mean  when  he  says  that  what  matters  is  Relation  R  “with 
any  cause?”   It  is  unlikely  that  he  means  “even  with  no  cause,”  because  the 19
relations  of  psychological  connectedness  and  continuity  seem  to  be  necessarily 
causal;  on  the  most  natural  reading,  two  causally  unrelated  psychological 
duplicates  would  not  be  R­related  to  one  another.  But  if,  as  Parfit  claims,  the 
nature  of  the  causal  connection  doesn’t  matter,  it  is  natural  to  at  least  wonder 
whether  the  existence  of  a  causal  connection  matters.  I  will  call  Parfit’s  view  the 
any­cause  view  and  the  alternative  view  on  which  the  existence  of  a  causal 
connection  is  unimportant  the  no­cause  view.  To  see  whether  Parfit  can  or  should 
adopt  the  no­cause  view,  we  need  to  get  clear  on  what  the  any­cause  claim 
amounts  to. 
We  have  seen  that  two  R­related  people  must,  at  a  minimum,  be  causally 
18  RP  p.  312 
19  RP  p.  283 
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related.  But  is  any  causal  connection  really  as  good  as  any  other?  Suppose  that 
there  exists  a  Putnam­style  Twin  Earth  somewhere  in  our  own  universe,  just  like 
ours  down  to  the  last  detail.   Now  suppose  that  I  catch  sight  of  my 20
(psychologically  identical)  counterpart  with  a  high­powered  telescope.  There 
now  exists  a  causal  connection  between  my  duplicate  and  me,  where  before  there 
was  none.  I  doubt  that  Parfit  would  want  to  say  that,  though  we  were  not 
R­related  before,  we  become  R­related  when  I  see  my  duplicate  through  my 
telescope.  It  would  be  a  stretch  to  suggest  that  the  two  of  us  are  somehow  more 
psychologically  “connected”  or  “continuous”  than  we  were  before. 
So  it  seems  that  the  R  relation,  and  thus  the  any­cause  claim,  must  require 
more  than  the  bare  existence  of  a  causal  connection  between  two  psychologically 
similar  people.  Rather  than  just  saying  that  two  R­related  people  must  be 
causally  related,  we  should  probably  say  that  at  least  some  of  the  causal  links 
they  share  must  be  causes  of  R .  But  if  we  leave  it  there,  we  risk  neutering  the 
any­cause  claim,  because  it  might  be  that  only  very  special  sorts  of  causal 
connections  can  be  causes  of  R.  21
Fortunately,  Parfit  himself  seems  to  hold  a  view  on  which  R’s  causal 
requirements  are  not  stronger  than  the  “connectedness”  and  “continuity” 
20  As  in,  e.g.,  “The  Meaning  of  ‘Meaning’.” 
21  E.g.  consider  the  view  that  two  people  do  not  count  as  “psychologically  connected” 
unless  they  are  biologically  continuous  with  one  another  in  the  ordinary  way.  A 
proponent  of  this  view  might  still  claim,  as  I  believe  that  Parfit  must,  that  what  matters 
is  R­with­any­cause­so­long­as­it­is­a­cause­ of­R .  But  this  theorist’s  “any­cause”  claim 
would  be  very  weak.. 
11 
language  strictly  requires.  He  takes  it  for  granted  that  R  obtains  in  many  unusual 
cases  (e.g.  teletransportation)  and  then  argues  as  a  further  substantive  point  that 
the  fact  that  R  obtains  via  an  unusual  cause  does  not  matter.   And  at  no  point 22
that  I’m  aware  of  does  he  ever  explicitly  endorse  a  view  on  which  one  type  of 
cause  is  markedly  better  than  another. 
I  will  not  try  to  give  an  exact  account  of  what  the  R  relation  demands 
beyond  the  bare  existence  of  a  causal  connection.  One  option  might  be  to  say  that 
two  people  are  R­related  just  in  case  their  causal  connection  explains  their 
psychological  similarity.  Another  might  be  to  say  that  they  are  R­related  just  in 
case  they  share  an  information­preserving  causal  link.  Or  an  intentionality­ 
preserving  causal  link.  There  is  probably  room  for  disagreement  in  some  cases 
about  whether  two  people  are  R­related.   But  what’s  right  out  is  requiring 23
something  like  ordinary  bodily  continuity  or  sameness  of  matter  or  immaterial 
soul.  There  cannot  be  any  restrictions  of  this  severe  sort  on  the  sort  of  causal 
connection  that  R  requires.  Any  plausible  causal  restrictions  on  R  should  be  mild 
enough  for  the  arguments  of  the  next  few  sections  to  go  through. 
The  any­cause  claim  states  that  R  is  what  matters  in  the  right  way,  if 
22  RP  pp.  283 – 287 
23  E.g.  consider  a  case  where  (in  a  deterministic  universe)  a  scientist  designs  and  create 
two  people,  one  of  whom  comes  into  existence  with  the  apparent  memories  of 
experiences  that  the  scientist  knows  the  other  will  eventually  have.  They  are  causally 
related,  and  their  causal  connection  explains  the  similarities  and  (if  it’s  an  appropriate 
use  of  the  term)  connections  between  their  psychologies.  Are  they  R­related?  I’m  not 
sure  we  have  to  decide. 
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anything  does,  no  matter  how  it  was  caused.  Since  there  are  no  severe  restrictions 
on  what  sorts  of  causal  connection  R  requires,  it  is  natural  to  wonder  whether  the 
existence  of  a  causal  connection  is  important.  That  is,  it  is  natural  to  at  least 
entertain  the  no­cause  claim. 
 
Is  the  No­Cause  View  Worth  Considering? 
The  R  relation,  on  the  most  natural  reading,  requires  there  to  be  some 
causal  link  between  the  two  R­related  people.  Parfit  does  not,  to  my  knowledge, 
consider  cases  in  which  people  come  to  be  psychologically  similar  through  sheer 
chance,  such  that  they  would  be  R­related  if  their  similarity  were  explained  by 
their  causal  connection;  he  limits  himself  to  cases  of  strangely­caused 
R­relatedness.  Nothing  in  his  view,  so  far  as  we  have  seen,  expressly  commits 
him  to  any  particular  response  to  these  no­cause  cases.  We  can  now  ask:  What 
should  he  say  about  them? 
This  question  may  seem  trivial,  because  it  is  impossible  for  two  R­related 
people  to  be  causally  unrelated.  Someone  might  reply:  If  R  alone  is  what  gives 
people  reasons  to  care  about  their  future  and  past  selves  in  a  different  way  than 
they  care  about  other  people,  and  R  cannot  obtain  between  two  causally 
unconnected  people,  then  cases  of  accidental  psychological  similarity  are  missing 
the  grounds  for  partial  concern;  accidental  duplicates  are  relevantly  like 
complete  strangers  and  relevantly  unlike  R­related  persons.  This  response  is 
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unconvincing.  Unless  there  is  independent  reason  to  think  that  the  existence  of  a 
causal  connection  matters,  we  can  tentatively  treat  the  presupposition  of  causal 
connectedness  as  an  unimportant  feature  of  R.  If  we  do,  we  can  replace  R  with  a 
new  relation  R*: 
 
Relation  R* :  A  cluster  of  psychological  relations  just  like  R,  except  that  any 
relation  in  R  that  presupposes  a  causal  connection  is  replaced  in  R*  by  the 
most  analogous  relation  that  does  not  presuppose  a  causal  connection. 
Instead  of  psychological  connectedness ,  we  would  speak  in  terms  of 
psychological  similarity ,  and  so  on.  24
 
I  mean  for  R*  to  be  defined  in  such  a  way  that  two  people  are  R*­related  just 
when,  and  to  the  degree  that,  they  would  be  R­related  if  they  shared  the  right  sort 
of  causal  connection.  (In  fact,  if  you’d  like,  you  can  take  this  as  an  alternative 
definition  of  R*.)  R*  obtains  in  every  case  in  which  R  obtains,  but  it  also  obtains 
in  cases  of  accidental  “connection.”  I  am  now  both  R­  and  R*­related  to  the 
person  who  woke  up  in  my  bed  this  morning.  I  would  be  R*­related,  but  not 
R­related,  to  a  person  in  some  distant  galaxy  if  they  were  psychologically  just 
like  the  person  who  woke  up  in  my  bed. 
The  move  from  R  to  R*  is  in  one  way  similar  to  Parfit’s  move  from 
24  Note  that  if  (contra  my  reading  of  Parfit)  nothing  in  R  presupposes  a  causal  connection 
then  R  and  R*  are  identical. 
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memory  and  intention  to  quasi­memory  and  quasi­intention.  There,  while  it 
might  be  true  that  memory  presupposes  personal  identity,  the  presupposition  is 
taken  to  be  unimportant,  and  so  quasi­memory  is  an  acceptable  substitute.  Here, 
while  it  may  be  true  that  R  presupposes  a  causal  connection,  we  have  not  yet 
seen  any  reason  that  the  causal  component  is  important  to  R,  and  so  R*  is 
tentatively  an  acceptable  substitute. 
I  want  to  signpost  a  few  other  worries  about  R*  and  the  no­cause  view 
before  I  go  about  defending  them.  First,  even  if  we  think  that  causal  connection  is 
not  necessary  for  what  matters  about  R­relatedness,  we  might  be  bothered  by  the 
apparent  fact  that  it  would  still  be  astronomically  unlikely  for  two  causally 
unrelated  people  to  be  R*­related  by  sheer  chance.  Second,  we  might  think  that 
R*  could  not  matter  in  the  way  that  R  could.  The  existence  of  a  causal  connection, 
or  the  type  of  causal  connection,  might  turn  out  to  matter.  If,  for  instance,  agency 
matters  and  requires  a  certain  type  of  causal  connection,  or  if  mental  content 
matters  and  requires  a  certain  type  of  causal  connection,  then  R*  cannot  matter  in 
the  way  that  R  (with  the  right  kind  of  cause)  might  matter. 
These  are  not  trivial  concerns,  but  I  would  note  that  many  of  Parfit’s  own 
cases — teletransportation,  fission,  duplication,  etc. — are  similarly  improbable  and 
might  also  count  as  the  wrong  sort  of  cause  for  (e.g.)  content­preservation  or  for 
continuity  of  agency.  And  so  rather  than  preemptively  heading  off  objections 
here,  I  will  first  go  over  his  arguments  for  the  any­cause  claim,  which  I  will  argue 
15 
actually  bolster  the  no­cause  view.  I  will  then  give  my  own  arguments  that  the 
no­cause  view  is  true,  that  R*  matters  as  much  as  R,  and  that,  since  R*  does  not 
matter,  R  does  not  matter  either.  I  will  not  argue  directly  that  agency,  content, 
etc.  do  not  matter,  but  I  will  give  cases  in  which  it  would  seem  that,  if  agency  and 
content  are  preserved  by  R  but  not  R*,  that  fact  does  not  matter.  
 
Parfit’s  Argument  for  his  Any­Cause  Claim 
The  argument  for  the  any­cause  view  considers  a  few  salient  alternatives 
and  judges  the  any­cause  view  to  be  the  best  among  them.   By  the  time  Parfit 25
makes  this  argument,  he  has  already  given  his  arguments  that  some  form  of 
reductionism  is  true.   He  considers  four  alternatives  for  what  could  matter  in  the 26
way  that  personal  identity  is  ordinarily  taken  to  matter:  “(1)  Physical  continuity, 
(2)  Relation  R  with  its  normal  cause,  (3)  R  with  any  reliable  cause,  (4)  R  with  any 
cause.”  27
By  “physical  continuity”  in  (1)  I  take  Parfit  to  mean  something  like  bodily 
continuity,  because  even  in  teletransportation  cases  there  is  always  a  sort  of 
physical  substrate.   He  claims  that  this  sort  of  physical  continuity  doesn’t 28
matter.  We  do  not  view  the  prospect  of  receiving  a  liver  transplant  as  being  as 
25  The  argument  I’m  talking  about  is  on  RP  pp.  282 – 287. 
26  Using,  e.g.,  the  fission  and  combined  spectrum  cases  I  discuss  above.  Cf.  RP  pp. 
253 – 266,  236 – 243  or  “Personal  Identity”  pp.  4 – 14. 
27  RP  p.  283 
28  I  owe  this  point  to  Galen  Strawson. 
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survival­threatening  as  the  prospect  of  receiving  a  brain  transplant.  The  reason 
that  we  value  keeping  the  same  brain  and  not  keeping  the  same  liver  is  that  the 
brain  holds  our  personality,  memories,  and  so  on.  Cases  in  which  the  body  is 
preserved  but  psychological  connectedness  and  continuity  are  lost  seem  as  bad 
as  death. 
(2)  fares  little  better,  because  the  “normal  cause”  of  R  is  the  same  sort  of 
physical  continuity  that  we  have  already  seen  does  not  matter,  at  least  on  its 
own.  (What  do  matter  are  “the  various  relations  between  ourselves  and  others, 
whom  and  what  we  love,  our  ambitions,  achievements,  commitments,  emotions, 
memories,  and  several  other  psychological  features.”)  29
There  are  some  reasons  to  prefer  keeping  our  bodies,  just  as  one  might 
prefer  to  keep  her  original  wedding  ring  and  not  a  teletransported  copy.  There 
might  also  be  strong  reasons  to  prefer  bodies  similar  to  our  present  ones  if  we 
prefer  bodies  with  our  own  primary  and  secondary  sex  traits,  if  we’re  very 
attractive,  if  we  are  athletes,  etc.;  but  we  might  just  as  often  prefer  new  bodies, 
and  here  what  matters  is  that  our  bodies  be  qualitatively  similar,  not  that  they  be 
the  very  same  material  bodies.  It’s  true  that  we  ordinarily  prefer  to  keep  our 
bodies  intact,  but  upon  reflection  we  should  think  that  this  preference  makes 
sense  only  insofar  as  keeping  our  bodies  intact  is  ordinarily  a  pretty  good  way  of 
ensuring  the  continuance  of  R.  We  might  decide  not  to  call  the  results  of  some 
29  RP  p.  284 
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R­preserving  processes,  like  teletransportation,  “survival.”  But  if  the  only  reason 
we  don’t  call  the  results  survival  is  that  R  has  been  preserved  through  some 
abnormal  cause,  we  should  not  think  that  it  matters  much  that  they  are  not 
survival. 
The  argument  against  (3)  works  by  way  of  analogy.  Suppose  that  there  is  a 
treatment  for  some  disease  that  is  not  very  reliable.  Of  course,  when  selecting  a 
treatment,  we  should  prefer  a  reliable  one.  But  after  the  fact,  if  the  unreliable 
treatment  happened  to  work,  “only  the  effect  matters.”  30
Having  rejected  all  of  the  other  alternatives,  Parfit  adopts  the  remaining 
option:  What  matters  is  R  with  any  cause.  
 
The  Any­Cause  Argument  Supports  the  No­Cause  Interpretation 
Again:  Parfit’s  strategy  in  arguing  for  his  any­cause  claim  is  to  consider  a 
list  of  alternatives  and,  having  rejected  all  but  one  of  them,  to  settle  on  the 
remaining  one.  Of  course,  this  style  of  argument  will  fail  if  the  initial  set  of 
alternatives  is  incomplete.  Someone  might  object  that  we  have  only  learned  that 
the  bodily  continuity  view,  the  R­with­its­normal­cause  view,  and  the 
R­with­a­reliable­cause  view  are  all  false;  we  have  not  learned  that  the 
R­with­any­cause  view  is  true. 
This  line  of  objection  is  interesting  only  if  we  can  identify  some  plausible 
30  RP  p.  287 
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alternative  to  the  any­cause  view  that  Parfit’s  arguments  do  not  tell  against.  Even 
though  he  argues  explicitly  against  only  three  alternatives,  he  seems  to  do  so  by 
way  of  arguing  for  (or  at  least  pumping  intuitions  in  favor  of)  two  positive 
claims,  which  I  will  call  the  Turning­Out  Claim  and  the  R  Claim. 
 
The  Turning­Out  Claim :  What  matters  in  the  right  way  in  personal 
identity  problem  cases  (and  in  everyday  life)  is  how  things  turn  out,  not 
how  they  came  to  pass.  31
 
The  R  Claim :  What  matters  in  the  right  way  about  how  things  turn  out,  if 
anything  does,  are  facts  that  depend  almost  exclusively  on  R,  and  not  on 
other  things  like  physical  continuity  or  a  further  fact.   32
 
I  myself  find  these  two  claims  persuasive.  I  do  not  see  what  besides  R  (or 
R*)  could  matter  in  the  absence  of  a  deep  further  fact,  and  I  am  persuaded  that 
there  is  no  deep  further  fact.  I  find  that  even  the  concept  of  real,  hardboiled, 
further­fact  identity  slips  through  my  fingers  whenever  I  try  to  get  hold  of  it. 
Even  if  I  could  get  some  sort  of  hold  on  what  the  further  fact  is  supposed 
to  be  or  depend  on — perhaps  something  like  a  Cartesian  soul — I’m  not  sure  that 
31  Again,  see  the  discussion  of  unreliable  causes  on  RP  p.  287. 
32  Once  again,  the  list  of  what  matters  from  RP  p.  284:  “[T]he  various  relations  between 
ourselves  and  others,  whom  and  what  we  love,  our  ambitions,  achievements, 
commitments,  emotions,  memories,  and  several  other  psychological  features.” 
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it  would  matter.  Certainly  it  would  not  matter  without  R  (or  R*);  the  prospect  of 
being  “reincarnated”  with  no  memory  of  my  current  life  has  never  been  the  least 
bit  comforting.  At  best,  the  further  fact  could  only  ever  matter  in  the  presence  of 
R  (or  R*)  or  enable  R  (or  R*)  to  matter.  But  it’s  not  clear  what  the  further  fact 
could  contribute  even  in  these  cases.  I  am  convinced,  for  example,  by  Locke’s 
objection  to  the  same­soul  criterion  of  personal  identity,  which  suggests  that  if 
souls  could  exchange  “consciousnesses,”  personal  identity  would  follow 
“consciousness”  rather  than  soul.   And  so  I  doubt  that  a  further  fact,  even  if  it 33
were  clearly  conceivable  and  not  empirically  suspicious,  could  provide  what  we 
want  it  to. 
When  I  think  about  whether  anything  could  plausibly  matter  in  the  way 
that  personal  identity  is  taken  to,  merely  physical  facts  do  not  seem  up  to  the 
task,   while  psychological  facts  are  more  promising.  I’d  much  rather  undergo  a 34
liver  transplant  than  a  brain  transplant,  and  I  am  completely  untroubled  by  the 
fact  that  the  atoms  in  my  body  are  constantly  being  replaced.  I  would  remain 
unconcerned  if  this  process  were  vastly  accelerated,  so  that  from  minute  to 
33  An  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  p.  338:  “But  yet  to  return  to  the  Question 
before  us,  it  must  be  allowed,  That  if  the  same  consciousness  (which,  as  has  been  shewn, 
is  quite  a  different  thing  from  the  same  numerical  Figure  or  Motion  in  Body)  can  be 
transferr’d  from  one  thinking  Substance  to  another,  it  will  be  possible,  that  two  thinking 
Substances  may  make  but  one  Person.  For  the  same  consciousness  being  preserv’d, 
whether  in  the  same  or  different  Substances,  the  personal  Identity  is  preserv’d.”  I  take 
Locke’s  “consciousness”  to  be  something  like  a  narrower  version  of  Parfit’s  R. 
34  Of  course,  psychological  facts  might  be  physical  facts.  But  they  are  not  merely  physical 
facts  in  the  way  I  am  using  the  term. 
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minute  my  body  would  be  made  of  completely  new  matter.  35
While  I  admit  that  nonstandard  cases  of  R­preservation  like  the 
teletransportation  case  make  me  feel  uneasy,  I  cannot  justify  my  unease;  all  of  the 
differences  between  the  nonstandard  and  the  standard  cases  appear  trivial  on 
closer  inspection.  Imagining  dancing  at  a  crowded  party  also  makes  me  uneasy. 
Unless  I  can  come  up  with  some  explanation  of  how  it  could  matter  that  the 
teletransporter  constructs  a  new  body  all  at  once  instead  of  over  time,  or  that  it 
uses  radio  waves  and  chemical  vats  rather  than  the  usual  biological  processes,  I 
am  forced  to  reject  my  unease  about  teletransportation  as  irrational,  just  as  I 
reject  my  unease  about  dancing.  (We  can  ignore  the  fact  that  I  am  so  bad  at 
dancing  that  it  might  actually  be  dangerous,  since  that’s  not  the  source  of  my 
fear.) 
I  can  imagine  that  it  might  matter  that  someone  psychologically  connected 
to  me  steps  out  of  the  teletransporter  on  Mars  after  my  body  disappears  on 
Earth.  I  cannot  see  how  it  could  possibly  matter  how  that  comes  to  pass  in  the 
absence  of  a  further  identity  fact  whose  metaphysical  underpinnings  I  fear  the 
teletransportation  process  will  disrupt.  (And  again,  I’m  not  sure  I  can  even  see 
how  a  further  fact  would  matter  if  there  were  such  a  thing.) 
I  also  think  that  the  Turning­Out  Claim  and  the  R  claim  give  as  much  or 
35  This  case  was  suggested  to  me  by  Galen  Strawson.  I  would,  of  course,  become 
concerned  if  all  the  bodily  processes  associated  with  taking  on  and  jettisoning  matter 
were  also  accelerated.  But  that’s  not  the  point. 
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more  support  to  the  no­cause  view  as  they  give  to  the  any­cause  view.  The  claim 
that  it  is  the  way  things  turn  out  that  matters  straightforwardly  supports  the 
no­cause  view.  The  Turning­Out  claim  is  different  from  the  weaker  claim  that  the 
sort  of  cause  does  not  matter.  In  fact,  it  explains  why  the  sort  of  cause  doesn’t 
matter.  In  other  cases,  the  sort  of  cause  might  not  matter  even  though  it  is  not 
just  the  way  things  turn  out  that  matters.  For  instance,  if  I  care  about  whether  I 
am  responsible  for  some  event  (in  a  broad  sense  of  “responsible”)  I  might  only 
care  whether  an  intentional  action  of  mine  caused  that  event  to  occur,  and  not  how 
my  action  caused  the  event  to  occur.  But  in  personal  identity  cases,  the  sort  of 
cause  doesn’t  matter  because  it  is  the  way  things  turn  out  that  matters.  And  if  it’s 
the  way  things  turn  out  that  matters,  why  should  we  care  about  whether  there 
was  a  causal  link  at  all?  If  it  is  the  way  things  turn  out  that  matters,  we  should 
adopt  the  no­cause  view  instead  of  the  any­cause  view. 
The  second  claim,  that  it  is  the  R  relation  that  matters  about  the  way 
things  turn  out,  may  seem  to  favor  the  any­cause  view  because  R  seems  to 
require  a  causal  connection.  But  the  R  claim  only  favors  the  any­cause  view  over 
the  no­cause  view  if  we  have  independent  reason  to  believe  that  the  existence  of 
some  causal  connection  is  part  of  what  allows  R  to  matter  in  the  right  way.  If  the 
existence  of  a  causal  connection  is  an  unimportant  feature  of  R,  we  should 
replace  the  R  claim  with  the  analogous  claim  that  it  is  R*,  if  anything,  that 
matters  about  the  way  things  turn  out. 
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The  Branch  Line 
Allow  me  a  quick  digression  before  I  get  to  my  further  arguments  for  the 
no­cause  claim: 
My  favorite  Parfitian  thought  experiment  has  always  been  the  branch  line 
teletransportation  case.   In  an  ordinary  teletransportation  case,  I  imagine 36
entering  a  machine  that  will  scan  my  body,  destroying  it  in  the  process,  and  then 
send  the  information  gathered  to  another  far­away  machine  that  will  reconstruct 
an  exact  duplicate  out  of  new  matter.  If  R  is  what  matters,  then  teletransportation 
is  not  to  be  feared,  and  would  be  rational  to  use  when  ordinary  transportation  is 
expensive,  dangerous,  or  otherwise  troublesome.  In  the  branch  line 
teletransportation  case,  the  first  machine  does  not  destroy  my  body  immediately, 
but  it  does  enough  damage  that  after  a  few  days  the  original  body  will  die 
painlessly.  A  copy  is  constructed  out  of  new  matter  as  usual,  but  the  original 
body  is  stuck  on  a  “branch  line.” 
Being  stuck  on  the  branch  line  strikes  most  people  I  have  discussed  the 
case  with  as  an  unfortunate  fate,  even  if  these  people  believe  that  “ordinary” 
teletransportation  is,  or  is  about  as  good  as,  survival.  But  how  could  it  be  worse 
for  me  that  my  body  be  destroyed  on  Thursday  rather  than  Tuesday?  In  ordinary 
cases,  we  would  probably  take  those  extra  days  of  life  to  be  a  good  thing.  37
36  RP  pp.  199 – 201,  287 – 289. 
37  It  would  of  course  be  bad  if  these  extra  two  days  are  consumed  by  a  painful  fear  of 
impending  death.  But  what’s  at  issue  is  whether  this  fear  is  warranted .  If  this  isn’t 
convincing,  just  suppose  that  it’s  an  unworried  Socrates  type  on  the  branch  line. 
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The  branch  line  thought  experiment  is  my  favorite  of  Parfit’s  thought 
experiments  not  because  its  conclusions  are  the  most  convincing — in  fact,  they 
are  probably  the  hardest  to  accept — but  because  it  shows  most  clearly  how 
radical  the  consequences  of  reductionism  are.  I  see  the  branch  line  case  as  the  last 
step  in  an  argumentative  process  that  begins  with  the  rejection  of  the  substantial 
further  fact. 
The  process  goes  something  like  this:  Cases  like  fission  and  the  combined 
spectrum  strongly  suggest  that  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a  separately  existing 
temporally  extended  self  or  a  deep  and  important  further  fact  about  personal 
identity.  If  there  is  no  deep  further  fact,  then  we  have  to  turn  to  other  facts  to 
ground  the  reasons  and  values  that  seemed  to  depend  on  the  existence  of 
temporally  extended  persons.  The  only  available  facts  that  could  plausibly 
ground  these  reasons  and  values  are  R  facts.  If  it’s  only  the  R  facts  that  matter, 
then  teletransportation  is  as  good  as  ordinary  survival.  The  branch  line  case  is 
not  significantly  worse  than  teletransportation,  since  delaying  the  destruction  of 
the  original  body  could  not  be  a  horrible  bad.  Since  it  is  not  significantly  worse 
than  ordinary  teletransportation,  the  branch  line  case  is  also  about  as  good  as 
ordinary  survival.  But  it  seems  clear,  in  a  way  that  it  may  not  be  in  ordinary 
teletransportation  cases,  that  the  person  on  the  branch  line  dies . 
Considering  the  branch  line  case  will  not  convince  anyone  who  is  not 
already  persuaded  by  a  broadly  Parfitian  reductionist  view  that  such  a  view  is 
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true.  But  it  should  convince  anyone  who  does  hold  such  a  view  of  how  serious 
its  normative  implications  are.  If  death  can  be  as  good  as  survival  because  of 
something  that  happened  on  the  moon  four  days  ago,  then  the  way  that  many 
people  conceive  the  badness  of  death  is  mistaken. 
I  want  to  pick  up  where  the  branch  line  case  leaves  off.  My  cases  are 
designed  to  show,  first,  that  R*  is  just  as  good  as  R.  The  second  thing  they’re 
designed  to  show  is  that  R*  doesn’t  matter  in  anything  like  the  right  way.  Put 
those  two  claims  together,  combine  with  reductionism,  and  you  get  Extreme 
Claim  Reductionism. 
 
Further  Argument  for  the  No­Cause  View 
I’ll  call  my  first  case 
 
Evacuation :  I  am  a  settler  on  a  planet  near  a  distant  star.  One  day,  I 
wake  up  to  distressing  news:  The  star  is  expected  to  go  supernova  at  any 
minute.  There  are  too  few  ships  for  a  complete  evacuation,  and  settlers  are 
asked  to  use  private  or  municipal  teletransporters.  (All  of  these 
teletransporters  work  in  the  usual  way;  the  original  bodies  are  destroyed  in 
the  scanning  process  and  a  digital  signal  is  transmitted  to  another  unit 
which  constructs  a  duplicate  out  of  new  matter.)  Unfortunately,  the 
increased  stellar  radiation  will  interfere  with  the  teletransporters’  signals, 
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and  the  information  that  makes  it  to  the  reconstruction  chambers  will  be 
unavoidably  incomplete. 
We  are  told  not  to  worry:  Modern  teletransporters  have  advanced 
gap­filling  algorithms  for  just  this  sort  of  contingency.  We  might,  we  are 
told,  wake  up  with  some  changes  to  our  bodies,  memories  and 
personalities,  but  no  matter  how  bad  the  signal  gets  we  will  be  sure  to 
wake  up  as  fully  functional  human  beings.  This  worries  me;  I  have  grown 
used  to  thinking  of  teletransportation  as  just  another  way  of  getting 
around,  but  I’ve  always  been  confident  that  I  wasn’t  risking  radical 
changes  to  my  psychology.  Nevertheless,  with  no  other  options,  I  queue  up 
for  the  municipal  teletransporter  and  cross  my  fingers  that  I’ll  have  good 
luck  and  that  the  person  who  steps  out  of  the  pod  on  a  distant  planet  will 
not  be  radically  different  from  me. 
 
Suppose  we  accept,  with  Parfit,  that  “ordinary”  teletransportation  is  about 
as  good  as  ordinary  travel.  Then  the  best  case  is  one  in  which  my  signal  makes  it 
through  the  stellar  radiation  undistorted.  In  this  case,  my  duplicate  will  be 
maximally  R­related  to  me.  But  what  if  the  signal  is  lossy?  In  this  case,  I  will 
probably  hope  that  the  gap­filling  algorithms  fill  in  the  missing  bits  as  close  to 
the  original  signal  as  possible.  In  the  limiting  case,  the  gap­filling  algorithms  will 
(against  all  odds)  get  everything  exactly  right. 
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Is  this  limiting  case  as  good  as  the  case  without  any  signal  loss?  If  R  is 
better  than  R*,  then  it  may  not  be.  Parts  of  my  duplicate’s  psychology  will  be 
merely  R*­  rather  than  R­related  to  the  relevant  parts  of  my  psychology,  because 
there  will  be  no  causal  link — certainly  nothing  like  an  explanatory  or 
information­preserving  causal  link,  to  be  sure — between  them. 
I  believe  that  the  case  in  which  the  gap­filling  algorithms  happen  to  get 
everything  exactly  right  is  not  worse  than  the  “best  case”  in  which  the  signal  is 
not  lossy.  I  can  think  of  no  reason  that  this  could  be  true  except  that  R*  is  as  good 
as  R.  My  next  thought  experiment  is  meant  to  get  you  to  believe  that  it  is  true;  the 
lucky  gap­filling  case  is  as  good  as  ordinary  teletransportation: 
 
False  Alarm :  I  wake  up  in  a  refugee  camp  on  another  planet.  I  seem  to 
remember  my  whole  life,  including  the  moments  before  entering  the 
teletransporter,  but  I  know  this  is  no  guarantee  that  my  signal  got  through 
unaltered;  the  gap­filling  algorithms  are  there  to  make  lossy 
teletransportation  as  non­traumatic  as  possible.  I  ask  one  of  the  counselors 
if  my  signal  had  any  gaps  that  had  to  be  filled,  and  I  am  told  that  it  did.  I 
put  it  out  of  my  mind;  my  planet  is  about  to  be  destroyed,  which  I  care 
about  much  more. 
The  supernova  fails  to  materialize.  After  a  few  weeks,  the  anomalous 
stellar  activity  dies  down,  and  scientists  announce  that  it  was  not  actually 
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evidence  of  an  impending  supernova.  Since  the  planet  was  not  destroyed, 
the  databases  containing  everyone’s  teletransportation  data  are 
undamaged.  The  post­teletransportation  settlers  have  the  option  of 
surgical  intervention  to  restore  them  to  their  pre­teletransportation  selves, 
with  or  without  their  memories  of  the  strange  ordeal  intact,  as  they  prefer. 
Settlers  who  opt  to  keep  their  new  personalities  are  asked  to  start  new 
lives  elsewhere,  and  new  duplicates  of  their  old  selves  are  created  on  the 
planet’s  surface.  Other  settlers  take  the  surgery  and  fly  back  home.  Some 
enter  teletransporters  but  ask  that  their  original  data  be  used  for 
reconstruction.  A  few,  cutting  out  the  middleman,  simply  kill  themselves 
and  leave  notes  asking  to  be  “revived”  on  the  planet  with  their  original 
teletransportation  data.  The  end  result  is  that  the  planet  ends  up 
repopulated  just  as  it  was  before  the  panic. 
My  case  is  unique.  Though  my  signal  was  lossy,  it  turns  out  that  the 
gap­filling  algorithms — through  an  astounding  coincidence — 
reconstructed  it  exactly  as  it  originally  was.  When  I  exited  the 
teletransporter,  I  was  an  exact  duplicate  of  the  person  who  entered  the 
teletransporter.  But  not — or  at  least  not  exclusively — because  of  the  way  he 
was  when  he  entered  it. 
Having  heard  about  my  case,  a  surgeon  approaches  me.  She  offers  to 
perform  the  reconstructive  surgery  that  other  settlers  are  getting.  She  will 
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remove  parts  of  my  brain  and  body  and  replace  them  with  exactly  identical 
pieces  of  brain  and  body.  But  these  new  pieces,  I  am  assured,  will  be 
copied  from  the  original  teletransportation  data.  After  the  surgery,  I  will 
be  a  non­accidental  duplicate  instead  of  a  merely  accidental  one.  
Since  I  am  already  a  duplicate  of  the  original,  albeit  an  accidental  one, 
surgery  costs  will  not  be  covered  by  the  government.  I  go  for  a  walk  and 
consider  whether  I  ought  to  pay  her  to  perform  the  surgery. 
 
I  want  to  make  two  claims  about  this  case.  (1)  It  would  be  irrational  to  pay 
for  the  surgery.  Getting  parts  of  my  brain  and  body  replaced  with  exact 
duplicates  would  not  make  me  a  more  apt  successor  to  the  person  who  entered 
the  teletransporter.  The  surgery  would  be  successful  only  at  making  me  poorer. 
(2)  If  it  would  be  irrational  to  pay  for  the  surgery,  that  could  only  be  because  the 
existence  of  an  R­preserving  causal  connection  does  not,  in  itself,  matter.  If  we 
were  persuaded  by  the  any­cause  view,  we  should  transition  to  the  no­cause 
view,  because  R*  is  just  as  good  as  R  with  any  cause. 
(1)  seems  almost  too  obvious  to  argue  for.  Imagine  our  two  data  files, 
content­wise  identical,  the  first  from  the  original  scan  and  the  second  the  filled­in 
one  from  which  the  duplicate  was  constructed.  Imagine  that  the  surgeon  is  sent  a 
printout  of  each.  Two  stacks  of  paper  with  the  same  code  printed  out  on  them. 
On  any  account,  performing  the  surgery  based  on  the  second  stack  of  paper  is,  at 
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best,  as  good  as  not  performing  the  surgery.  If  the  any­cause  claim  were  true, 
and  not  the  no­cause  claim,  then  performing  the  surgery  based  on  the  first  stack 
would  be  better.  But  the  thought  that  having  the  surgeon  read  from  one 
(identical)  printout  rather  than  the  other  while  performing  the  surgery  would 
make  any  meaningful  difference  strikes  me  as  completely  unbelievable  and 
bizarre.  It  would  be  equally  unbelievable  and  bizarre  even  if  the  entire  signal  had 
been  reconstructed  at  random. 
(2),  the  claim  that  the  only  reason  paying  for  the  surgery  would  be 
irrational  is  that  R*  is  as  good  as  R,  requires  more  argument.  It  might  plausibly 
be  objected  that  the  surgery  is  not  better  for  the  person  who  undergoes  it  because 
(a)  we  do  not  have  the  same  sort  of  interest  in  our  pasts  that  we  do  in  our  futures 
or  because  (b)  the  surgery  disrupts  ordinary  bodily  continuity  in  a  way  that 
matters.  Both  objections  can  be  warded  off  by  tinkering  with  the  original  case. 
Suppose  that  before  I  enter  the  teletransporter  an  oracle  descends  from  on 
high  and  tells  me  about  how  my  signal  will  be  lossy  but  how  it  will,  by 
coincidence,  be  reconstructed  exactly  as  it  was.  If  the  oracle  were  then  to  offer  me 
the  chance  to  pre­pay  to  force  my  duplicate  to  undergo  the  surgery,  accepting  the 
offer  would  be  just  as  irrational  for  me  as  getting  the  surgery  would  be  for  him, 
even  if  I  am  behaving  completely  egoistically.  Since  my  concern  in  this  case  is  for 
the  future,  objection  (a)  fails.  Objection  (b)  fails  because  I  am  already  resigned  to 
teletransportation,  which  is  total  bodily  discontinuity.  Any  further  bodily 
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discontinuity  could  not  plausibly  matter  more,  and  so  the  good  of  causal 
connection,  if  there  were  any,  could  be  expected  to  win  the  day. 
If  the  any­cause  view  were  true,  and  the  no­cause  view  false,  then  it 
would  be  better,  at  least  from  my  pre­teletransportation  perspective,  that  my 
post­teletransportation  duplicate  get  the  surgery.  Since  it  is  not  better,  the 
any­cause  view  is  false,  and  we  should  adopt  the  no­cause  view  instead. 
Some  readers  might  believe  my  diagnosis  of  the  Evacuation  and  False 
Alarm  cases  but  be  unmoved  by  my  conclusion  because  the  prospect  of 
accidental  duplication  is  so  unlikely.  But,  in  a  thought  experiment,  mere 
unlikeliness  should  not  bother  us.  It  certainly  would  not  bother  Parfit.  He  is 
explicit  that  even  impossible  cases  can  make  for  instructive  thought  experiments. 
This  is  true  even  of  “deeply  impossible”  cases,  but  doubly  so  for  “merely 
technically  impossible”  cases.   If  the  impossible  is  kosher,  as  it  always  has  been 38
in  the  personal  identity  literature,  then  so  is  the  improbable. 
If  my  arguments  from  this  section  succeed,  then  R*  is  as  good  as  R  with 
any  cause.  It  remains  to  show  that  R*  doesn’t  matter.  
 
R*  Does  Not  Matter 
On  the  surface,  the  claim  that  R*  does  not  matter  seems  easy  enough  to 
believe.  I  have  no  normatively  important  relation  to  someone  on  the  other  side  of 
38  RP  p.  219 
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the  universe  who  lived  billions  of  years  ago  (or  will  live  billions  of  years  in  the 
future)  merely  because  our  atoms  are  arranged  in  more  or  less  the  same  way.  It 
would  be  a  mistake  to  regret  things  in  his  past,  and  if  I  were  punished  for  them, 
it  would  be  undeserved.  It  would  also  be  a  mistake  to  anticipate  things  in  his 
future.  (I  mean  by  “mistake”  not  that  it  would  be  imprudent  but  that  it  would 
rest  on  a  confusion.)  If  I  could  somehow  make  his  or  his  friends’  lives  better,  I 
would  have  no  more  reason  to  do  that  than  I  have  to  make  anyone  else’s  lives  go 
better.  If  I  have  a  goal,  his  accomplishing  it  does  not  matter  to  me,  except  insofar 
as  it  may  mean  that  a  good  thing  has  happened  somewhere.  If  I  put  this  view 
forward  in  a  vacuum,  I  would  expect  it  to  be  relatively  uncontroversial. 
I  have  already  argued  that  R,  by  itself,  does  not  matter  more  than  R*.  And 
I  have  endorsed  and  tried  to  unpack  Parfit’s  arguments  that  R,  by  itself,  matters 
as  much  as  anything  can  matter  in  the  ways  that  personal  identity  is  taken  to 
matter.  If  these  claims  are  right,  and  R*  does  not  matter,  it  follows  that  I  have  no 
special  normative  relation  to  (what  I  would  ordinarily  call)  my  own  past  and 
future  and  that  attitudes  of  regret,  anticipation,  etc.  rest  on  a  mistake.  This  claim 
is  harder  to  accept  than  the  claim  that  it  is  a  mistake  to  anticipate  the  future  or 
regret  the  past  of  an  accidental  duplicate. 
If  the  earlier  steps  of  my  argument  succeed,  the  only  remaining  way  to 
block  the  Extreme  Claim  is  to  argue  that  R*  without  R  can  sometimes  matter.  This 
is  a  view  worth  considering.  After  all,  wouldn’t  it  be  some  comfort  to  be  told  by 
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the  oracle  in  Evacuation  that,  though  my  signal  will  not  get  through  undamaged, 
an  exact  duplicate  will  be  constructed  in  the  other  teletransporter  pod  as  usual? 
False  Alarm  has  the  curious  feature  that  my  accidental  duplicate  knows 
that  he  is  my  duplicate  (and,  if  I  am  visited  by  the  oracle,  I  know  that  I  will  have 
an  accidental  duplicate).  In  this  way  it  is  more  like  an  “ordinary” 
teletransportation  case  than  an  “ordinary”  accidental  duplicate  case. 
I  do  not  believe  that  the  mere  knowledge  that  I  have  (or  had  or  will  have) 
a  duplicate  can  make  the  right  sort  of  difference.  Consider: 
 
Great  Big  World :  Scientists  announce  that  the  universe  turns  out  to  be 
much  larger  than  we  ever  expected.  It  extends  so  many  light  years  and 
aeons  in  every  direction  that  the  numbers  involved  aren’t  concisely 
representable  even  with  tools  like  Conway’s  chained  arrow  notation.   It 39
looks  more  or  less  the  same  all  the  way  through,  filled  with  galaxies  and 
stars  and  planets,  and  so  just  through  sheer  probability  we  can  all  expect 
to  have  a  great  number  of  causally  unrelated  duplicates  spread  across 
time  and  space,  many  of  whom  will  be  living  lives  very  much  like  our 
own. 
 
39  The  chained  arrow  notation  is  defined  in  The  Book  of  Numbers .  Using  Conway’s 
recursively  defined  notation,  we  can  express  numbers  that  are  far  too  large  to  encode  in 
ordinary  decimal  or  exponential  notation  even  using  all  of  the  matter  in  the  universe  by 
writing  down  a  few  numerals  and  arrows. 
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I  might  be  happy  or  unhappy  to  learn  that  the  universe  is  this  large,  but  it  would 
be  a  mistake  to  be  happy  or  unhappy  for  myself  if  I  hadn’t  had  any  money  riding 
on  the  question.  40
Of  course,  knowing  that  the  universe  is  very  large  would  only  justify  a 
belief  that  I  have  duplicates  somewhere  or  other.  Knowing  that  I  have  some 
particular  accidental  duplicate  somewhere  or  other  might  give  me  the 
psychological  machinery  necessary  to  care  about  him,  but  it  could  not  give  me  a 
reason  to  care  about  him  in  a  first­personal  way.  Learning  in  a  deterministic 
universe  that  things  were  so  arranged  at  the  beginning  of  time  that  I’d  have  a 
particular  duplicate  at  spacetime  coordinates  <t,x,y,z>  would  not  give  me  any 
more  reason  for  additional  first­personal  concern  than  I  would  have  in  the  Great 
Big  World.  Neither  would  spotting  a  duplicate  with  a  sophisticated  telescope. 
40  It  may  be  worth  considering  the  somewhat  parallel  case  of  “quantum  immortality.” 
David  Lewis  believes  that  if  a  “no­collapse”  /  “many  worlds”  interpretation  of  quantum 
mechanics  is  true  then  we  should  expect  to  live  forever.  The  argument  (very  roughly)  is 
that  there  is  nothing  that  it  is  like  to  be  dead,  which  means  that  we  cannot  properly 
expect  such  an  outcome,  but  we  can  expect  to  live  out  one  of  the  futures  in  which  we 
survive  due  to  some  quantum  fluke  (“How  Many  Lives…”  especially  pp.  16 – 19).  Lewis 
finds  this  possibility  frightening,  because  in  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  cases  in 
which  a  person’s  life  is  saved  by  a  quantum  fluke  they  will  be  left  in  very  bad  shape. 
(E.g.  some  fraction  of  a  bullet  quantum  tunnels  past  my  brain  but  the  rest  makes 
contact.) 
From  what  I  can  tell,  few  people  who  are  familiar  with  the  argument  share  Lewis’ 
fears.  I  assume  that  this  is  not  because  they  are  all  convinced  that  the  no­collapse  view  is 
false.  It  is  more  likely  that  they  believe  that  the  jump  from  “there’s  nothing  that  it  is  like 
to  be  dead”  to  “expect  to  live  forever,  so  long  as  there  is  no  collapse”  is  unwarranted.  I 
agree  with  this  diagnosis.  Lewis’  expectation  seems  unwarranted  in  the  same  way  that  it 
would  be  unwarranted  to  expect  to  live  (close  enough  to)  forever  upon  learning  that  we 
live  in  a  Great  Big  World.  In  fact,  I  believe  that  all  ordinary  first­personal  expectation  for 
the  future  is  fundamentally  mistaken  in  this  same  way. 
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(There  would  be  some  causal  connection  between  me  and  my  duplicate  here,  but, 
as  I  have  argued,  it  wouldn’t  be  the  right  kind.) 
In  Evacuation,  if  I  am  visited  by  an  oracle  who  tells  me  how  things  will 
turn  out,  then  it  is  not  just  that  I  know  that  I  will  have  a  particular  duplicate  in  a 
particular  place  at  a  particular  time.  I  know  that  he  will  continue  my  story;  he’ll 
be  friends  with  my  friends  (or  their  teletransported  duplicates),  continue  with 
my  work,  etc.  These  are  the  sorts  of  thing  that  Parfit  repeatedly  suggests  matter 
about  R,  and  it  seems  that  in  some  special  cases  R*  does  as  good  a  job  of 
preserving  them  as  R  does.  But  not  always — my  causally  unrelated  duplicates  in 
the  Great  Big  World  will  not  continue  my  story  in  this  same  way.  Perhaps,  then, 
we  can  claim  that  my  accidental  duplicate  in  False  Alarm  does  have  special  and 
important  relations  to  me  even  though  my  duplicates  in  Great  Big  World  do  not. 
I  do  not  believe  that  this  reply  can  work.  We  can  modify  a  response  that 
Parfit  gives  on  behalf  of  the  Extreme  Claim  against  the  objection  that  we  can 
rationally  have  special  concern  for  our  own  futures  and  pasts  for  the  same  sorts 
of  reason  that  we  can  rationally  have  special  concern  for  our  loved  ones. 
He  asks:  “Why  should  I  care  about  what  will  happen  later  to  those  people 
whom  I  love?  The  reason  cannot  be  [...]  ‘Because  my  loved  ones  now  care  about 
what  will  happen  to  them  later’.  This  is  no  answer,  because  our  problem  is  also 
to  know  why  they  should  care  about  what  will  happen  to  them  later.”  41
41  RP  pp.  310 – 312.  Parfit  attributes  this  argument  to  Broome. 
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We  can  ask:  Why  should  I  care  that  my  accidental  duplicate  will  live 
among  people  who  are  causally  linked  to  their  past  selves?  The  reason  cannot  be 
“because  they  now  care  more  about  those  R­related  selves  to  which  they  are 
causally  linked  than  any  accidental  R*­related  duplicates  they  might  have.”  This 
is  no  answer,  because  our  problem  is  also  to  know  why  they  should  care  more 
about  causally  connected  “selves.” 
I  have  claimed  that  it  would  be  irrational,  before  or  after  the  False  Alarm, 
to  pay  for  a  surgery  that  would  replace  any  amount  of  my  duplicate’s  brain  and 
body  with  identical  parts  built  from  data  with  a  “better”  causal  history.  This 
would  be  equally  true  for  all  of  my  acquaintances  or  their  duplicates.  It  would  be 
an  implausible  sort  of  bootstrapping  to  accept  these  claims  but  to  argue  that 
nevertheless  the  fact  that  my  accidental  duplicate  in  False  Alarm  can  step  into 
these  very  same  friends’  lives  gives  me  a  normatively  important  relationship  with 
him  that  I  do  not  have  with  my  accidental  duplicates  in  Great  Big  World. 
If  these  arguments  succeed,  then  we  have  no  special,  normatively 
important  relationship  to  our  own  pasts  and  futures  that  we  do  not  have  to  any 
coincidentally  R*­related  people.  By  the  same  token  we  also  have  no  special, 
normatively  important  relationship  to  our  friends’  pasts  and  futures  that  we  do 
not  have  to  people  who  are  coincidentally  R*­related  to  them.  But  we  have  no 
special  relationships  with  such  people.  Extreme  Claim  Reductionism  is  true. 
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Normative  Consequences  of  Extreme  Claim  Reductionism 
I  want  to  highlight  four  areas  where  ECR  undermines  our  ordinary 
normative  beliefs.  (The  list  is  meant  to  be  neither  non­overlapping  nor 
exhaustive.)  42
First,  we  should  reject  reasons  of  partial  concern,  either  for  our  own  pasts 
and  futures  or  for  others’.  For  example,  it  would  unwarranted  for  me  to  care 
more  (or  even  in  a  special  way)  about  my  own  impending  torture  than  about  a 
stranger’s,  except  insofar  as  it  might  now  be  possible  for  me  to  prepare  for  or  try 
to  avoid  my  own  torture  in  a  way  that  I  couldn’t  with  a  stranger’s.  This  is 
probably  the  most­discussed  ethical  upshot  of  reductionism  and,  in  a  moderate 
form,  it  informs  many  of  Parfit’s  substantial  conclusions.  If  I  learn  that  tomorrow 
someone  will  be  in  great  pain,  I  have  no  reason  to  hope  that  it  will  not  be  me  and 
no  additional  reason,  if  I  learn  that  it  will,  to  prevent  it.  This  rejection  of  partial 
concern  follows  more  or  less  straightforwardly  from  the  arguments  from  the  past 
few  pages.  It  may  be  a  welcome  conclusion,  because  someone  who  could  be 
motivated  exclusively  by  impartial  reasons  might  act  selflessly  and  live  without 
many  of  the  worries  that  plague  the  rest  of  us. 
42  Compare  Marya  Schechtman’s  “four  basic  features  of  personal  experience — survival, 
moral  responsibility,  self­interested  concern,  and  compensation”  ( The  Constitution  of 
Selves  p.  2).  As  I  read  Schechtman,  her  “four  features”  are  a  proper  subset  of  my  “four 
areas.”  I’ve  defined  the  Extreme  Claim  in  terms  of  the  reasons  and  values  that  personal 
identity  is  ordinarily  taken  to  ground,  and  I  take  the  fact  that  Schechtman,  I,  and  others 
have  come  to  similar  conclusions  about  the  (supposed)  normative  importance  of 
personal  identity  to  be  good  evidence  that  there  are  such  reasons  and  values  and  that 
my  “four  areas”  are  among  them. 
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Second,  and  relatedly,  we  should  reject  everything  that  depends  on  any 
sort  of  lasting  responsibility  for  actions.  Desert,  obligation,  etc.  are  at  best 
instrumentally  important.  Attitudes  of  resentment  and  gratitude  are 
unwarranted.  If  I  learn  that  yesterday  someone  committed  a  terrible  crime,  I 
have  no  reason  to  hope  that  it  was  not  me  and  no  additional  reason,  if  I  learn  that 
it  was,  to  help  the  victim. 
This  second  conclusion  is  less  welcome  than  the  rejection  of  partial 
concern,  but  I  think  that  it  is  equally  unavoidable.  Suppose  I  now  have  an  exact 
physical  and  psychological  duplicate  whose  body  has  a  different  history.  (This 
body  has  been  involved  in  some  crimes  that  his  has  not,  let’s  say.)  As  I  have 
argued,  undergoing  a  surgery  to  replace  any  amount  of  my  brain  or  body  with 
exact  duplicate  parts  could  not  matter,  even  if  the  duplicate  parts  are  built  from 
data  with  a  different  causal  history.  This  means  that  neither  I  nor  my  duplicate 
could  take  on  or  lose  responsibility  for  some  action  by  getting  the  surgery.  But  in 
the  limiting  case  where  my  entire  brain  and  body  are  replaced,  the  surgery  would 
effectively  be  the  same  as  killing  me  and  replacing  me  with  a  teletransported 
copy  of  my  duplicate,  which  could  not  be  importantly  different  from  ordinary 
survival  for  him  or  for  me.  It  follows  that  either  we  are  both  responsible  for  each 
other’s  actions  or  we  are  both  not  responsible  in  any  morally  weighty  sense  for 
any  past  actions.  In  a  Great  Big  World,  I  would  have  many  duplicates  with  many 
different  past  lives.  I  do  not  think  it  is  plausible  that  I  would  be  responsible  for 
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all  of  their  actions;  discovering  that  I  live  in  a  large  universe  would  not  make  that 
sort  of  moral  difference.  It  is  much  more  plausible  that  nobody  bears 
responsibility  in  any  deep  or  morally  important  sense  for  any  past  actions. 
Third  on  the  chopping  block  are  uniquely  first­personal  attitudes  like 
anticipation  and  reminiscence.  This  (by  my  reckoning)  is  a  less­discussed 
consequence  of  reductionism,  but  it  is  not  ignored.  Parfit  mentions  briefly  the 
possibility  that  anticipation  “might  be  justified  only  by  the  non­existent  deep 
further  fact.”   Wachsberg  grounds  the  irrationality  of  special  concern  at  least 43
partly  in  the  incoherence  of  anticipation.   More  recently,  Stokes  takes  the  unique 44
phenomenology  and  apparent  respectability  of  first­personal  attitudes  like 
anticipation  as  evidence  that  reductionism  is  not  the  threat  to  ordinary  morality 
that  people  like  me  take  it  to  be.  45
I  am  not  as  sure  as  Wachsberg  or  Stokes  that  the  rationality  or 
intelligibility  of  attitudes  like  anticipation  is  as  inextricably  tied  to  the  moral  facts 
about  impartialism,  responsibility,  etc.  as  all  that.  It  seems  to  me  that  rational 
creatures  with  quite  different  psychologies,  who  do  not  anticipate  and  remember 
in  the  first­personal,  metaphysically  loaded  way  that  we  seem  to,  might  still 
recognize  and  be  subject  to  all  of  the  same  moral  reasons  that  we  are. 
Whether  or  not  rejecting  anticipation  etc.  has  immediate  ethical 
43  RP  p.  312 
44  In  Personal  Identity,  the  Nature  of  Persons,  and  Ethical  Theory ,  especially  ch.  2. 
45  In  “Will  it  be  me?  Identity,  concern  and  perspective . ” 
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consequences,  it  does  have  a  few  practical  and  psychological  upshots.  Or  at  least 
it  has  for  me.  When  I  worry  about  some  event  in  my  future,  my  worries  often 
take  the  form  “x  is  going  to  happen  to  me.”  On  any  reductionist  view,  this  sort  of 
worry  can  be  rephrased  as  “x  is  going  to  happen  to  someone  who  bears 
such­and­such  relations  to  my  present  self.”  But  I  am  convinced  that  none  of 
these  relations  matter.  I  can  still  imagine  my  future  experiences  from  the  inside, 
and  this  might  still  frighten  me.  But  I  can  imagine  experiencing  things  that  will 
happen  to  other  people  just  as  well.  In  both  cases,  my  imagining  it  doesn’t  make 
it  real,  and  my  fear,  to  the  extent  that  it  takes  a  first­personal  form,  is 
unwarranted. 
When  I  apply  this  line  of  thinking  to  something  that  is  worrying  me,  I  am 
often  able  to  worry  less.  In  my  own  case,  it  is  not  so  much  that  I  find  the  fearful 
prospect  less  fearful  as  it  is  that  I  can  more  easily  turn  my  attention  elsewhere.  If 
I  am  flying  through  some  turbulence  or  riding  with  a  speeding  driver — two 
things  that  have  historically  terrified  me — I  am  now  often  able  to  close  my  eyes 
and  think:  “If  there  is  a  crash,  that  will  be  unpleasant  for  the  people  involved,  but 
it  will  have  nothing  at  all  to  do  with  what’s  happening  now,  which  is  that  I  am 
experiencing  the  pleasant  sounds  and  vibrations  of  a  huge  machine  propelling 
itself  along  at  breakneck  speeds.” 
It  is  often  remarked  that  there  is  no  use  in  worrying  about  something  if 
you  can’t  do  anything  to  change  it.  I  have  always  tried  to  follow  this  advice.  I 
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find  that  I  have  an  easier  time  following  it  now  that  I  believe  that,  besides  being 
useless,  many  of  my  worries  are  fundamentally  unwarranted  and  mistaken. 
One  might  worry  that  it  may  be  psychologically  impossible  to  stop 
anticipating  and  reminiscing  in  a  metaphysically­loaded  first­personal  way.  Or 
that  even  if  it  were  possible  it  would  likely  lead  to  a  sort  of  life­destroying 
myopia.  I  find  both  conclusions  plausible,  but  only  a  little  troubling. 
The  mere  fact  that  ordinary  anticipation  depends  on  mistaken 
assumptions  does  not  mean  that  we  should  try  to  stop  anticipating  our  futures, 
or  that  we  could  succeed  if  we  did.  It  might  be  psychologically  impossible  to  feel 
a  certain  sort  of  love  for  a  person  or  to  root  for  a  sports  team  without  on  some 
level  believing  that  they  are  especially  deserving,  or  to  navigate  the  physical 
world  without  tacitly  buying  into  some  illusory  concepts  along  the  lines  of 
substance  and  extension,  or  to  enjoy  a  work  of  fiction  without  thinking  of  the 
characters  as  real  in  some  way.  Only  a  person  who  felt  an  uncontrollable  need 
not  only  to  be  right  but  to  be  right  at  all  times  about  all  things  in  all  ways  would 
try  to  cut  these  activities  from  their  life  because  they  bring  along  error. 
However:  If  I  start  becoming  too  invested  in  the  Rockets’  season,  or  if  I 
find  myself  rationalizing  too  many  flaws  in  a  friend,  or  if  I  begin  sobbing 
uncontrollably  at  the  death  of  a  character  in  a  TV  show,  or  if  I  start  taking  a 
non­scientific  metaphysics  too  seriously,  I  can  pause,  take  a  step  back,  and 
remind  myself  of  the  truth.  The  Rockets  don’t  deserve  the  championship  more 
41 
than  anyone  else  just  because  they  are  from  a  nearby  city;  my  caring  for  someone 
does  not  immediately  transform  them  into  a  better  person;  the  characters  in 
fiction  are  not  real  people;  the  physical  world  operates  in  strange  ways  at  the 
fundamental  level. 
The  truth  of  Extreme  Claim  Reductionism  is  like  these  truths.  If  I  find 
myself  worrying  about  the  future  or  fixating  on  the  past  in  what  I  judge  to  be  an 
unhealthy  or  unproductive  way,  I  can  remind  myself  that  my  future  and  past 
selves  bear  no  normatively  important  relationship  to  me  and  see  if  that  helps. 
Admittedly,  anticipation  and  first­personal  memory  are  probably  more 
fundamental  to  the  human  experience  than  rooting  for  the  Rockets  is,  and  so 
accepting  ECR  even  on  an  abstract  intellectual  level  may  throw  a  wrench  into 
some  of  our  everyday  thought  processes.  Ever  since  I  started  giving  the  practical 
implications  of  ECR  serious  thought,  I’ve  found  myself  almost  obsessively 
picking  apart  my  thought  processes  to  see  if  they  involve  mistaken  assumptions 
about  selves  or  about  what  matters.  It  is  a  strange  and  self­alienating  endeavor. 
In  the  normative  sphere,  this  sort  of  self­alienation  has  a  unique  and 
disturbing  character.  But,  as  I  will  argue  later,  some  degree  of  moral 
self­alienation  is  unavoidable  in  a  sufficiently  reflective  life  even  if  one  does  not 
accept  the  Extreme  Claim  or  reductionism  about  personal  identity,  and  so  it  has 
to  be  grappled  with  for  anyone  who  takes  the  time  to  honestly,  scrupulously,  and 
reflectively  examine  her  moral  thought.  This  alienation,  and  the  questions 
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surrounding  it,  are  the  central  topics  of  the  remainder  of  this  dissertation. 
The  fourth  and  final  implication  of  ECR  that  I  will  note  here  is  that  the 
grounds  for  a  lot  of  what  we  take  to  be  valuable  disappear.  Goods  like  earned 
accomplishment,  lasting  friendship,  atonement,  a  positive  life  trajectory,  etc.,  if 
they  are  good  for  anyone  at  all,  are  good  for  temporally  extended  persons.  The 
Extreme  Claim  tells  us  that  temporally  extended  persons,  if  they  can  be  said  to 
exist  in  the  first  place,  are  not  well  suited  to  be  basic  units  of  moral  analysis. 
Something  being  good  for  a  person  is  about  as  plausible  as  something  being 
good  for  the  composite  entity  comprising  me  from  ages  8 – 12,  the  world’s  largest 
octopus,  and  three  minutes  of  Lebron  James’s  evening  on  June  12,  2011.  The 
notion  that  a  life  well  lived  could  be  good  beyond  the  sum  of  the  local  goodness 
of  its  constituent  parts  is  imperiled. 
It’s  no  good  to  appeal  to  organic  unities  or  holism  about  value  or  to  argue 
that  something  like  a  lasting  friendship  could  just  be  a  good  apart  from  being 
good  for  anyone.  Nothing  that  I’ve  said  implies  that  facts  about  the  metaphysics 
of  persons  make  it  strictly  impossible  for  things  like  lasting  friendship  to  matter.  A 
lasting  friendship  is,  of  course,  a  beautiful  story,  which  might  make  it  valuable  in 
some  way.  Beautiful  stories  can  be  (and  usually  are)  told  about  more  than  one 
object.  It’s  not  obviously  impossible  for  there  to  be  a  good  that  depends  on  more 
than  one  object;  we  would  ordinarily  think  that  there  are  many  such  goods.  The 
problem  isn’t  that  persons,  because  they  aren’t  unified  wholes,  could  obviously 
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never  ground  any  goods.  The  problem  is  that  persons  aren’t  suited  to  ground  the 
special  kinds  of  goods  we  think  they  do . 
Here  we  can  appeal  to  Parfit’s  comparison  of  persons  to  nations.   There’s 46
nothing  I’ve  said  about  the  metaphysical  structure  of  values  and  reasons  that 
implies  that  nothing  could  ever  be  good  for  a  nation,  or  that  there  could  never  be 
a  good  that  depends  on  a  nation  for  its  existence.  But  goods  like  lasting 
friendship  are  not  among  them.  If  we  thought  that  nations  were  unified  wholes, 
as  many  believe  about  people,  we  might  think  that  something  like  a  lasting 
friendship  between  nations  could  be  an  important  intrinsic  good.  If  we  were  then 
to  become  reductionists  about  nations,  it  would  be  rational  to  believe  not  just 
that  lasting  friendship  among  nations  is  less  important  than  we  thought,  but  to 
believe  that  it  is  not  important  at  all.  It  could  not  matter  in  anything  like  the  same 
way.  
It  might  be  impossible,  and  would  almost  certainly  be  psychologically 
unhealthy,  to  stop  caring  about  lasting  friendship,  atonement,  accomplishment, 
etc.  But  this  does  not  mean  that  these  things  are  important — just  that  we  perhaps 
ought  from  a  practical  standpoint  to  allow  ourselves  to  go  on  caring  about  them 
in  our  everyday  lives. 
 
 
46  Eg.  in  RP  p.  211,  240. 
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Conclusion 
This  chapter  is  titled  “Why  People  Don’t  Matter.”  It  would  be  more 
accurate,  but  less  snappy,  to  say  that  people  don’t  matter  qua  person .  Insofar  as 
people  have  a  capacity  for  great  depth  and  intensity  of  experience,  they  matter  a 
great  deal.  Pain  is  just  as  bad  on  my  view  as  it  is  on  any  other.  (Worse,  perhaps, 
because  no  person  could  ever  be  properly  compensated  for  her  pain.)  And  there 
is  room  in  the  view  for  some  non­hedonistic  values  like  aesthetic  appreciation, 
knowledge,  capacities,  etc.,  if  you  find  any  of  those  compelling.  (I  don’t,  but  not, 
or  not  entirely,  because  of  my  views  about  personal  identity.) 
But  whatever  precise  reasons  and  values  do  manage  to  survive  Extreme 
Claim  Reductionism,  it  is  clear  that  ECR  substantially  shrinks  the  normative 
realm  from  what  we  might  ordinarily  imagine.  We  start  with  a  peach  and  end  up 
with  a  pit.  ECR  is  a  difficult,  alienating  truth  to  believe,  let  alone  to  internalize 
and  act  on,  to  the  point  that  we  might  wonder  whether  and  how  we  should 
internalize  or  act  on  it  at  all.  It  is  to  these  questions  that  I  now  turn  my  attention. 
 
45 
 Chapter  Two  –  The  Truth  Will  Set  You  Against  Yourself 
 
In  Chapter  One,  I  argued  that  both  reductionism  about  personal  identity 
and  Parfit’s  Extreme  Claim  are  true.   These  claims  together  imply  that  the  moral 1
universe  is  very  different  from  what  it  ordinarily  appears  to  be.  When  I  reflect  on 
their  truth  and  implications,  I  experience  feelings  of  loss,  unreality, 
disconnection,  and  tension.  In  short,  I  feel  alienated — from  myself  and  from  the 
world  around  me.  I  suspect  that  for  normal,  reflective  human  beings,  belief  in  the 
truth  of  Extreme  Claim  Reductionism  might  always  be  alienating.  But  the  fact 
that  the  truth  is  alienating  does  not  imply  that  it  is  false  or  even  that  it  cannot  be 
believed.  Perhaps,  to  the  extent  that  alienation  is  a  bad  thing,  it  shouldn’t  be 
believed;  but  it  is  difficult  to  sincerely  reject  a  belief  that  the  epistemic  reasons 
favor  even  if  the  practical  reasons  favor  dropping  it. 
My  goal  in  this  chapter  is  to  show  how  and  why  Extreme  Claim 
Reductionism  (ECR)  is  alienating,  and  why  this  alienation  is  something  that  we 
shouldn’t  expect  to  be  able  to  easily  ignore,  sidestep,  or  reason  away.  If  I  am 
successful,  what  I  say  might  matter  even  to  people  who  do  not  believe  ECR;  as  I 
will  argue  in  Chapter  Three,  the  sort  of  alienation  that  belief  in  ECR  engenders 
1  Recall:  The  “Extreme  Claim”  language  comes  from  Reasons  and  Persons  (pp.  308 – 312).  I 
have  in  mind  the  strongest  available  version  of  the  claim:  Nothing  else  matters  in 
anything  like  the  way  that  we  ordinarily  take  the  deep  further  fact  of  identity  to  matter, 
and  if  there  is  no  such  deep  further  fact,  there  is  nothing  left  to  ground  the  value  of  a 
long  life,  reasons  of  self­interest,  etc. 
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 threatens  to  show  up,  if  less  frequently,  for  people  with  any  plausible  (and 
sufficiently  realist)  set  of  beliefs  about  what  matters.  It  will  be  the  work  of  that 
chapter  to  outline  a  practical  strategy  for  living  with  alienation. 
 
Reasons  Alienation 
What  do  I  mean  when  I  say  that  believing  in  reductionism  together  with 
the  Extreme  Claim  causes  alienation?  As  a  first  pass,  I  intend  “alienation”  in  its 
broadest  possible  sense — that  thing  that  Railton  calls  “a  kind  of  estrangement, 
distancing,  or  separateness  (not  necessarily  consciously  attended  to)  resulting  in 
some  loss  (not  necessarily  consciously  noted).”   I  can  imagine  a  belief  in  ECR 2
causing  everything  from  interpersonal  or  familial  alienation  (“Grandma,  please 
don’t  take  this  the  wrong  way,  but  you’re  not  a  person  in  any  deep  sense”)  to 
moral  alienation  (“I  know  that  he  killed  my  best  friend  and  ruined  my  life,  but 
apparently  nobody  can  deserve  to  suffer”)  to  even  a  quasi­Marxist  alienation 
from  the  fruits  of  one’s  labor  (“All  I  can  really  say  is  that  I’m  psychologically  and 
biologically  related  to  whoever  built  this  cabinet  over  the  past  month,  and  I 
guess  that  doesn’t  matter”). 
These  and  other  sorts  of  alienation  will  be  in  the  background  over  the 
course  of  the  present  chapter,  but  the  sort  of  alienation  that  I  intend  to  treat  most 
directly  is  what  I’ll  call 
2  “Alienation,  Consequentialism,  and  the  Demands  of  Morality”  p.  134 
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Reasons  Alienation :  The  sort  of  alienation  that  occurs  when  what  I  believe 
I  do,  should,  or  even  must  care  about  is  different  from  what  I  believe 
actually  matters,  or  when  the  intensity  of  my  care  about  something  is 
wildly  out  of  proportion  with  my  beliefs  about  how  much  it  matters.  3
 
It  might  not  be  immediately  clear  that  Reasons  Alienation  as  I  describe  it 
is  possible.  It  implies  a  gap  between  one’s  beliefs  about  what  matters  and  what 
one  cares  about,  and  it  might  seem  strange  to  think  that  care  and  belief  can  come 
apart  in  this  way.  My  first  task,  then,  is  to  defend  the  claim  that  Reasons 
Alienation  is  not  impossible.  My  first  line  of  defense  will  be  a  simple  argument 
from  cases:  I’ll  describe  situations  in  which  it  seems  clear  that  a  belief  in  ECR 
would  engender  a  gap  between  what  a  person  does,  can,  and  should  care  about 
and  what  they  actually  believe  is  important.  If  these  cases  are  possible,  then 
Reasons  Alienation  is  possible  (and,  moreover,  can  be  caused  by  a  belief  in  ECR).  
 
Extreme  Claim  Reductionism  and  Reasons  Alienation 
ECR  is  the  combination  of  two  theses.  The  first  is  reductionism  about 
personal  identity.  I  take  reductionism  to  be  the  claim  that  there  is  no  “deep 
3  There  may,  of  course,  be  ways  of  mattering  that  are  not  properly  cashed  out  in  terms  of 
reasons,  as  valuable  objects  or  states  might  if  a  Scanlonian  buck­passing  analysis  of 
value  is  wrong  ( What  We  Owe  to  Each  Other  pp.  95 – 98).  But  “Mattering­Wise  Alienation” 
doesn’t  have  the  same  ring  as  “Reasons  Alienation.” 
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 further  fact”  about  personal  identity,  but  only  lower­level  facts  about  things  like 
psychological  connectedness,  biological  continuity,  etc.  The  second  thesis  is  the 
Extreme  Claim,  which  says  that  none  of  these  lower­level  facts  ground  any  of  the 
special  normative  reasons  that  we  ordinarily  take  the  supposed  deep  further  fact 
to  ground.  When  we  combine  the  two  theses,  we  get  a  view  on  which,  because 
there  is  in  fact  no  deep  further  fact,  there  are  in  fact  none  of  these  special  reasons. 
In  Chapter  One,  I  discussed  four  sorts  of  ordinary  judgment  or  attitude 
that  ECR  implies  are  often  or  always  unwarranted — (1)  attitudes  of  partial 
concern  and  judgments  of  partial  importance,  (2)  judgments  about  lasting 
responsibility,  (3)  attitudes  like  anticipation  and  reminiscence,  and  (4)  judgments 
about  values  grounded  in  extended  periods  of  people’s  lives.  Each  sort  of  case  is 
a  possible  source  of  alienation,  as  the  following  four  examples  are  meant  to 
show:  4
 
(1)  Arthur  loves  his  boyfriend  Andrew  very  much,  and  values  Andrew’s 
well­being  over  the  well­being  of  others.  But  Arthur  also  believes  that 
ECR  is  true,  and  thus  believes  that  his  partial  concern  and  care  for 
Andrew  are  unwarranted.  Nevertheless,  Arthur  does  care  more  about 
Andrew  than  about  other  people,  and  knows  that  this  special  care  is  part 
and  parcel  of  his  love  and  is,  moreover,  necessary  for  the  health  and 
4  Feel  free  to  skip  ahead  once  you  feel  like  you  get  the  picture. 
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 happiness  of  the  relationship.  Even  if  he  could  get  rid  of  his  partial  care, 
he  would  not;  nevertheless,  he  is  troubled  by  the  knowledge  that  it  is 
unwarranted. 
 
(2)  Bette,  who  has  been  poor  for  all  of  her  life,  comes  across  a  huge 
windfall  of  money.  She  uses  the  money  to  buy  gifts  for  the  people  who 
helped  her  when  she  needed  it  and,  in  a  few  cases,  to  exact  a  measure  of 
justice  on  people  who  did  her  terrible  wrongs.  Paying  everyone  back  in 
this  way  gives  her  a  deep  sense  of  satisfaction  that  she  wouldn’t  give  up 
for  the  world.  This  satisfaction  strikes  her  as  irrational,  however,  when  she 
reflects  on  the  knowledge  that  the  people  she  “repaid”  are  merely 
psychologically  and  biologically  connected  to  the  people  who  did  right  or 
wrong  by  her  in  the  past  and  that  such  connections  cannot  ground  any 
sort  of  desert.  The  further  knowledge  that  by  repaying  her  debts  she 
contributes  to  a  culture  that  incentivizes  good  behavior  is  not  enough  to 
justify  her  sense  of  satisfaction.  She  is  not  satisfied  because  of  her 
contribution  to  a  shared  expectation  of  reciprocity;  she  is  satisfied  because 
she  was  finally  able  to  follow  the  dictates  of  her  sense  of  justice, 
misguided  as  she  ultimately  believes  it  to  be. 
 
(3)  Cleo  has  a  well­paying  job  that  she  hates.  She  gets  through  the  day  by 
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 thinking  about  how,  in  less  than  a  year’s  time,  she  will  have  saved  up 
enough  money  to  quit  her  job  and  move  to  a  better  city.  Occasionally  she 
remembers  that  all  of  the  fun  experiences  in  her  new  home  will  be  had  by 
someone  who  is  merely  psychologically  related  to  her,  and  not  by  “her 
future  self”  in  any  deep  sense.  In  order  to  avoid  sinking  into  a  deep 
depression,  she  does  her  best  to  put  such  thoughts  out  of  her  mind  and  go 
on  anticipating  a  better  future  in  the  usual  way. 
 
(4)  Del’s  life  has  involved  overcoming  a  series  of  difficult  and  painful 
challenges.  They  assure  themselves  that  each  each  challenge  is,  was,  or 
will  be  a  meaningful  chapter  in  a  full  life.  But  reflection  on  ECR  reminds 
them  that  their  pain  will  be  in  no  way  absorbed  or  counteracted  by  any 
eventual  relief  or  accomplishment,  and  that  it  plays  no  role  in  grounding 
some  higher  good.  Their  life  is,  simply,  painful  and  dreary,  with  a  few 
bright  spots  between  struggles.  Del  finds  this  outlook  grim  and 
comfortless,  and  does  their  best  to  put  it  out  of  their  mind. 
 
Arthur,  Bette,  Cleo,  and  Del  all  care,  and  moreover  do  well  by  caring, 
about  things  that  they  know  do  not  actually  warrant  their  care.  In  each  case,  I 
expect  that  their  knowledge  of  their  situations  will  prove  disconcerting,  that  it 
will  undermine  their  images  of  themselves  as  practically  rational,  as  unified 
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 agents,  as  genuine  and  intellectually  honest  people.  In  short,  their  knowledge 
will  be  alienating.  Unfortunately,  there  is  no  obvious  way  I  can  see  for  Arthur  et 
al  to  transcend  the  source  of  their  alienation  and  live  in  good  faith.  Their 
alienation  is  a  natural  result  of  their  knowledge  of  the  gap  between  what  they 
care  about  and  what  actually  matters;  and  this  gap,  for  them  as  well  as  for  us,  is 
one  that  is  impossible,  or  at  least  extremely  difficult  and  probably  inadvisable,  to 
bridge. 
 
The  Possibility  of  Reasons  Alienation:  Akrasia 
If  the  above  cases  are  successful,  they  show  that  Reasons  Alienation  is 
possible.  But  they  do  not  show  how  it  is  possible;  there  remains  the  problem  of 
explaining  why  it’s  not  straightforwardly  im possible  given  the  apparently  close 
link  between  caring  and  valuation. 
I’ve  defined  Reasons  Alienation  as  resulting  from  the  gap  between  what 
we  believe  we  do,  should,  or  even  must  care  about  on  the  one  hand  and  what  we 
believe  actually  matters  on  the  other.  “Care  about”  here  is  open­ended,  and 
intentionally  so.  In  one  perfectly  good  sense,  believing  that  something  matters  is 
a  way  of  caring  about  it.  If  that  were  all  that  caring  about  something  consisted  in, 
or  the  only  way  of  caring  about  something,  then  reasons  alienation  as  I  describe  it 
would  be  impossible.  It  would  also  be  impossible  if,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
judgments  of  importance  always  had  to  line  up  precisely  with  every  sort  of  care. 
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 Accepting  one  of  these  claims  according  to  which  Reasons  Alienation  is 
impossible  would  amount  to  adopting  an  extreme  sort  of  what  is  generally  called 
judgment  internalism  about  motivation.  I  myself  am  inclined  towards 
externalism  about  motivation,  according  which  it  is  possible  to  judge  something 
to  matter  without  being  at  all  motivated  by  this  judgment.  But  even  if  one  were 
to  accept  a  more  moderate  internalist  view,  on  which  normative  judgments 
might  entail  some  degree  of  motivation  without  fully  determining  all  facts  about 
motivation  and  care,  there  is  plenty  of  space  for  Reasons  Alienation.  5
I  believe  that  we  should  be  no  more  than  moderately  internalist  about 
motivation;  an  extreme  internalism  on  which  normative  judgments  completely 
fix  the  spaces  of  motivation,  desire,  and  care  seems  to  entail  that  weakness  of  the 
will  is  impossible,  since  weakness  of  will  involves  being  motivated  to  do 
something  other  than  what  one  judges  to  be  best.  6
It  is  true  that  philosophers  of  as  high  a  degree  of  eminence  as  you  like 
have  held  the  view  that  weakness  of  will  really  is  impossible;  but  remembering 
5  For  example,  a  belief  in  ECR  might  cause  me  to  be  less  inclined  to  promote  my  own 
future  welfare  at  the  expense  of  the  future  welfare  of  others,  but  so  long  as  I  retain  some 
disproportionate  self­interest,  the  door  is  open  for  Reasons  Alienation. 
6  It  might  be  argued  that  a  Davidsonian  analysis  of  weakness  of  will,  according  to  which 
the  akratic  actor  really  does  judge  the  thing  they  do  to  be  “unconditionally”  better  and  is 
simply  failing  to  keep  all  of  their  reasons  in  mind,  could  be  made  compatible  with 
extreme  internalism,  though  I  am  not  sure  how  convincingly  (“How  is  Weakness  of  the 
Will  Possible,”  especially  pp.  38 – 42).  In  any  case,  Bratman’s  case  of  Sam,  the 
hard­drinking  akratic  depressive  who  sees  no  good  reason  whatsoever  to  keep  drinking 
and  avoid  sleep  but  does  so  anyway,  seems  to  me  to  show  decisively  that  Davidson’s 
analysis  cannot  account  for  every  apparent  case  of  weakness  of  will  (“Practical 
Reasoning  and  Weakness  of  the  Will”  pp.  156 – 157). 
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 some  of  the  other  patently  false  views  that  eminent  philosophers  have  held — 
Kant’s  claim  that  one  should  not  lie  to  the  murderer  at  the  door  about  his 
victim’s  hiding  place  comes  to  mind — should  be  enough  to  disabuse  anyone  of 
the  belief  that  every  view  held  by  a  great  philosopher  ought  to  be  taken 
seriously.  There  may,  of  course,  be  a  problem  of  how  weakness  of  the  will  is 
possible,   just  as  there  may  be  a  problem  of  how  consciousness  is  possible;  but 7
that  weakness  of  the  will,  like  consciousness,  is  possible  (because  it  is  actual) 
seems  so  certain  that  I  am  unsure  how  anyone  with  any  experience  of  the  world 
could  sincerely  doubt  it.  Anyone  who  has  ever  wanted  to  stop  running  during 
the  last  lap  of  an  important  race,  to  keep  drinking  even  though  the  party  is  dying 
down,  to  order  a  dessert  even  though  it  is  expensive  and  unhealthy  and  will  be 
gone  in  a  minute,  or  to  keep  watching  TV  instead  of  finishing  a  dissertation 
ought  to  know  that  weakness  of  will  is  real. 
If  weakness  of  will  implies  that  extreme  judgment  internalism  about 
motivation  is  false,  then  the  door  is  open  at  least  to  the  possibility  of  Reasons 
Alienation.  Actually,  we  can  say  more:  Weakness  of  will,  insofar  as  it  can  be 
alienating  and  involves  a  disconnect  between  normative  judgments  and 
motivation,  is  a  sort  of  Reasons  Alienation,  although  not  one  that  I  will  focus  on 
after  this;  the  cases  I’m  most  interested  in  involve  more  than  a  temporary  conflict 
7  My  guess  is  that  Plato  may  already  have  had  it  close  to  right  with  his  appeal  to  parts  of 
the  soul. 
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 between  occurrent  motivation  and  sober  judgment.  In  the  next  sections,  I  turn 
my  attention  to  the  question  of  whether  such  deeper  conflicts  are  also  possible.  
 
The  Possibility  of  Reasons  Alienation: 
The  Wrong  Kind  of  Reasons  Objection  –  an  Introduction 
The  discussion  in  the  next  section  will  be  unavoidably  technical,  and  so  to 
make  it  easier  for  the  reader  to  avoid  getting  bogged  down  in  the  details,  I  want 
to  take  some  time  here  to  sketch  briefly  the  conclusions  with  which  I  hope  to 
emerge. 
Consider  again  the  case  of  Arthur  and  Andrew.  In  one  sense,  Arthur  has 
reason  to  value  Andrew  only  as  much  as  he  does  other  people,  because  as  a 
matter  of  fact  Andrew  is  not  more  valuable  than  most  other  people.  But  in  another 
perhaps  less  direct  way  Arthur  has  all  the  reason  in  the  world  to  value  Andrew 
more  than  other  people;  it  is  only  by  so  doing  that  he  can  maintain  the  health  and 
happiness  of  their  relationship. 
I  will  be  defending  a  few  claims  about  this  sort  of  case.  First,  whatever 
these  two  sorts  of  reason  end  up  amounting  to,  they  are  both  perfectly  good; 
neither  is  an  illusion,  and  both  make  legitimate  practical  demands  on  Arthur. 
Second,  and  relatedly,  whatever  we  might  do  to  make  sense  of  the  moral 
metaphysics  surrounding  Arthur’s  case,  the  demands  made  on  him  are  practically 
irreconcilable.  He  cannot  privilege  one  sort  of  reason  and  put  the  other  out  of  his 
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 mind  (or,  for  that  matter,  arrive  at  some  satisfying  split  weighting  of  the  two). 
 
The  Possibility  of  Reasons  Alienation: 
The  Wrong  Kind  of  Reasons  Objection 
In  my  description  of  Reasons  Alienation  I  talk  about  “what  I  believe  I  do, 
should,  or  even  must  care  about”  coming  apart  from  what  I  judge  to  be 
important.  And  while  “do,  should,  or  even  must”  is  meant  to  be  read  as  a 
disjunction,  the  really  interesting  cases  are  the  ones  where  someone  knowingly 
does  and  should  or  must  care  in  a  way  that  is  unwarranted  (at  least  in  the  usual 
way)  by  the  actual  reasons  at  play. 
One  might  be  happy  to  allow  that  weakness  of  will  is  possible  but  doubt 
that  there  could  be  cases  where  we  should  care  about  things  that  do  not  matter.  It 
is  natural  to  think  that  that  mattering  involves — or  just  is — warranting  care. 
Nothing  besides  the  fact  that  something  actually  matters,  we  might  think,  could 
give  us  reason  to  care  about  it.  It  is  true  enough  that  by  caring  more  for  his 
boyfriend  Andrew  than  for  other  people  Arthur  is  able  to  keep  his  relationship 
healthy  and  happy,  but  this  fact  does  not  bear  on  Andrew’s  value.  As  such,  we 
might  wonder  whether  the  utility  of  Arthur’s  disproportionate  care  for  Andrew 
can  bear  on  whether  he  should  care  disproportionately.  Practical  utility  seems  to 
provide  a  different  sort  of  reason  for  having  a  feeling  than  does  the  fact  that  the 
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 feeling  fits   or  is  appropriate  to  its  object  in  the  usual  way,  and  we  might  wonder 8
whether  it  in  fact  provides  a  reason  of  the  wrong  kind,  and  thus  no  reason  at  all. 
Likewise,  we  might  wonder  whether  it  is  fittingness,  and  not  utility,  that  gives 
Arthur  the  wrong  kind  of  reason  to  care.  After  all,  the  pain  of  a  toxic  relationship 
is  immediate,  unavoidable,  and  intense,  whereas  perhaps  “fittingness”  is 
something  that  should  only  worry  philosophers. 
If  we  are  convinced  that  only  either  the  fittingness  of  care  on  the  one  hand 
or  the  utility  of  care  on  the  other  bears  on  how  Arthur  should  feel  about  Andrew, 
then  the  alienation  that  Arthur  feels  over  the  conflicting  pulls  of  fittingness  and 
utility  is  ultimately  irrational.  Call  this  the  wrong  kind  of  reasons  objection  to  the 
possibility  of  reasons  alienation. 
Several  versions  of  the  so­called  wrong  kind  of  reasons  problem  have 
received  a  flurry  of  attention  in  the  past  decade  or  two.   Much  of  the 9
contemporary  debate  surrounding  cases  like  Arthur’s  involves  the  special 
problem  they  present  for  the  “fitting  attitude”  or  “buck­passing”   accounts  of 10
8  By  “fit”  or  “fittingness”  I  intend  what  I  think  is  a  commonsense  notion  with  broad 
application.  Anger  fits  injustice,  admiration  fits  excellence,  amusement  fits  humor, 
caution  fits  danger,  doubt  fits  unreliable  testimony,  motivation  fits  an  opportunity  to  do 
some  good,  and  so  on.  This  usage  of  the  terms  is  meant  to  be  in  line  with  their  usage  in 
the  relevant  contemporary  debates. 
9  Key  papers  and  chapters  that  lay  the  groundwork  for  the  contemporary  debate  include 
D'arms  and  Jacobson’  “Sentiment  and  Value,”  Rabinowicz  and  Rønnow­Rasmussen’s 
”The  Strike  of  the  Demon,”  Heironymi’s  “The  Wrong  Kind  of  Reasons,”  Olson’s 
“Buck­Passing  and  the  Wrong  Kind  of  Reasons,”  Raz’s  “Reasons,  practical  and 
Adaptive,”  and  others. 
10  The  “buck­passing”  language  originates  with  Scanlon  ( What  We  Owe  to  Each  Other  p. 
97).  
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 value  advocated  by  Scanlon  and  others.   As  we  will  see,  the  wrong  kind  of 11
reasons  problem  has  implications  beyond  reductionist  theories  of  value,  and  my 
focus  in  this  section  will  be  on  a  few  of  these  implications.  But  first,  it’s  worth 
getting  the  problem  on  the  table  in  the  context  of  the  buck­passing  debate. 
Buck­passing  views,  in  general,  reduce  a  thing’s  “value”  to  its  possession 
of  lower­level  features  that  give  us  reasons  to  respond  to  it  in  certain  ways. 
Taking  Scanlon’s  view  as  a  paradigmatic  example,  a  thing’s  being  valuable 
consists  not  in  its  possession  of  anything  like  an  irreducible  Moorean  property  of 
goodness  but  rather  in  its  having  certain  other  features  that  give  us  reason  to 
take  certain  positive  attitudes  towards  it,  e.g.  admiration  or  respect.   Value  is 12
analyzed  in  terms  of  reasons,  effectively  shrinking  the  realm  of  the  normative  by 
making  value  theory  a  subset  of  the  theory  of  reasons  as  opposed  to  a  separate 
field  with  separate  metaphysical  commitments.  Different  buck­passing  accounts 
differ  in  subtle  ways  in  terms  of  the  precise  sort  of  reasons­to­respond  that  they 
reduce  value  to,  and  so  for  simplicity,  I’ll  use  the  verb  “value”  as  an  umbrella 
term  to  cover  the  having  of  any  of  a  number  positive  orientations  towards  an 
object.  Thus  I  will  say  that  something  is  valuable  on  a  buck­passing  account  in 
case  we  have  reason  (of  the  right  kind)  to  value  it. 
Let’s  return  to  Arthur  and  Andrew.  If  Arthur  takes  exceptionally  positive 
attitudes  towards  Andrew,  and  is  especially  disposed  to  promote  Andrew’s 
11  Rabinowicz  and  Rønnow­Rasmussen  and  Olson,  for  example,  take  this  approach. 
12  What  We  Owe  to  Each  Other  pp.  95 – 98 
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 welfare,  their  relationship  is  more  likely  to  be  happy  and  healthy.  Thus,  he  has 
certain  indirect  practical  reasons  to  take  these  positive  attitudes,  to  promote 
Andrew’s  welfare,  etc.  But  none  of  these  reasons  seem  like  they  make  Andrew 
valuable!   They  are  reasons  of  the  wrong  kind . 13
You  don’t  have  to  be  a  buck­passer — that  is,  you  don’t  have  to  believe  that 
Andrew’s  value  consists  in  his  having  lower­level  properties  that  give  Arthur 
reason  to  value  him — to  get  the  feeling  that  there  is  a  deep  difference  between 
the  reasons  of  the  “wrong”  and  “right”  kinds  in  Arthur’s  case.  Whether  or  not 
some  buck­passing  theory  is  true — that  is,  whether  or  not  things’  value  consists  in 
the  existence  of  reasons  to  value  them — we  can  still  probably  say  more 
cautiously  that  something  is  valuable  just  in  case  it  is  warranted  or  fitting  to  value 
it.  The  special  sorts  of  reason  that  Arthur  has  for  valuing  Andrew  do  not  seem  to 
be  connected  up  value  in  this  way. 
In  the  context  of  the  contemporary  buck­passing  debate,  to  say  that  a 
reason  for  valuing  something  is  of  the  “wrong  kind”  means  that  it’s  of  the  wrong 
kind  to  account  for  that  thing’s  value.   But,  as  we’ve  seen,  the  right  /  wrong 14
kind  of  reasons  distinction  seems  to  be  (or  to  suggest)  an  important  distinction 
outside  of  the  confines  of  the  buck­passing  debate.  It  would  be  natural  at  this 
13  The  non­ECR  theorist  can,  of  course,  hold  that  Andrew  is  valuable — just  not  more  than 
anyone  else  and  not  for  these  reasons.  He  is  valuable  because  of  things  like  his  capacity 
to  feel  pleasure  and  pain,  his  agency,  etc. — not  because  valuing  him  helps  Arthur  be  a 
better  boyfriend. 
14  Of  course,  for  the  buck­passer,  this  distinction  as  stated  is  circular — hence  the 
challenge  posed  by  the  WKR  problem. 
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 point  to  wonder:  Can  (something  like)  the  right  /  wrong  kind  of  reasons 
distinction  apply  to  things  besides  reasons  to  value? 
The  answer  to  this  question  seems  to  be  yes,  although  once  we  widen  our 
scope  it  becomes  much  harder  to  give  rules  to  classify  reasons  as  being  of  the 
right  or  wrong  kind.  In  fact,  there  seem  to  be  all  sorts  “wrong  kindish”  reasons  at 
play  for  all  sorts  of  things  throughout  the  history  of  philosophy.  Pascal’s  Wager 
purports  to  give  us  a  reason  for  belief  in  God  that  seems  wrong­kindish.  Kavka’s 
Toxin  Puzzle   and  Newcomb’s  Problem   suggest  wrong­kindish  reasons  to 15 16
intend.  Railton’s  Kantian  demon  case  suggests  a  wrong­kindish  reason  for 
15  In  “The  Toxin  Puzzle,”  Kavka  imagines  an  eccentric  billionaire  who  offers  you  a 
million  dollars  if  at  midnight  you  intend  to  drink  a  non­lethal  toxin  the  next  day,  at 
which  point  the  money  will  already  be  in  your  account,  so  that  you  will  not  have  to 
actually  drink  the  toxin  to  keep  it.  Kavka  believes  that  in  this  case  you  would  have 
reason  to  intend  to  drink  the  poison  but  not  reason  to  drink  it,  which  is  meant  to 
introduce  a  wedge  between  reasons  to  intend  and  reasons  to  act. 
16  As  presented  by  Nozick  in  “Newcomb’s  Problem  and  Two  Principles  of  Choice,”  the 
problem  imagines  perfectly­accurate  action­predicting  computer  that  will  put  one 
million  dollars  into  a  box  if  and  only  if  it  predicts  that  you  will  not  open  a  second  box 
that  will  definitely  have  one  thousand  dollars  in  it.  The  practical  question  is  whether  you 
should  open  both  boxes  or  instead  forego  opening  the  thousand  dollar  box,  given  that 
the  million  dollars  will  either  be  there  or  not  by  the  time  you  get  the  chance. 
    Though  they  might  appear  identical  in  structure,  there  are  subtle  differences  between 
Newcomb’s  Problem  and  the  Toxin  puzzle.  You  would  get  your  money  in  Kavka’s  case 
if  you  changed  your  mind  at  the  last  minute  so  long  as  you  had  earnestly  intended  to 
drink  the  poison  at  midnight.  On  the  other  hand,  the  computer  in  Newcomb’s  problem 
would  presumably  predict  any  changes  of  heart,  so  that  it  is  what  you  actually  do  as 
opposed  to  what  you  intend  that  determines  (or  at  least  perfectly  lines  up  with)  how 
much  money  you  walk  out  with.  Thus  the  Toxin  Puzzle  arguably  makes  clearer  or  more 
pressing  Kavka’s  supposed  difference  between  reasons  to  act  and  reasons  to  intend, 
whereas  Newcomb’s  Problem  arguably  makes  clearer  the  depth  of  the  tension  between 
the  reasons  in  play.  
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 having  a  certain  sort  of  moral  outlook  or  character.   You  might  be  able  to 17
imagine  others. 
To  pick  the  simplest  and  best­known  of  these  cases,  Pascal  famously 
argues   that  we  ought  to  believe  in  God  not  because  there  is  overwhelming 18
evidence  that  They  exist  but  because  it  is  decisively  prudential  to  do  so;  since  we 
must  rationally  assign  some  positive  probability  to  God’s  existence,  and  since  the 
reward  for  belief  in  the  case  that  They  exist  is  infinite  while  the  reward  for 
unbelief  is  at  most  finite,  belief  in  God  promises  the  greatest  expected  payoff.  The 
reason  that  Pascal  gives  us  to  believe  in  God,  if  it  is  a  reason  at  all,  seems 
“wrong­kindish”  in  very  much  the  same  way  that  Arthur’s  reasons  for 
disproportionate  care  do.  What  precisely  these  cases  all  have  in  common  has, 
again,  proven  to  be  hard  to  nail  down,  but  it  is  easy  to  get  the  sense  that  there 
must  be  a  general  phenomenon  to  be  accounted  for. 
I  say  “wrong­kindish”  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  because,  once  we 
broaden  our  scope  beyond  the  objection  to  buck­passing,  it’s  not  obvious  that  all 
of  the  reasons  we  were  calling  the  “wrong  kind”  are,  in  fact,  wrong  for  anything. 
17  Railton’s  case  involves  a  powerful,  all­knowing  demon  who  threatens  humanity  with 
bad  consequences  to  the  extent  that  we  stray  from  Kantian  morality.  He  notes  that 
consequentialists  would  “have  reason  to  convert  to  Kantianism,  perhaps  even  to  make 
whatever  provisions  could  be  made  to  erase  consequentialism  from  human  memory  and 
prevent  any  resurgence  of  it”  (“Alienation,  Consequentialism,  and  Morality”  p.  155). 
They  have  these  reasons,  presumably,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  their  epistemic  reasons 
favor  (or  seem  to  them  to  favor)  the  truth  of  consequentialism.  I  return  briefly  to  the 
demon  case  in  Chapter  Three. 
18  Pensées  680  (in  Pensées  and  Other  Writings ,  pp.  152 – 158) 
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 They’re  certainly  not  all  wrong  in  the  distinctive  buck­passing  way.   As  such, 19
from  here  on  out,  I’ll  adopt  Raz’s  more  neutral  language  of  “standard”  (meaning 
right­kind)  and  “non­standard”  (meaning  wrong­kind)  reasons,   though  in  so 20
doing  I  don’t  mean  to  commit  myself  to  understanding  the  distinction  exactly  as 
he  does. 
Now  that  the  stage  is  set,  I’ll  restate  my  purposes.  I  want  to  remain 
less­than­fully  committed  about  what  exactly  the  standard  /  non­standard 
reasons  distinction  amounts  to,  though  I  will  describe  one  promising  sort  of 
strategy  that,  if  successful,  could  explain  why  conflicts  between  standard  and 
non­standard  reasons  seem  so  intractable.  Note  that  even  if  this  attempted 
explanation  of  the  intractability  of  conflicts  between  standard  and  non­standard 
reasons  fails,  I  hope  to  establish  in  the  next  section  at  least  that  they  are 
intractable  (or  at  least  really  really  hard  to  tract). 
On  what  I  understand  to  be  the  most  popular  sort  of  view,  and  the  one  to 
which  I  myself  am  inclined,  the  essential  difference  between  standard  and 
non­standard  reasons  is  that  standard  reasons  are  “object­given”  and 
non­standard  reasons  are  “state­given.”  Parfit,   Raz,   and  others  endorse 21 22
19  Remember:  In  the  buck­passing  context,  the  “wrong  kind”  of  reasons  are  of  the  wrong 
kind  to  account  for  a  thing’s  value.  This  sort  of  wrongness  isn’t  available  in  other 
contexts. 
20  “Reasons,  Practical  and  Adaptive”  p.  1 
21  On  What  Matters  vol.  1  pp.  50 – 51,  420 – 432 
22  “Reasons,  Practical  and  Adaptive” 
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 versions  of  this  view.  We  can  see  how  the  object  /  state  view  works  by 
considering  its  application  in  a  few  different  cases.  
In  the  epistemic  case,  Pascal  appeals  not  to  the  object  of  our  belief,  which 
is  God’s  existence,  but  to  the  state  of  believing  in  God.  He  does  not  need  to  say 
anything  about  evidence  for  God’s  existence  to  run  his  argument  that  the  state  of 
belief  is  a  good  one  to  be  in,  and  likewise,  he  is  happy  to  admit  that  his  argument 
gives  no  evidence  for  the  existence  of  God.  23
In  the  toxin  puzzle  and  Newcomb’s  problem,  imagined  players  are  in  a 
position  to  be  rewarded  if  they  genuinely  intend  to  take  actions  that,  when  the 
time  comes  and  their  rewards  are  already  secured  or  lost,  they  would  be  better 
off  not  performing.  In  both  cases  cases,  the  objects  of  their  intention — drinking  a 
non­lethal  poison  or  leaving  a  box  of  money  unopened,  respectively — have 
nothing  to  recommend  them.  But  the  state  of  intending  to  achieve  these  ends  is  a 
very  good  place  to  be. 
Turning  back  to  Arthur  and  Andrew,  it’s  much  the  same.  The  object  of 
Arthur’s  affection,  Andrew,  has  nothing  in  particular  to  make  him  an 
appropriate  object  of  care  and  partial  concern  over  anyone  else.  But  Arthur’s 
23  Indeed,  he  believes  that  the  possibility  of  a  rational  proof  of  God’s  existence  is 
explicitly  denied  in  scripture:  “Who  will  then  blame  the  Christians  for  being  able  to 
provide  a  rational  basis  for  their  belief,  they  who  profess  a  religion  for  which  they 
cannot  provide  a  rational  basis?  They  declare  that  it  is  a  folly,  stultitiam  (1  Cor.  1:  18)  in 
laying  it  before  the  world:  and  then  you  complain  that  they  do  not  prove  it!  If  they  did 
prove  it,  they  would  not  be  keeping  their  word”  ( Pensées  and  Other  Writings  p.  153). 
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 being  in  the  state  of  caring  for  him  is  one  of  the  surest  sources  of  happiness  in  his 
life  (and  for  that  matter,  in  Andrew’s). 
The  key  insight  of  the  object  /  state  account  is  that  standard  and 
non­standard  reasons  do  not  simply  attach  themselves  to  a  single  object  and 
favor  potentially  conflicting  responses.  Cases  of  that  sort  are  familiar  in  everyday 
life  and  (comparatively)  simple  to  deal  with.  Suppose  I  make  a  promise  that 
would  be  harmful  to  keep;  on  commonsense  morality  I  have  reasons  of  fidelity  to 
keep  it  and  consequentialist  reasons  not  to.  I  reflect  for  a  moment  and  decide  one 
way  or  the  other.  Genuine  moral  dilemmas  aside  (if  such  things  are,  as  I  doubt, 
possible)  we  can  usually  reach  a  relatively  satisfying  weighing  of  the  reasons  in 
these  cases  and  move  on  with  our  lives.  Cases  of  straightforwardly  competing 
reasons  are  certainly  common  causes  of  inner  turmoil,  but  except  in  extreme 
cases  they  don’t  seem  to  generate  the  sort  of  persistent,  undermining  alienation 
that  I’m  considering  here.   Because  standard  and  non­standard  reasons  attach 24
themselves  to  objects  of  different  sorts,  they  can,  unlike  merely  competing 
reasons,  favor  not  just  different  responses  but  fundamentally  different  sorts  of 
response.  This  fact,  on  my  view,  is  what  makes  standard  and  non­standard 
reasons  practically  irreconcilable. 
To  get  clear  on  what  I  mean  by  “fundamentally  different  sorts  of 
response,”  we  can  turn  to  Parfit’s  discussion  of  state­given  reasons  in  On  What 
24  Of  course,  if  ordinary  conflicting  reasons  did  regularly  and  unavoidably  generate 
Reasons  Alienation,  that  would  help  my  case  rather  than  hurting  it. 
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 Matters .   Parfit  considers  a  series  of  cases  in  which  a  despot  threatens  us  with  a 25
horrible  outcome  unless  we  come  to  have  some  unjustified  belief  or  unwarranted 
desire.  He  argues  that  it  is  an  illusion  that  the  threat  of  the  horrible  outcome 
bears  on  our  beliefs  and  desires  in  at  all  the  way  that  ordinary  reasons  for  belief 
and  desire  do: 
 
Return  now  to  the  claim  that,  in  such  cases,  we  would  be  responding  to 
our  reasons  to  have  these  beneficial  beliefs.  We  ought,  I  have  suggested,  to 
reject  this  claim.  If  we  were  causing  ourselves  to  have  these  beliefs,  this 
process  might  be  rational,  and  involve  responses  to  reasons.  We  would  be 
responding  to  reasons  for  acting ,  which  would  be  provided  by  the  facts 
that  would  make  it  good  if  we  had  these  beliefs.  26
 
In  other  words,  our  non­standard  /  state­given  reasons  for  belief  are  not  reasons 
for  belief  at  all!  They  are  reasons  for  action — the  action  of  making  ourselves 
adopt  certain  beliefs  if  the  means  to  do  so  are  available  to  us.  The  point  seems  to 
me  essentially  right,  and  one  that  Pascal  may  have  appreciated  when  he 
suggested  long­term  ceremonial  religious  practice  as  the  road  to  belief  for 
anyone  convinced  by  his  argument. 
25  Vol.  1,  pp.  420­432 
26  On  What  Matters  vol.  1  p.  422 
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 We  can  easily  extend  Parfit’s  analysis  to  Arthur’s  case.  Arthur,  we  can  say, 
has  no  reason  whatsoever  to  care  especially  about  Andrew,  and  indeed,  caring 
especially  about  Andrew  is  irrational.  On  the  other  hand,  Arthur  has  every 
reason  to  cause  or  allow  himself  to  care  especially  about  Andrew,  and  no  reason 
not  to.   If  Arthur’s  case  works  analogously  to  the  epistemic  case  in  this  way,  as  I 27
believe  it  does,  then  in  Parfit’s  terminology  we  can  say  that  his  reasons  compete 
but  do  not  conflict.  They  compete  because  Arthur  “could  not  successfully 
respond  to  both,”  but  do  not  conflict  because  they  do  not  “support  different 
answers  to  the  same  question.”  28
Hoping  that  it  might  help  to  clarify  Parfit’s  distinction  between  competing 
and  conflicting  reasons,  I  spent  some  time  trying  to  think  of  cases  of  competing 
but  non­conflicting  reasons  that  weren’t  among  these  perhaps  confusing 
standard  vs.  non­standard  reasons  cases.  I  found  that  all  I  could  come  up  with 
were  cases  where  the  reasons  in  question  were  had  by  different  agents  or  by  the 
same  agent  at  different  times.  For  example,  my  friend  and  I  both  have  reason  to 
win  (or,  if  you  like,  try  to  win)  a  race.  Our  reasons  compete,  because  we  cannot 
both  act  on  them  successfully,  but  they  do  not  conflict,  because  his  reasons  bear 
27  Arthur  might  have  reason  not  to  cause  or  allow  himself  to  care  especially  about 
Andrew  if  there  were  something  about  having  appropriate  levels  of  care  that 
recommended  itself  as  an  end,  e.g.  if  having  appropriate  levels  of  care  turned  out  to  be  a 
moral  duty  for  some  reason.  But  any  such  reasons  would  be  quite  different  from  the 
standard  reason  Arthur  would  have  if  Andrew  were  especially  good  or  valuable,  and  do 
not  affect  my  argument  here. 
28  On  What  Matters  vol.  1  p.  425 
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 on  his  actions  and  my  reasons  on  my  actions.  Similarly,  I  might  now,  so  far  as  I 
can  anticipate  the  future,  have  most  reason  to  ensure  some  future  outcome  that, 
once  the  time  draws  nearer,  I  realize  I  must  ensure  does  not  occur.  Again,  my 
reasons  compete,  but  they  do  not  conflict;  my  old  reasons  bear  on  old  actions  and 
my  new  actions  on  my  current  ones. 
I  mention  these  multi­agent  and  diachronic  cases  because  I  think  that  they 
help  to  illustrate  precisely  what  it  is  about  competing  but  non­conflicting  reasons 
in  the  synchronic  single­agent  case  that  alienates:  Competing  but  non­conflicting 
reasons  like  Arthur’s  undermine  our  practical  unity.  They  set  us  against 
ourselves. 
As  Christine  Korsgaard  wonderfully  puts  it,  “ when  you  deliberate,  it  is  as 
if  there  were  something  over  and  above  all  of  your  desires,  something  which  is 
you ,  and  which  chooses  which  desire  to  act  on.”   With  the  quibble  that  I  might 29
prefer  to  think  of  deliberation  as  adjudicating  between  reasons  rather  than 
desires,  I  think  she  perfectly  describes  the  ideal  case  of  deliberate  action.  In  the 
case  of  competing  reasons,  I  think  that  most  of  us  are  able  to  achieve  this  ideal 
most  of  the  time.  Even  when  we  make  difficult  decisions  or  ones  that  we  will 
regret,  they  strike  us  as  wholly  ours .  Korsgaard  is  concerned  with  agential  unity 
in  particular,  but  her  characterization  of  ideal  deliberation  applies  equally  well  to 
other  cases  in  which  we  respond  to  reasons.  In  the  best  sort  of  case,  we  can  step 
29  The  Sources  of  Normativity  p.  100 
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 back,  survey  all  of  the  relevant  reasons,  and  arrive  at  a  single  response  (or  set  of 
responses)  that  we  can  endorse  wholeheartedly  as  appropriate  and  correct. 
I  do  not  believe  that  most  of  us  can  achieve  the  Korsgaardian  ideal  when  it 
comes  to  competing  but  non­conflicting  reasons.  When  Arthur  faces  up  to  his 
decisive  reasons  not  to  care  especially  for  Andrew  on  the  one  hand  but  to  try  to 
cause  or  allow  himself  to  care  especially  for  Andrew  on  the  other,  he  is  like  the 
two  competitors  trying  to  win  the  race.  As  a  rational  actor,  he  is  bound  to  try  to 
cause  or  allow  irrational  cares  if  he  can.  As  a  rational  valuer,  he  is  bound  not  to 
have  these  cares.  It  seems  to  me  difficult  if  not  impossible  for  the  valuer  and  the 
actor — likewise  the  epistemic  agent,  the  intention­former,  and  any  of  Arthur’s 
other  “parts,”  if  I  can  be  allowed  to  speak  so  loosely,  to  which  reasons  can 
individually  speak — to  reach  any  sort  of  satisfying  accord.  Arthur  cannot  feel 
any  one  way  about  Andrew  and,  stepping  back,  endorse  that  feeling  as  being 
wholly  his .  Arthur  is  alienated. 
 
The  Rationality  of  Reasons  Alienation: 
The  Commensurability  Objection 
I’ve  just  argued  that  the  best  available  account  of  the  standard  / 
non­standard  reasons  distinction  can  explain  how  ECR  engenders  Reasons 
Alienation.  Though  I  do  believe  that  this  picture  is  essentially  correct,  it  does  not 
need  to  be  one  hundred  percent  true  for  it  to  support  the  intractability  of 
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 conflicts  like  Arthur’s.  All  that’s  required  is  for  the  demands  on  Arthur  to  be 
genuinely  practically  irreconcilable.  Some  philosophers  have  denied  (or  seemed 
to  deny)  this  sort  of  claim,  at  least  in  the  epistemic  case.  Chisholm,   for  example, 30
holds  that  ethical  demands  on  belief  always  trump  epistemic  ones,  implying  that 
ethical  demands  on  belief  are  commensurable  and  reconcilable  with  epistemic 
demands  on  belief.   In  this  section  I’ll  be  making  two  claims:  First,  there  is  good 31
reason  to  believe  that  Chisholm  is  wrong;  moral  demands  are  not  even  in 
principle  commensurable  with  epistemic  demands  (likewise  the  sorts  of 
axiological  demands  that  bind  Arthur).  Second,  and  most  importantly,  even  if 
Chisholm  is  right,  moral  demands  are  at  least  practically  irreconcilable  with 
epistemic  (likewise  axiological)  demands. 
To  support  his  commensurability  claim,  Chisholm  gives  an  analysis  of 
epistemic  requirements  on  which  they  turn  out  to  be  a  special  proper  subset  of 
doxastic  requirements,  i.e.  requirements  to  have  some  belief,  to  withhold 
judgment,  and  so  on.  An  epistemic  requirement,  for  Chisholm,  is  just  a  doxastic 
requirement  imposed  by  some  fact  or  state  of  affairs  p  such  that  p  imposes  no 
non ­doxastic  requirements  beyond  such  requirements  as  are  required  by  any  fact 
30  In  “Firth  and  the  Ethics  of  Belief.” 
31  As  I  will  use  them,  “(ir)reconcilable”  and  “(in)commensurable”  are  related  but  distinct 
terms.  Roughly,  reasons  are  (in)commensurable  when  they  can(not)  be  weighed  against 
one  another  whereas  reasons  are  (ir)reconcilable  when  they  can(not)  be  satisfyingly 
responded  to  or  accounted  for  together.  Genuine  moral  dilemmas,  if  there  are  such 
things,  might  thus  be  thought  of  as  cases  of  commensurable  but  irreconcilable  reasons. 
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 or  state  of  affairs.   On  this  view,  epistemic  requirements  are  analogous  to 32
requirements  of  etiquette  or  aesthetics,  and  just  like  such  requirements  they  are 
trumped  absolutely  by  ethical  requirements.  He  claims:  “The  distinguishing 
feature  of  ethical  duty  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  the  considerations  that  impose  that 
duty.  Rather,  an  ethical  duty  is  simply  a  requirement  that  is  not  overridden  by 
any  other  requirement.”  33
Against  Chisholm’s  view  we  can  say  that  it  makes  the  difference  between 
standard  and  non­standard  reasons  for  belief — which  pre­theoretically  seems 
like  a  very  real  and  very  deep  one — look  shallow  and  ad  hoc.  This  objection  is 
particularly  strong  in  the  face  of  Parfit’s  view  that  epistemic  reasons  are  properly 
reasons  for  belief  while  non­standard  reasons  “for  belief”  are  in  fact  reasons  for 
the  actions  of  trying  to  cause  or  allow  oneself  to  have  certain  beliefs.  On  Parfit’s 
view,  the  difference  between  standard  and  non­standard  reasons  for  belief  seems 
neither  shallow  nor  ad  hoc,  which  is  good  reason  to  prefer  it  to  Chisholm’s  view. 
32  “Firth…”  pp.  123 – 124.  Two  bookkeeping  notes  on  this  retelling  of  Chisholm’s  view: 
First,  Chisholm  does  not  actually  specify  what  sort  of  thing  p  is,  but  I  think  that 
something  like  facts  or  state  of  affairs  are  what  he  has  in  mind.  If  not,  and  he’s  actually 
thinking  about  beliefs  or  propositions  or  something  else,  nothing  much  is  lost.  Second, 
this  is  actually  Chisholm’s  account  of  a  “purely  doxastic  requirement.”  But  when  he 
goes  on  to  define  “epistemic  requirements”  as  a  proper  subset  of  these,  he  seems  to  do 
so  in  such  a  way  that  he  repeats  his  earlier  definition,  such  that  epistemic  requirements 
just  are  purely  doxastic  requirements.  Colleagues  with  whom  I’ve  talked  on  the  subject 
have  likewise  failed  to  see  the  difference  between  the  two  definitions,  and  in  his  “Why 
There  Are  No  Epistemic  Duties,”  Chase  Wrenn  notes  that  Chisholm  seems  to  have  made 
the  error  I’m  claiming  here  (pp.  117  and  133). 
33  “Firth…”  p.  127 
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 Still,  though  some  have  denied  it,   there  is  something  attractive  about 34
Chisholm’s  “ethical  ought.”  It’s  an  all­things­considered  just­plain­ought,  a  top 
level  ought,  a  trump  card.  Wouldn’t  it  be  nice  if  such  things  existed?  When  we 
are  faced  with  Pascalian  wager  or  a  Newcombian  box  or  an  Arthurian 
relationship,  shouldn’t  there  be  at  least  one  rational  way  to  respond?  Can  even 
the  most  virtuous  possible  person  really  be  condemned  to  some  form  of 
irrationality  when  faced  with  competing  standard  and  non­standard  reasons? 
I  think  that  the  incommensurabilist  can  offer  a  partly  satisfying  response 
to  this  sort  of  worry.  We  could  (though  would  not  be  not  bound  to)  say  that  in 
these  cases  there  is  at  least  one  right  way  to  act — it’s  just  that  the  way  you’re 
required  to  act  might  be  to  cause  yourself  to  be  irrational  in  your  beliefs,  cares, 
etc.  We  might  even  be  able  to  say  that  so  acting  may  be  the  best  available 
response,  where  “response”  is  meant  to  include  not  only  your  actions  but  your 
beliefs,  cares,  etc.  Since  it  seems  to  me  generally  far,  far  less  important  that  I 
believe  or  care  rationally  than  that  I  act  rightly,  it  would  generally  be  much  better 
for  me  to  act  rightly  in  making  myself  believe  or  care  irrationally  than  to  act 
wrongly  in  allowing  myself  to  believe  or  care  rationally.  Still,  even  in  this  best 
34  E.g.  Feldman:  “I  take  Hall  and  Johnson  to  be  suggesting  that  when  you  epistemically 
ought  to  gather  more  evidence  and  you  morally  ought  to  do  something  else,  the  moral 
ought  "wins"  and  you  just  plain  ought  to  do  that  other  thing.  It's  this  that  I  just  don't 
understand.  Of  course,  by  this  I  mean  to  suggest  that  no  one  else  understands  it  either.  It 
makes  no  sense”  (“The  Ethics  of  Belief”  p.  692). 
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 case,  my  belief  or  care  is  not  made  rational  by  the  rightness  of  my  actions,  and  so, 
insofar  as  I  can  observe  my  irrationality,  the  seeds  of  alienation  are  sown. 
A  conversation  with  my  colleague  Jonathan  Drake  made  me  aware  of  a 
second,  more  difficult  objection  to  the  sort  of  incommensurabilist  view  that  I 
favor.  (I  don’t  actually  remember  which  one  of  us  came  up  with  the  objection  or 
if  he  ultimately  endorsed  it.)  I  am  inclined  to  say,  with  Parfit,  that  reasons  for 
belief  are  one  thing  and  reasons  for  action,  including  the  action  of  causing  or 
allowing  oneself  to  believe  something  if  one  can,  are  another.  But  perhaps  it  is 
just  a  contingent  fact  about  human  psychology  that  our  faculties  for  action  and 
belief  formation  seem  so  separate  and  different.  If  we  were,  say,  perfect  doxastic 
voluntarists,  with  just  one  faculty  responsible  for  both  action  and  belief 
formation,  would  we  really  be  tempted  to  say  that  reasons  for  action  and  belief 
were  incommensurable?  (Would  such  a  claim  even  make  sense?)  If  not,  maybe 
we  shouldn’t  make  the  deep  and  perhaps  necessary­if­true  claim  that  reasons  of 
different  sorts  are  incommensurable  on  the  basis  of  contingent  facts  about 
human  psychology. 
Perhaps  we  can  respond  that  even  though  it  is  plausibly  a  merely 
contingent  fact  about  human  psychology  that  we  apparently  respond  to  reasons 
for  action  and  reasons  for  belief  in  deeply  different  ways  or  using  distinct 
faculties,  nevertheless  reasons  to  act,  believe,  and  care  are  still  necessarily  deeply 
conceptually  different  from  one  another,  or  work  metaphysically  in  totally 
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 different  ways,  or  are  sensitive  to  wholly  different  sorts  of  considerations,  and  as 
a  result  are  still  deeply  incommensurable  with  one  another.  On  this  account,  the 
perfect  doxastic  voluntarist  would  simply  be  using  one  faculty  to  respond  to  two 
deeply  different  and  incommensurable  sorts  of  reason.  I  think  that  a  response 
along  these  lines  is  likely  to  be  right,  but  I  am  not  certain. 
Or  perhaps  it  is  enough  to  say  in  response  that  reasons  for  care,  belief, 
action,  etc.  are  incommensurable  in  principle  for  creatures  like  us.  Suppose  there 
exists  some  perfectly  doxastically  and  affectively  voluntarist  alien  that  handles 
all  reasons­response  with  a  single  mental  faculty.  Suppose  too  that  the 
metaphysical  structures  of  reasons  for  action,  care,  belief,  etc.  do  not  render  these 
reasons  deeply  or  necessarily  incommensurable.  Suppose  that  there  are  no  such 
things  as  genuine  dilemmas  between  reasons  of  different  “sorts”  and  that  in 
every  case  this  alien  can  make  a  wholly  rational  all­things­considered  best 
response.  Well,  so  what?  We  can’t  do  such  a  thing,  because  we  respond  to  reasons 
of  different  sorts  in  deeply  different  ways,  and  rationality  in  one  realm  can’t 
somehow  wash  clean  irrationality  in  another.  
If  neither  of  these  responses  is  satisfying,  I  do  not  know  a  better  way  to 
answer  the  objection,  though  that  is  not  to  say  that  it  cannot  be  answered. 
Fortunately,  my  more  modest  claim  of  practical  irreconcilability,  which  ought  to 
be  enough  to  show  that  Reasons  Alienation  is  a  predictable  effect  of  a  belief  in 
ECR,  doesn’t  depend  on  deep  incommensurability. 
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 Suppose  that  Chisholm  is  right;  suppose  that  reasons  for  belief,  for  care, 
and  for  action,  among  others,  are  perfectly  commensurable.  Suppose  too  that 
there  are  no  such  things  as  a  genuine  dilemmas,  as  some  people  believe  there  are 
even  between  reasons  of  commensurable  sorts.  That  is,  suppose  that  it  is  always 
possible  in  every  circumstance  to  simultaneously  act,  believe,  and  care  in  right, 
warranted,  and  fitting  ways.  Even  then,  I  believe  that  knowing  the  truth  of  ECR 
must  be  alienating  for  creatures  like  us.  Here’s  why: 
However  the  moral  metaphysics  turn  out,  Arthur  will  always  be  able  to 
think:  “The  man  sitting  next  to  me  on  this  couch  is  merely  psychologically  and 
otherwise  continuous  with  and  connected  to  the  person  who  was  at  the  park 
with  me  yesterday,  just  as  “me  yesterday”  was  merely  connected  in  these  ways 
to  me  now;  I  can  owe  the  man  next  to  me  nothing,  nor  can  he  owe  me;  every  act 
of  kindness  and  cruelty  and  romance  and  bitterness  that  he  has  done  to  me  or  I 
to  him  is  in  the  past  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  two  people  here  now  except 
insofar  as  it  may  have  helped  shape  us;  it  cannot  matter  for  me  now  whether  he 
will  die  tomorrow  anymore  than  it  could  matter  for  me  whether  I  will  die 
tomorrow;  the  man  I  love,  since  I  love  all  of  him  and  not  just  the  tiny  piece  of  him 
in  this  room,  is  ultimately  a  conventional  fiction.” 
Since  Arthur  believes  ECR,  he  believes  everything  he’s  just  thought.  How 
could  having  these  thoughts  be  anything  but  painful  and  alienating?  He  can,  of 
course,  assure  himself  that  since  reasons  are  commensurable  and  since  his 
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 reasons  to  care  for  Andrew  outweigh  his  reasons  not  to,  he’s  being  perfectly 
rational  in  every  way.  I  do  not  think  that  this  thought  will  be  much  consolation. 
Whether  or  not  he  can  ultimately  endorse  his  attitudes,  they  will  unavoidably 
strike  him  as  immediately  bizarre,  absurd,  unwarranted,  fantastic. 
What,  then,  does  Arthur  do?  Or  any  of  us? 
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Chapter  Three  –  How  to  Live  a  Lie 
 
In  my  first  chapter,  I  argued  for  Extreme  Claim  Reductionism  (ECR),  the 
view  that  there  is  no  “deep  further  fact”  about  personal  identity  and  that  nothing 
matters  in  anything  like  the  way  that  we  ordinarily  take  the  “deep  further  fact” 
to  matter.  If  this  is  true,  then  things  like  partial  concern,  desert,  first­personal 
anticipation,  and  the  value  of  lives  taken  as  wholes  are  left  without  any  plausible 
grounds  or  justification. 
In  my  second  chapter,  I  argued  that  a  belief  in  ECR  threatens  us  with  what 
I  called  Reasons  Alienation,  which  I  defined  as  alienation  resulting  from  a  gap 
between  what  one  believes  one  does,  should,  or  must  care  about  on  the  one  hand 
and  what  one  believes  actually  matters  on  the  other.  I  then  argued  that,  in  the 
present  case,  our  Reasons  Alienation  is  the  result  of  ECR  undermining  many  of 
our  standard,  object­given  reasons  to  value,  act,  and  believe  while  leaving 
untouched  many  of  our  non­standard,  state­given  reasons  to  cause  or  allow 
ourselves  to  have  certain  motivations,  values,  or  beliefs.  If,  as  I  argued,  standard 
reasons  are  at  least  practically  irreconcilable  with  non­standard  reasons,  we 
should  expect  Reasons  Alienation  to  be  a  difficult­to­avoid  fact  of  life  for  those  of 
us  convinced  of  ECR. 
Thus  we  face  a  question:  What  do  we  do  when  our  beliefs  set  us  against 
ourselves  in  this  way?  
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Consequentialism  and  Self­Defeat 
This  question,  it  turns  out,  is  not  entirely  new  in  the  philosophical 
literature.  Charges  of  self­defeat  and  alienation  have  been  made  against 
consequentialist  ethical  theories  for  many  years,  and  philosophers  who  take 
these  charges  seriously  have  attempted  to  give  accounts  of  how  people  should  go 
about  trying  to  be  consequentialists.  The  issues  faced  by  ECR  and  the  Reasons 
Alienation  that  it  engenders  are  similar  to  the  ones  faced  by  consequentialism, 
and  can,  I  think,  be  met  with  the  same  sorts  of  replies  that  consequentialists  have 
historically  used  to  defend  their  theories.  In  fact,  because  ECR  strips  away  much 
of  ordinary  morality,  the  remaining  core  may  end  up  looking  much  more 
consequentialist  than  whatever  we  started  with.   (Parfit  thought,  at  least  when  he 1
wrote  Reasons  and  Persons ,  that  even  Moderate  Claim  Reductionism  supported 
act  utilitarianism.)  If  this  is  so,  as  I  believe  it  is,  then  the  self­defeat  charges  that 
consequentialism  faces  will  be  among  the  self­defeat  charges  that  ECR  faces.  And 
so,  since  the  relevant  literature  on  consequentialism  is  as  rich  as  it  is,  I  will  in  the 
next  few  sections  consider  the  cases  of  consequentialism  and  ECR  side  by  side. 
1  An  argument  by  way  of  example:  Suppose  that,  before  coming  to  believe  ECR, 
someone  believed  in  the  seven  Rossian  prima  facie  duties  of  fidelity,  reparation, 
gratitude,  justice,  beneficence,  self­improvement,  and  non­maleficence  ( The  Right  and  the 
Good  p.  21).  The  only  of  these  duties  that  could  plausibly  survive  ECR  would  seem  to  be 
beneficence,  nonmaleficence,  and  perhaps  a  very  limited  form  of  justice.  This 
now­former  Rossian,  whose  ethics  started  out  looking  very  much  like  commonsense 
morality,  would  now  have  something  very  close  to  a  consequentialist  view. 
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It  is  widely  believed  that  some  forms  of  consequentialism  are  bound  to 
recommend  that  we  do  not  strive  to  do  the  actions  that  the  theories  say  are  right. 
I  share  this  belief.  The  following  case  is  meant  to  motivate  this  seemingly 
paradoxical  recommendation: 
Suppose  I  get  a  $500  tax  refund  and  am  deciding  whether  to  buy  a  nice 
new  bike  or  give  it  to  the  JustMilk  charity.   On  any  minimally  plausible  view,  a 2
world  where  fewer  infants  contract  HIV  or  Malaria  or  suffer  from  dehydration  is 
vastly  impersonally  better  than  a  world  where  I  experience  fewer  flat  tires  and 
chafed  thighs.  And  so,  on  any  minimally  plausible  impartialist  consequentialist 
theory,  I  should  give  the  $500  to  JustMilk  before  spending  it  on  a  bike,  barring 
any  unforeseen  effects  of  either  action.  3
So  far  so  good;  I  give  the  money  to  charity  and  forego  the  bike.   Now 4
suppose  that  I  run  through  this  sort  of  calculation  whenever  I  make  even  minor 
decisions.  I  stop  going  out  with  friends,  because  my  time  could  be  better  spent 
earning  supplemental  income  to  donate  or  volunteering  at  a  homeless  shelter;  I 
2  Since  it’s  my  dissertation,  I’m  picking  my  favorite  charitable  organization,  co­founded 
by  my  brother,  which  aims  to  manufacture  silicone  nipple  shields  with  inserts  that 
would  be  used  to  deliver  nutrients  and  drugs  to  breastfeeding  infants. 
3  In  most  of  what  follows,  I  assume  a  maximizing  consequentialism,  on  which  I  may 
perform  an  action  only  if  no  other  available  option  has  a  better  outcome.  I  do  not  think 
that  this  assumption  is  necessary;  I  make  it  because  the  argument  runs  most 
straightforwardly  in  the  maximizing  case.  Satisficing  views  make  room  for  permissible 
actions  that  do  not  maximize  consequences  so  long  as  the  outcome  is  “good  enough,” 
but  the  gap  between  buying  the  bike  and  giving  to  JustMilk  is  so  massive  that  it  is  hard 
to  see  how  any  satisficing  view  that  allows  buying  the  bike  could  ever  prohibit  much  of 
anything. 
4  I’m  giving  myself  too  much  credit  here,  but  this  is  after  all  a  thought  experiment. 
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stop  drinking  socially — alcohol  is  expensive,  after  all — and  eating  anything 
besides  brown  rice  and  beans;  I  take  my  girlfriend  to  Taco  Bell  for  our 
anniversary  dinner;  I  take  on  a  second  and  then  a  third  job  so  that  I  can  donate 
the  proceeds;  and  so  on.  Before  long,  my  friends  have  begun  to  ignore  me,  my 
girlfriend  has  left  me,  I’ve  lost  my  jobs,  I’m  a  nervous  wreck,  my  health  is  failing, 
and — worst  of  all,  consequentially  speaking — I  am  giving  less  time  and  money  to 
worthy  causes  than  I  was  before  my  consequentialist  awakening. 
Well,  so  what?  Haven’t  I  just  described  a  case  where  I’m  not  really 
performing  actions  that  are  all  things  considered  for  the  best?  Aren’t  I  simply 
failing  to  perform  the  consequentialist  calculus  properly?  The  answer  to  the  first 
question  is  surely  “yes,”  but  the  second  one  is  trickier.  In  some  cases  it  seems 
likely  that  I  have  simply  ignored  some  of  the  predictable  psychological  and  social 
tolls  of  my  actions,  as  when  I  take  my  girlfriend  to  Taco  Bell  for  our  anniversary, 
which  results  in  my  being  dumped  and  suffering  through  a  period  of  crushing 
depression  and  non­productivity.  This  sort  of  case  may  be  enough  by  itself  to 
recommend  that  I  stop  trying  to  perform  the  consequentialist  calculus,  because  it 
might  be  that  I  am  predictably  bad  at  it. 
But  in  other  cases,  I  might  go  through  the  consequentialist  calculus 
perfectly  and  manage  to  act  according  to  its  dictates  but  still  end  up  bringing 
about  worse  consequences  than  I  would  have  otherwise.  There  may  seem  to  be  a 
contradiction  here,  but  if  the  very  implementation  of  the  calculus  involves  costs, 
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there  is  not.  Acting  always  for  consequentialist  reasons  might  blunt  my  capacity 
to  care  for  the  people  around  me  or  make  me  difficult  or  unpleasant  to  be 
around,  regardless  of  what  actions  I  perform.  Thinking  constantly  about  the 
suffering  that  I  could  be  using  my  time  and  money  to  prevent  might  turn  me  into 
a  nervous  wreck,  even  if  I  often  reason  myself  into  performing  actions  of 
self­care.  And  there’s  the  obvious  point  that  calculation  takes  time  and  mental 
energy.  Again,  these  are  costs  associated  with  the  very  application  of  the  calculus; 
they  could  not  be  avoided  by  making  better  calculations.  For  someone  like  me, 
applying  a  consequentialist  calculus  might  have  bad  consequences  even  if  I  were 
to  calculate  correctly  in  every  case! 
There  is,  of  course,  nothing  impossible  about  creatures  that  are 
psychologically  equipped  to  apply  and  act  on  a  consequentialist  calculus  with 
minimal  cost,  but  it  seems  probable  that  few  human  beings  are  of  this  sort.  For 
most  of  us,  trying  in  all  cases  to  do  the  consequentialist  thing  will  make  things  go 
suboptimally,  or  even  very  badly;  in  Parfit’s  terminology,  consequentialism  is 
“indirectly  self­defeating.”   I  will  follow  his  usage  and  call  any  normative  theory 5
indirectly  self­defeating  just  in  case  attempting  to  follow  the  theory  increases  the 
5  RP  p.  14.  Parfit  believes  that  indirectly  self­defeating  theories  are  not  problematic  in  the 
way  that  what  he  calls  directly  self­defeating  theories  are.  For  these  latter  theories, 
individual  success  guarantees  collective  failure.  This  chapter  will  not  explicitly  deal  with 
any  directly  self­defeating  theories. 
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risk  (vs.  some  other  available  strategy)  of  failure  on  its  own  terms.   I  will  also 6
follow  Parfit  in  calling  normative  theories  “self­effacing”  just  in  case  they  admit 
that  they  themselves  are  self­defeating.   That  is,  a  theory  is  self­effacing  just  in 7
case  it  explicitly  tells  us  to  try  to  believe  or  follow  some  other  theory. 
It  may  not  be  immediately  clear  whether  an  indirectly  self­defeating 
theory  could  be  correct  or  a  self­effacing  theory  coherent.  Williams,  who  is 
reluctant  to  draw  a  distinction  between  a  false  moral  theory  and  a  moral  theory 
that  should  not  be  adopted,  takes  the  self­defeat  objection  to  be  absolutely  fatal 
to  utilitarianism.   I  believe  that  Railton,   Parfit,   and  others  have  shown  that  this 8 9 10
reaction  is  too  strong. 
Self­effacing  consequentialism  might  seem  paradoxical  because  it  might 
seem  to  order  us  not  to  do  the  consequentialist  thing.  “Do  not  follow  this  order” 
is  paradoxical  in  something  like  the  way  that  the  Liar  sentence  is.   If  I  follow  the 11
order,  I  have  not  followed  it;  if  I  do  not  follow  it,  I  have  followed  it.  But,  in  fact, 
no  version  of  consequentialism  that  I  know  actually  takes  this  paradoxical  form. 
6  More  than  just  moral  theories  could  be  indirectly  self­defeating.  Commands,  aims, 
games — anything  with  specified  success  conditions,  really — might  be  indirectly 
self­defeating. 
7  RP  p.  24 
8  “A  Critique  of  Utilitarianism”  p.  135 
9  “Alienation,  Consequentialism,  and  the  Demands  of  Morality” 
10  RP  part  1 
11  A  theory  that  took  this  form  would  be  even  more  immediately  self­defeating  than 
Parfit’s  directly  self­defeating  theories,  discussed  above  in  footnote  five. 
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Some  theories  worth  calling  consequentialist  might  instead  say:  “Try  your 
best  to  make  things  go  well.”  Let’s  suppose  that  following  these  theories  would 
make  things  go  much  worse  than  they  otherwise  might.  This  feature  of  the 
theories  makes  them  implausible,  since  a  main  intuition  supporting 
consequentialism  is  that  it  is  important  that  things  actually  do  go  well,  but  it  does 
not  make  the  theories  paradoxical.  By  way  of  comparison:  You  tell  me  that  you 
are  feeling  stressed  and  I  tell  you  to  focus  as  hard  as  you  can  on  not  thinking 
about  your  responsibilities,  which  causes  you  to  obsess  over  them.  My  advice  is 
bad,  because  it  makes  you  experience  more  stress,  which  is  presumably  the 
opposite  of  what  is  good  for  you,  but  it  is  not  paradoxical  or  impossible  to 
follow.  All  you  need  to  do  to  follow  my  advice  is  to  focus  as  hard  as  you  can  on 
keeping  your  responsibilities  off  your  mind.  Though  you  could  do  this,  you 
shouldn’t. 
Better  versions  of  consequentialism  say:  “Do  whatever  as  a  matter  of  fact 
makes  things  go  well.”  If  consequentialism  is  indirectly  self­defeating,  trying  to 
follow  such  a  theory  will  mean  failing  to  actually  follow  it.  This  feature  presents  a 
practical  problem  for  anyone  convinced  of  the  truth  of  such  a  theory,  but  does 
not  make  such  theories  genuinely  paradoxical.  By  way  of  comparison:  “The 
Game”  is  a  fairly  well­known  game  that  one  loses  whenever  one  thinks  about  it. 
Focusing  on  doing  well  at  The  Game  is  thus  a  sure  recipe  for  failure,  whereas  not 
caring  about  winning  is  generally  a  good  strategy.  (Up  until  I  started  work  on 
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this  paper,  I  had  been  doing  very  well  for  years.)  There  are  practical  problems 
with  playing  The  Game,  but  there  is  no  paradox  proper;  The  Game  is  entirely 
coherent,  and  success  and  failure  are  perfectly  well  defined. 
Likewise,  self­effacing  consequentialism — consequentialism  that  tells  us 
not  to  try  too  hard  to  discover  and  pursue  consequentialist  actions  at  all 
moments  of  our  lives — presents  a  problem,  but  not  a  paradox  or  contradiction. 
The  arguments  I  have  just  made  to  support  this  claim  generalize  to  other 
self­effacing  theories,  which  is  important,  because  any  plausible  normative 
theory  compatible  with  ECR  will  tell  us  that  we  often  have  strong  practical  or 
moral  reasons  to  cause  or  allow  ourselves  to  ignore  many  of  the  normative 
implications  of  ECR. 
For  a  reader  unsympathetic  to  consequentialism  or  ECR,  that  a  theory  is 
self­effacing   might  seem  to  be,  if  not  enough  to  render  it  paradoxical,  then  at 12
least  some  evidence  against  its  truth.  But  I  believe  that  even  this  moderated 
reaction  is  too  strong,  because  any  plausible  theory  of  morality  has  at  least  the 
potential  to  be  self­effacing  in  some  circumstances — a  point  to  which  I’ll  soon 
return.  If  some  malevolent  intelligence  threatens  unspeakable  harm  to  all  human 
12  Strictly,  I  should  say  not  that  ECR  is  self­effacing,  because  ECR  makes  only  the 
negative  normative  claim  that  nothing  matters  in  the  way  that  personal  identity  is 
mistakenly  taken  to  matter.  ECR  does  not  imply,  by  itself,  that  anything  does  matter. 
More  carefully,  I  would  say  that  a  pairing  of  ECR  together  with  a  plausible  moral  theory 
compatible  with  it  will  be  self­effacing.  Such  a  theory  pair  is  likely  to  hold,  for  example, 
that  long­term  friendship  does  not  matter  intrinsically  or  finally  but  that  we  should  let 
ourselves  think  and  act  as  if  it  does. 
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beings  if  I  do  not  come  to  believe  and  act  on  some  close­but­not­perfect 
approximation  of  the  true  moral  theory,  then  I  should  certainly  do  whatever  it 
takes  to  believe  and  act  on  the  slightly  false  moral  theory  instead  of  the  true 
one.   Importantly,  I  should  do  so  according  to  any  minimally  plausible  moral 13
theory,  not  just  consequentialism;  a  theory  that  told  me  to  try  to  preserve  my  true 
moral  beliefs  in  the  face  of  horrific  suffering  would  be  cruel,  perverse,  and  false. 
In  the  terminology  of  Chapter  Two,  we  should  believe  that  any  plausible 
theory  will  acknowledge  that  we  might  have  decisive  non­standard  state­given 
reasons  to  cause  or  allow  ourselves  to  have  irrational  beliefs,  motivations,  or 
values.  That  a  theory  has  the  potential  to  be  self­effacing  in  this  way  in  some 
circumstances  thus  does  not  reveal  some  structural  flaw.  The  fact,  if  it  is  a  fact, 
that  consequentialism  and  ECR  are  self­defeating  more  often  in  the  actual  world 
than  are  other  candidate  theories  is  no  evidence  against  the  truth  of 
consequentialism  or  of  ECR. 
 
Can  We  Get  Around  Self­Defeat? 
I  have  said  that  self­effacement  and  indirect  self­defeat  present  no  genuine 
paradox  but  that  they  do  present  a  practical  problem.  What  do  I  do  when  I 
13  This  case  is  adapted  from  Railton’s  thought  experiment  about  a  demon  that  demands 
Kantian  belief  and  action  of  consequentialists  (“Alienation,  Consequentialism,  and  the 
Demands  of  Morality”  p.  155).  I  describe  the  case  in  more  general  terms  in  order  to  make 
clear  that  it’s  not  just  consequentialism,  but  rather  any  plausible  moral  theory,  that  is 
open  to  self­effacement. 
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believe  a  self­effacing  theory? 
In  Chapter  Two,  I  argued  that  conflicts  between  standard  (object­given) 
and  non­standard  (state­given)  reasons  will  generally  be  practically  impossible  to 
reconcile,  since  the  different  sorts  of  reason  tend  to  appeal  to  different  faculties  or 
forms  of  rationality,  or  at  least  to  one  faculty  at  different  times.  In  the 
consequentialist  case,  we  have  standard  object­given  epistemic  reasons  to  have 
consequentialist  moral  beliefs  alongside  competing  non­standard  state­given 
reasons  to  cause  or  allow  ourselves  to  have  non­consequentialist  moral  beliefs. 
We  also  have  standard  object­given  reasons  to  promote  the  good  alongside 
competing  non­standard  state­given  reasons  to  cause  or  allow  ourselves  to  have 
a  character  or  motivational  profile  such  that  we  often  fail  to  promote  the  good. 
Thus,  if  my  arguments  in  Chapter  Two  succeeded,  we  should  expect  the 
self­defeating  natures  of  consequentialism  and  ECR  to  be  pretty  stable.  However, 
competition  between  standard  and  non­standard  reasons  is  only  intractable 
when  there  is  no  way  to  change  our  situation  so  that  our  reasons  become 
different.  For  example,  if  someone  threatens  to  shoot  me  unless  I  believe  that  the 
moon  landing  was  a  hoax,  I  can  get  around  the  irreconcilable  conflict  between 
my  competing  reasons  by  taking  his  gun  away  and  driving  off.  Maybe  there  is  a 
similarly  ideal  solution  in  the  consequentialist  or  ECR  cases.  
In  one  sort  of  ideal  case,  I  might  bring  my  cares  in  line  with  my  beliefs 
about  what  matters.  I  might  reshape  my  desires,  projects,  reactive  attitudes,  etc. 
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in  an  entirely  new  mold  in  the  hopes  of  minimizing  the  costs  of  applying  a 
consequentialist  calculus  or  taking  an  impersonal  view  of  the  world.  But  it  is 
unlikely  that  I  (or  very  many  other  people)  could  succeed  in  such  a  project; 
indeed,  its  difficulty  is  a  major  reason  that  consequentialism  might  be  indirectly 
self­defeating.  Even  if  I  could  somehow  succeed  in  radically  reshaping  my 
personality,  it  is  not  clear  that  doing  so  would  be  warranted  even  on  my  own 
terms,  as  it  would  only  allow  me  to  escape  some  of  the  traps  that  make 
consequentialism  and  ECR  indirectly  self­defeating;  I  might  minimize  the  direct 
psychological  toll  of  promoting  impersonal  good  over  all  else,  but  I  might  still  be 
prone  to  calculation  errors  or  be  seen  as  untrustworthy  or  undesirable  as  a 
friend.  I  might  stop  caring  about  people  qua  person  but  in  doing  so  come  to 
alienate  my  friends  and  family.  And  so  on.  This  is  not  even  to  mention  the 
psychological  toll  that  trying  to  reshape  my  personality  would  likely  entail, 
whether  or  not  I  managed  to  succeed.  It  seems  unwise  to  try  to  bring  my  cares  in 
line  with  my  beliefs. 
In  another  sort  of  ideal  case,  I  might  bring  my  beliefs  in  line  with  my 
cares.  I  might  succeed  in  convincing  myself  that  consequentialism  or  ECR  is  false 
and  that  some  other  theory  is  true.  If  I  were  to  do  a  good  job  of  picking  the  new 
theory  out,  I  might  manage  to  succeed  much  better  on  my  old  terms  than  I  would 
have  if  I  had  continued  believing  in  consequentialism  or  ECR.  The  most 
immediate  problem  with  this  strategy  is,  of  course,  that  it  is  extremely  hard  to 
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make  oneself  believe  something  for  purely  practical  reasons  when  the  epistemic 
reasons  seem  to  rule  it  out.  If  I  am  threatened  with  some  terrible  misfortune 
unless  I  come  to  disbelieve  some  obvious  but  unimportant  truth,  it  seems  clear 
that  I  should  make  myself  disbelieve  it  but  equally  clear  that  I  will  not  be  able  to 
do  so  by  ordinarily  available  means. 
Moreover,  it  is  not  clear  that  I  should  come  to  believe  a  theory  that  is 
exactly  in  line  with  my  ordinary  cares.  It  may  be  that  allowing  some  gap  between 
what  I  believe  and  what  I  personally  care  about  is  ideal.  It  might  be  best,  for 
instance,  to  have  a  tendency  to  revert  to  consequentialist  reasoning  when  it 
comes  to  some  extremely  high­stakes  decisions.   Or  there  might  be  something 14
undesirable  about  psychologies  that  can  shrug  off  Singer­style  thought 
experiments   that  are  meant  to  demonstrate  the  moral  irrelevance  of  factors  like 15
physical  distance  which  we  may  nevertheless  be  psychologically  incapable  of 
14  Hare  argues  for  this  claim,  which  strikes  me  as  extremely  plausible,  in  his  defense  of 
“two  level”  utilitarianism  ( Moral  Thinking ,  especially  ch.  3).  On  Hare’s  view,  the 
utilitarian  should  be  able  to  make  both  slow,  considered,  utilitarian  judgments  and 
quicker  intuitive  judgments.  He  compares  this  task  to  that  of  a  commander  keeping  both 
strategy  and  tactics  in  mind  during  battle  (p.  52).  As  I  will  ultimately  suggest  that  we 
must  live  with  tension  between  our  beliefs,  cares,  and  desires,  this  sort  of 
multi­standpoint  or  multi­strategy  picture  is  not  too  different  from  my  own.  But  I 
believe  that  Hare  is  too  optimistic  about  the  ease  of  this  sort  of  project.  Keeping  difficult 
moral  truths  in  mind  alongside  ordinary  cares  is  unlike  keeping  strategy  and  tactics  in 
mind  because  strategy  and  tactics  do  not  directly  undermine  one  another. 
15  In  “Famine,  Affluence,  and  Morality,”  Singer  famously  compares  the  choice  one  has  to 
save  famine­threatened  lives  by  donating  money  with  the  choice  one  would  have  when 
walking  past  a  drowning  child  to  save  it  by  jumping  in  and  ruining  one’s  clothes.  In 
both  cases,  lives  can  be  saved  at  a  non­negligible  but  relatively  inconsequential  cost. 
Singer  argues  that,  because  there  seem  to  be  no  morally  relevant  differences  between  the 
two  cases,  we  are  as  just  as  required  to  donate  our  money  to  famine  relief  as  we  would 
be  to  save  the  nearby  drowning  child. 
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ignoring  in  all  cases  without  substantial  psychological  cost.  And  so,  even  if  I 
could  practically  come  to  bring  my  beliefs  in  line  with  my  cares,  it  is  far  from 
clear  that  I  should. 
A  middle  strategy,  wherein  I  attempt  to  adjust  my  desires  and  beliefs  so 
that  they  meet  somewhere  in  the  middle,  inherits  all  of  the  problems  of  the  two 
strategies  I’ve  just  described.  Ultimately,  in  both  the  consequentialist  and  ECR 
cases,  there  seems  to  be  no  clear  way  to  close  the  gap  between  standard  and 
non­standard  reasons  so  that  they  no  longer  compete. 
In  giving  these  arguments,  I  do  not  mean  to  suggest  that  no  creature,  or 
even  no  human  being,  could  align  their  cares,  beliefs,  and  desires  in  such  a  way 
as  to  avoid  the  possibility  of  reasons  alienation.  Perhaps  a  Buddhist  sage  could 
manage  it,  or  a  person  with  deeply  impaired  capacities  for  empathy  and  emotion 
but  a  fully  functional  capacity  for  moral  reasoning.  It  might  also  be  that 
technology  could  provide  us  with  an  answer.  But  for  most  of  us  living  in  the 
present,  myself  included,  aligning  our  cares,  beliefs,  and  desires  is  not  a  realistic 
option. 
In  short,  if  I  believe  that  consequentialism  or  ECR  is  true  and 
self­defeating,  then  I  am  morally  and  practically  required  to  accept  a  disconnect 
between  what  I  believe  matters  and  what  I  care  about.  To  the  extent  that  this 
disconnect  is  unavoidably  alienating,  as  I  have  argued  that  it  must  be,  I  am 
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morally  and  practically  required  to  live  with  Reasons  Alienation  rather  than 
attempting  to  eliminate  it  from  my  life. 
 
Everyday  Reasons  Alienation 
In  Chapter  Two,  I  characterized  Reasons  Alienation  as  the  sort  of 
alienation  that  results  from  a  disconnect  between  what  I  believe  I  do,  should,  or 
must  care  about  on  the  one  hand  and  what  I  believe  actually  matters  on  the 
other.  I  argued  from  cases  that  this  disconnect  is  indeed  alienating  and  then 
attempted  to  account  for  this  fact  (and  for  the  stability  of  the  disconnect)  by 
appealing  to  the  practical  irreconcilability  of  competing  standard  and 
non­standard  reasons.  In  this  chapter,  I  elaborated  on  the  specific  sorts  of 
competing  standard  and  non­standard  reasons  at  play  in  the  cases  of 
consequentialism  and  ECR  and  argued  that  the  tension  they  present  does  not 
undermine  the  plausibility  of  either  theory.  I  then  argued  that  we  should  not 
expect  to  be  able  to  change  our  situations  so  as  to  align  our  standard  and 
non­standard  reasons  in  these  cases,  which  suggests  that  the  disconnect  between 
our  beliefs  and  cares  will  (and  should)  remain  stable  and  we  will  have  to  live 
with  Reasons  Alienation  rather  than  finding  a  way  around  it  after  all. 
Some  philosophers  writing  about  consequentialism  and  reductionism 
about  personal  identity  would  reject  these  claims.  They  would  argue  that  the 
disconnect  between  belief  and  care  need  not  exist  or  that  it  need  not  be 
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alienating.  My  appendix  defends  my  view  against  these  arguments,  and  for  the 
rest  of  the  chapter  proper  I  will  assume  that  alienation  is  the  real,  necessary 
result  of  ECR  and  consequentialism.  My  eventual  “solution”  will  therefore  not 
pretend  to  eliminate  or  even  minimize  Reasons  Alienation  but  will  instead 
suggest  a  strategy  for  living  with  it.  But  before  I  get  to  this  solution,  I  want  to  ask 
my  readers  to  engage  in  some  introspection  about  sources  of  possible  Reasons 
Alienation  in  their  own  lives  and  to  consider  what  a  tall  order  it  would  be  to 
handle  even  the  simplest  of  these — too  tall,  I  think,  for  any  “good  faith”  solution 
to  the  problem  of  Reasons  Alienation  to  be  successful.  After  doing  so,  even 
readers  unsympathetic  to  ECR  or  consequentialism  may  discover  that  my 
solution  nevertheless  has  something  to  offer  them. 
Many  of  us — I  would  think  the  vast  majority — have  things  in  our  lives 
that  we  care  about  greatly  but  that,  upon  reflection,  we  could  be  convinced  do 
not  actually  matter  very  much.  Probably  even  more  of  us  have  things  that  we 
recognize  intellectually  to  be  important  but  that  we  do  not  care  very  much  about 
in  everyday  life.  We  all  seem  to  get  along  fine  in  the  face  of  these  disconnects,  but 
they  are  alienating  nevertheless. 
I’m  going  to  recommend  a  sort  of  exercise:  Think,  if  you  can,  of  something 
that  matters  especially  to  you  that  you  recognize  may  not  be  as  objectively 
important  as  your  care  would  suggest.  If  you  believe  some  theory,  like  ECR  or 
act  utilitarianism,  that  has  unintuitive  normative  implications,  the  exercise 
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should  be  easy.  But  I  think  that  most  anyone  who  is  honest  with  themselves 
should  be  able  to  manage  it.  There  are  any  number  of  things  that  might  fit  the 
bill — the  success  of  a  local  sports  team,  the  happenings  in  a  fictional  universe,  the 
outcome  of  a  months­long  multiplayer  strategy  game  you’re  playing  with 
friends — whatever.  Once  you’ve  picked  one,  focus  as  hard  as  you’re  able  on  its 
ultimate  triviality.  Remind  yourself  that  your  team  doesn’t  deserve  the 
championship  any  more  than  their  rivals,  that  it  doesn’t  actually  matter  whether 
your  favorite  characters  live  or  die  (except  perhaps  insofar  as  it  impacts  the 
quality  of  the  story),  and  so  on.  These  are  obvious  truths  but  they  are  also — 
maybe  for  that  reason — easy  to  keep  out  of  mind. 
When  I  think  about  facts  like  these,  I  feel  uneasy.  My  cares  begin  to  seem 
silly  and  unwarranted,  and  my  normative  beliefs  begin  to  seem  cold  and  alien. 
Perhaps  strangely,  I  don’t  stop  caring,  and  I  don’t  change  my  beliefs.  And  I  don’t 
know  that  I  could — at  least  not  so  quickly.  Instead,  I  feel  disconnected,  like  I  am 
reading  a  novel  in  which  I — another  I — am  a  character.  I  find  that  I  cannot  fully 
inhabit  the  two  roles  simultaneously.  As  a  character,  I  lack  the  reader’s  clear 
image  of  the  world  of  the  novel  as  essentially  fiction.  As  a  reader,  I  lack  the 
character’s  humanity,  his  depth  of  feeling  and  engagement.  Neither  role  is  fully 
me .  And  I  believe  that  this  must  be  so.  I  cannot  at  the  same  time  and  from  the 
same  perspective  identify  myself  fully  with  some  care  and  also  believe  that  the 
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thing  that  I  care  about  is  completely  worthless  and  unimportant.  There  must  be  a 
split. 
This  might  all  seem  overly­dramatic.  After  all,  I’ve  only  recommended 
meditating  on  the  ultimate  unimportance  of  the  events  in  the  Star  Trek  universe 
or  some  such  thing.  But  there  are  other,  tougher  thoughts  that  can  do  the  trick. 
Try  thinking  about  the  ultimate  ordinariness  of  the  people  that  you  care  most 
about,  and  how  someone  else  could  easily  have  taken  their  places  if  the  timing 
had  been  right.  Or  think  about  all  of  the  suffering  in  the  world  that  you  put  out 
of  mind  on  a  daily  basis  because  you  couldn’t  get  through  the  day  if  you  didn’t. 
Think  about  how  unimportant  you  are  in  the  scheme  of  things. 
Depending  on  your  working  theory  of  value,  these  exercises  may  not  have 
much  of  an  effect.  You  might  be  content  that,  though  many  of  the  things  you  care 
about  do  not  matter  much  in  some  objective  sense,  they  nevertheless  warrant 
your  care.  (I  think  it’s  implausible  that  all  of  our  cares  could  survive  close 
scrutiny  even  on  a  heavily  subjectivist  or  partialist  theory  of  value,  but  no 
matter.)  If  this  is  so,  all  I  can  think  to  do  is  suggest  that  you  try  on  another  theory 
of  value,  just  for  the  sake  of  the  thought  experiment,  and  see  if  you  can  get  a 
sense  of  the  sort  of  alienated  feeling  that  I  am  trying  to  get  across. 
 
What  to  do? 
I  have  argued  at  length  that  it  is  impossible  to  reflect  honestly  on  one’s 
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cares  and  values  without  experiencing  Reasons  Alienation  and  that  this  is 
particularly  true  for  those  of  us  whose  honest  reflection  has  led  us  to  accept 
views  like  hedonistic  act  utilitarianism  or  ECR.  I  expect  that  for  some  of  of  us  in 
this  latter  group,  this  alienation  is  disconcerting,  if  not  outright  painful.  (It  is  for 
me.)  It  demands  a  practical  response. 
A  good  response  cannot  be  a  straight  one.  That  is,  a  good  response  cannot 
and  should  not  attempt  to  eliminate  my  experience  of  alienation,  nor  should  it 
even  necessarily  take  minimizing  alienation  as  a  central  aim;  as  I  have  said,  it  is 
much  better  to  lead  a  productive,  fulfilling,  alienated  life  than  a  parasitic  and 
miserable  one  in  good  faith.  On  the  list  of  things  that  contribute  directly  or 
indirectly  to  value — even  on  the  narrow  conception  of  value  that  survives  ECR — 
good  faith  is  going  to  rank  a  lot  lower  than  things  like  happiness,  the  capacity  for 
friendship  and  care,  the  capacity  for  theoretical  and  practical  rationality,  and  so 
on.  These  more  important  components  and  enablers  of  value  are,  in  my  view, 
threatened  more  by  an  insistence  on  good  faith  than  they  are  by  Reasons 
Alienation  itself.  It  is  better,  if  we  can  manage  it,  to  care  irrationally  without 
undermining  our  capacity  for  practical  reason  than  it  is  to  blunt  our  capacity  to 
care  or  reason  for  the  sake  of  self­unity  or  authenticity.  Thus  alienation  is  to  be 
managed  and  accepted,  not  minimized  or  eliminated.  But  how  do  we  manage 
and  accept  alienation  when  we  are  faced  constantly  with  the  plain,  glaring  fact 
that  we  are  at  odds  with  ourselves,  off  balance,  irrational? 
93 
I  do  not  know  a  totally  satisfying  answer  to  this  question,  nor  do  I  know  if 
there  can  be  one.  But  I  can  describe  the  strategy  which  I  have  tried  to  apply  in  my 
own  case  and  with  which  I  have  found  some  success.  I  do  not  know  that  this  is 
the  best  strategy  for  everyone,  or  even  for  myself,  though  I  believe  that  it  has 
much  to  recommend  it.  The  strategy,  to  the  extent  that  I  can  put  it  into  words, 
involves  a  sort  of  compartmentalization  of  the  self,  an  anti­Korsgaardian  dis unity 
of  agency,  a  good  faith  acceptance  of  bad  faith  and  irrationality,  and  the  active 
maintenance  of  an  elaborate,  humanizing,  and  simultaneously  totalizing  and 
contingent  fiction.  Or,  better  than  fiction,  kayfabe. 
 
Kayfabe  and  Wrestling 
In  professional  wrestling  terminology,  “kayfabe”  is  the  fictional  world 
that  the  practice  of  wrestling  creates  and  in  which  it  is  supposed  to  reside.   In 16
kayfabe,  wrestling  is  is  a  sporting  competition,  not  a  collaborative  performance. 
In  kayfabe,  The  Rock’s  purely  theatrical  People’s  Elbow  finisher  is  more  likely  to 
render  a  combatant  unable  to  continue  than  is  a  torn  quadricep,  a  concussion,  or 
a  dislocated  shoulder.  In  kayfabe,  The  Undertaker  is  some  kind  of  undead 
wizard  who  nevertheless  fights  (and  occasionally  loses  to)  ordinary  men  and 
Braun  Strowman  can  flip  an  ambulance  with  his  bare  hands.  The  concept  of 
16  Actually,  the  word  “kayfabe”  has  a  few  different  related  uses — it  can  be  used  to  talk 
about  the  fiction  itself,  the  fiction’s  status  as  purportedly  real,  or  the  norm  that  the  fiction 
should  not  be  revealed  as  fiction. 
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kayfabe  can  be  extended  beyond  the  world  of  wrestling,  because  different 
activities  can  create  similar  fictional  worlds — politics,  interpersonal  relationships, 
and  so  on.  And  so  it  makes  sense  to  talk  not  just  about  kayfabe  but  about 
kayfabes. 
As  I’ll  use  the  term,  a  kayfabe  is  more  than  an  ordinary  fiction  in  at  least 
two  ways.   First,  a  kayfabe  is  all­encompassing.  In  a  kayfabe,  the  world  of  the 17
fiction  is  just  the  real  world.  This  is  not  ordinarily  so  in  most  fiction.  When  I 
watch  an  ordinary  staged  performance,  the  characters  played  by  the  actors  are 
not  supposed  to  be  aware  of  me  or  of  the  other  audience  members,  because  we 
are  not  a  part  of  their  world.  When  I  read  an  ordinary  novel,  I  don’t  usually  think 
of  the  characters  as  standing  in  some  particular  spatio­temporal  relation  to  me. 
This  is  often  true  even  of  novels  set  in  “the  real  world;”  when  I  entertain  such 
fictions  in  the  usual  way,  I  think  of  them  more  as  ways  things  could  have  been 
than  as  ways  things  are  (but  of  course  really  aren’t).  So,  for  instance,  when 
reading  a  book  set  in  downtown  Austin  I  do  not  believe,  or  even  pretend,  that  I 
could  hop  on  the  7  bus  to  see  the  action  unfold.   Entertaining  most  fictions  is 18
17  If  you  prefer  to  think  of  a  kayfabe  as  a  just  a  special  kind  of  fiction,  nothing  much 
should  be  lost. 
18  Galen  Strawson  has  pointed  out  to  me  that  this  may  not  always  be  the  case  for  all 
readers.  Walking  tours  of  Dublin  that  stop  at  the  various  places  where  Leopold  Bloom 
spends  time  in  Ulysses  might  suggest  that  people  like  to  imagine  the  world  of  the  novel 
as  being  part  of  our  real  world.  The  fact  that  we  sometimes  entertain  ordinary  fictions  in 
this  way — that  occasionally  the  novel  rises  to  the  level  of  professional  wrestling — does 
not  threaten  the  point  that  kayfabe  is  interestingly  different  and  worth  distinguishing 
from  ordinary  fiction  so  long  as  most  or  all  ordinary  fiction  does  not  invite  this  sort  of 
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usually  just  that — entertaining.  Properly  entertaining  a  kayfabe  is  more  like 
make­believe.  19
Second,  and  relatedly,  a  kayfabe  is  maintained  and  insisted  upon.  After  an 
ordinary  play,  I  think  nothing  of  seeing  the  actors  who  played  the  hero  and  the 
villain  getting  on  stage  and  bowing  together,  because  the  fiction  has  come  to  a 
close.  At  a  wrestling  show,  at  least  before  the  1980s,  such  a  thing  would  be 
unheard  of.  In  past  decades,  wrestlers  would  never  publicly  admit  that  the  world 
of  wrestling  was  a  fiction.  Even  today,  wrestlers  traditionally  at  least  wait  for  a 
change  of  venue  to  relax  their  characters  and  “break  kayfabe.” 
While  a  kayfabe  is  more  than  an  ordinary  fiction,  it  is  also  less  than  an 
ordinary  lie.   A  kayfabe,  like  an  ordinary  fiction  but  unlike  an  ordinary  lie,  can 20
survive  the  common  knowledge  that  it  is  false.  If  it  is  common  knowledge 
between  me  and  my  friend  that  I  stole  his  bicycle,  there  is  no  point  in  insisting 
that  I  didn’t.  On  the  other  hand,  savvy  wrestling  audiences  have  long 
reification,  or  so  long  as  this  reification  is  not  ordinarily  as  central  to  appropriately 
entertaining  such  fiction.  (Though  see  the  next  footnote.) 
19  Kendall  Walton  has  argued  that  entertaining  all  fiction  means  engaging  in  a  sort  of 
make­believe,  for  the  reason  that  to  hold  otherwise  would  imply  that  we  experience 
genuine  emotions  about  things  that  we  know  are  not  real  (“Fearing  Fictions”).  The 
argument  is  ingenious,  but  ultimately  I  believe  that  views  on  which  we  do  in  fact 
experience  genuine — not  pretend — emotions  in  response  to  fiction  are  more  promising. 
(For  one  such  view,  see  Noël  Carroll’s  The  Philosophy  of  Horror  pp.  60 – 88.)  Even  if  a 
Waltonian  view  turns  out  to  be  true,  there  seems  to  be  an  important  difference  between 
the  more  active,  voluntary,  and  encompassing  game  of  make­believe  played  by  a 
wrestling  audience  and  the  more  passive,  non­voluntary,  and  localized  one  played  by, 
say,  a  movie­watcher. 
20  If  you  prefer  to  think  of  a  kayfabe  as  a  just  a  special  kind  of  lie,  nothing  much  should 
be  lost. 
96 
understood  that  wrestling  is  not  real  but  have  only  recently  begun  to  tolerate 
breaks  in  kayfabe  in  specific  contexts. 
A  kayfabe,  then,  is  a  false  image  of  the  real  world  that  is  maintained  at 
almost  all  times,  and  especially  (or  most  interestingly)  one  that  is  maintained  in 
spite  of  open  knowledge  of  its  falsity.  Besides  the  traditional  wrestling  kayfabe, 
there  are  political  kayfabes  (as  when  a  politician  makes  some  obviously 
impossible  policy  a  part  of  their  election  platform),  familial  kayfabes  (the 
insistence  of  a  parent  that  they  love  all  of  their  children  equally  is  often  like  this), 
and  others. 
What  is  the  purpose  of  a  kayfabe?  Why  entertain  a  fiction  at  almost  all 
times?  Why  maintain  a  lie  that  is  known  to  be  false?  This  is  a  difficult  question, 
and  probably  there  is  no  single  answer.  Sometimes,  kayfabes  are  probably 
maintained  just  for  the  sake  of  saving  face,  as  in  the  case  of  the  parent  who  insists 
against  all  evidence  that  they  love  their  children  equally.  Other  times,  when  the 
falsity  of  the  kayfabe  is  not  quite  common  knowledge,  there  may  be  some  fun  in 
feeling  like  one  is  in  on  a  secret.   But  to  my  mind,  the  most  interesting  function 21
of  a  kayfabe  is  that  it  allows  people  to  entertain  a  fiction  more  fully,  deeply,  and 
personally  than  they  might  otherwise  be  able  to. 
21  I  suspect  that  this  may  have  the  case  for  much  of  the  history  of  wrestling — that  it  was 
more  widely  understood  by  the  audience  that  wrestling  was  a  spectacle  than  many  of 
the  fans  or  even  performers  realised,  and  that  many  (falsely)  believed  that  they  were  in 
on  an  exclusive  secret. 
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In  support  of  this  point,  let  me  tell  a  story.  CM  Punk,  aka  Phil  Brooks,  was 
one  of  the  greatest  professional  wrestlers  of  the  modern  era  before  his  early 
retirement  in  2014.  In  September  2016,  after  two  years  of  training,  Punk  had  a 
mixed  martial  arts  fight — a  real  fight — at  UFC  203.  He  lost,  badly.  This  result  was 
unsurprising.  Punk  was  past  his  physical  prime,  was  totally  unproven,  and  had 
gone  through  much  less  MMA  training  than  his  opponent  Mickey  Gall.  But  for  a 
lot  of  wrestling  fans,  myself  included,  the  loss  felt  like  a  punch  in  the  gut.  This 
guy  was  a  former  world  champion.  He  won  that  title  by  beating  John  Cena  clean 
in  one  of  the  best  matches  of  the  last  decade.  We  know  that  wrestling  is  fake,  but 
still — how  could  he  lose?  How  dare  he  lose? 
Suppose  LeVar  Burton  were  to  go  on  Jeopardy  and  get  creamed.   Here’s  a 22
guy  who  played  the  brilliant  Geordi  La  Forge  on  Star  Trek:  The  Next  Generation, 
but  he  loses  at  jeopardy?  Well,  so  what?  We  know  that  Burton  isn’t  La  Forge.  We 
know  that  La  Forge  isn’t  real.  Those  of  us  who  like  Burton’s  work  might  feel  bad 
for  him,  but  we  wouldn’t  think  that  the  Star  Trek  fiction  had  somehow  been 
undermined.  Why  the  difference?  The  answer,  I  think,  is  kayfabe. 
Roland  Barthes  says  this  about  wrestling: 
 
When  the  hero  or  the  villain  of  the  drama,  the  man  who  was  seen  a  few 
minutes  earlier  possessed  by  moral  rage,  magnified  into  a  sort  of 
22  I  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  this  would  be  what  would  happen  if  LeVar  Burton 
were  to  go  on  Jeopardy;  I  have  no  notion  of  Burton’s  knowledge  of  trivia. 
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metaphysical  sign,  leaves  the  wrestling  hall,  impassive,  anonymous, 
carrying  a  small  suitcase  and  arm­in­arm  with  his  wife,  no  one  can  doubt 
that  wrestling  holds  that  power  of  transmutation  which  is  common  to  the 
Spectacle  and  to  Religious  Worship.  In  the  ring,  and  even  in  the  depths  of 
their  voluntary  ignominy,  wrestlers  remain  gods  because  they  are,  for  a 
few  moments,  the  key  which  opens  Nature,  the  pure  gesture  which 
separates  Good  from  Evil,  and  unveils  the  form  of  a  Justice  which  is  at  last 
intelligible.  23
 
For  one  type  of  fan,  because  this  transformation  from  humble,  anonymous 
husband  to  godlike  figure  is  central  to  the  magic  of  wrestling,  the  ordinary 
unmagical  reality  is  something  to  focus  in  on  and  keep  in  mind  in  order  to  bring 
the  transformation  into  sharp  relief.  But  there  is  another  type  of  fan  that  does  not 
like  to  dwell  on  the  fact  that  these  godlike  figures  are,  after  all,  just  ordinary 
people  with  a  particular  talent  for  performance.  This  sort  of  fan  knows,  of  course, 
that  gods  don’t  walk  among  us,  but  they  would  like  to  in  some  way  believe — to 
suspect — that  they  do.  It  is  these  fans  that  kayfabe  serves  best.  I  believe  that  the 
ECR  theorist  can  learn  something  from  this  sort  of  wrestling  fan. 
 
 
23  “The  World  of  Wrestling”  p.  23 
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Normative  Kayfabe 
ECR  shrinks  the  scope  of  normativity.  When  someone  comes  to  believe 
ECR,  they  come  to  believe  that  there  are  far  fewer  reasons  or  sources  of  value  in 
the  world  than  people  ordinarily  suspect.  Since  it  is  inadvisable  either  to  let  this 
realization  do  too  much  to  shrink  their  capacity  for  care  or  to  let  their  care  force 
them  back  into  a  false  moral  view,  the  ECR  theorist  ought  to  take  steps  to  insure 
that  neither  happens  and  that  the  experience  of  the  resulting  gap  between  belief 
and  care  is  no  more  painful  than  it  has  to  be.  One  way  to  do  this,  in  my  view,  is 
for  the  ECR  theorist  to  enact  a  sort  of  normative  kayfabe. 
In  the  normative  kayfabe,  people  can  deserve  praise  or  blame  for  past 
actions.  In  the  normative  kayfabe,  lives  matter  as  wholes,  not  just  as  the  sum  of 
individual  experiences.  Friendships  and  relationships  and  the  rationality  of  love 
and  affection  are  partly  grounded  in  shared  histories.  The  fact  that  someone  has 
worked  long  and  hard  for  something  makes  it  all  the  more  worthwhile  when  it 
happens.  And  so  on.  None  of  these  things,  of  course,  is  true .  But  the  ECR  theorist 
entertains  them  in  the  special  way  that  one  entertains  a  kayfabe:  They  pretend 
that  they  are  true  and  act  in  accordance  with  their  truth  when  circumstances 
allow.  They  never  lose  sight  of  their  falsity,  but  only  openly  focus  on  this  falsity 
under  special  circumstances — when  it  would  be  pleasant  or  productive  to  do  so, 
when  engaged  in  serious  conversation,  and  so  on.  They  build  for  themselves  (or 
let  stand)  a  working  model  of  the  world  that  operates  according  to  the  rules  of 
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the  normative  kayfabe,  and  they  spend  most  of  their  time  and  their  thought  at 
least  waist­deep  in  that  world. 
There  is  an  apparent  disanalogy  between  the  wrestling  case  and  the 
individual  moral  case,  however.  The  existence  of  the  kayfabe  in  wrestling 
depends  on  the  gap  between  performer  and  audience.  Wrestlers  do  not  keep 
kayfabe  with  one  another.  They  couldn’t;  a  wrestler  who  believed 
wholeheartedly  in  the  fiction  or  even  took  it  too  seriously  would  be  an  unsafe 
performer,  would  undermine  stories,  would  ruin  friendships,  and  so  on.  But  the 
ECR  theorist  is  just  one  person.  How  can  someone  keep  kayfabe  with 
themselves?  The  best  answer  I  can  give,  though  it’s  an  imperfect  one,  is  that  we 
ECR  theorists  should  allow  ourselves  to  compartmentalize  our  fictions. 
When  we  care,  appreciate,  and  experience — when  we  are  in  a  position  to 
be  swept  up  in  all  of  life’s  apparent  richness — the  normative  kayfabe  is  our 
friend.  In  this,  we  are  like  an  audience  member  at  a  wrestling  show,  along  for  the 
ride  and  enjoying  the  fiction.  If  entertaining  and  enacting  the  normative  kayfabe 
helps  a  person  develop  deeper  care  for  their  friends  and  family,  if  it  helps  them 
find  greater  satisfaction  in  work  and  in  life,  if  it  helps  them  maintain  hope  for  the 
future,  they  ought  to  do  it.  In  life,  as  in  wrestling,  it  is  unpleasant,  taxing,  and 
ultimately  unfulfilling  to  keep  the  truth  in  full  view.  The  fans  who  approach 
wrestling  in  this  way — so­called  “smarks”  — seem  plainly  to  be  missing  out  on 24
24  In  traditional  wrestling  parlance,  a  “mark”  was  an  audience  member  who  believed  in 
the  reality  of  the  spectacle.  The  term  “smark,”  short  for  “smart  mark,”  became  used  to 
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much  of  what  the  medium  has  to  offer.  This  charge  seems  even  more  telling 
against  those  who  would  adopt  a  detached,  hyper­rationalist  approach  to  life 
that  cares  only  about  how  the  sausage  is  made  and  not  at  all  about  its  taste. 
When  we  act,  the  story  is  more  complicated.  On  the  one  hand,  the  best 
action  will  be  the  one  most  favored  by  the  narrow  set  of  reasons  that  survive 
ECR.  On  the  other,  as  we  saw  in  the  consequentialist  case,  trying  to  respond  only 
to  the  reasons  that  actually  exist  might  not  be  the  best  way  to  act  well  in  the  long 
run.  Thus,  as  an  agent,  a  person  ought  to  entertain  the  kayfabe  only  in  a  limited 
way.  At  the  risk  of  straining  the  analogy,  a  person  should  in  action  be  like  a 
wrestler  in  the  ring.  They  ought  to  keep  reality  in  mind  to  the  extent  that  they 
can  act  well  (and  safely),  but  they  ought  to  do  so  with  an  eye  to  the  fiction;  they 
should  not  do  too  much  to  expose  or  undermine  it  unless  the  stakes  are  high.  
How  much  is  the  right  amount  to  entertain  the  moral  kayfabe  in  action?  I 
don’t  have  a  good  answer  to  that.  I  expect  that  the  answer  is  different  for 
different  people,  and  the  question  is  one  that  is  probably  better  suited  to 
empirical  psychology  than  to  moral  philosophy  and  introspection. 
describe  fans  who  understood  that  the  spectacle  was  a  fiction  but  nevertheless  remained 
fans.  More  recently,  as  genuinely  duped  marks  are  understood  on  all  sides  to  be  a  very 
rare  breed,  “smark”  has  taken  on  a  more  narrow  usage.  On  the  contemporary  usage,  a 
smark  not  only  understands  that  wrestling  is  staged,  but  shifts  much  of  their  focus  from 
the  fiction  to  what  they  imagine  to  be  happening  behind  the  scenes.  A  smark  might 
cheer  good  writing  instead  of  heroic  characters  or  jeer  when  a  performer  botches  a  move 
in  a  way  that  exposes  it  as  fake.  There  can  of  course  be  a  certain  pleasure  in  seeing 
slivers  of  reality  through  cracks  in  kayfabe,  but  many  wrestlers  and  fans  resent  the  way 
in  which  smarks  actively  undermine  the  illusion — with  good  reason,  in  my  mind. 
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Unfortunately,  it’s  also  a  practical  question  that  demands  an  answer  of  us,  so 
we’ve  got  to  do  the  best  that  we  can  with  the  tools  that  we  have.  In  answering 
the  question  for  ourselves,  all  we  can  do  is  step  back,  take  a  full  view  of  reality, 
and  try  to  come  up  with  a  plan  for  living  with  one  foot  in  a  fiction.  Something 
like  what  I  am  doing  now  in  writing  this  chapter.  I  can’t  resist  extending  the 
wrestling  analogy:  We  must,  occasionally,  step  back  and,  like  the  writers  of  a 
wrestling  show,  “book”  our  own  lives.  Then,  when  we  step  back  into  everyday 
life,  we  do  our  best  to  put  on  a  show  that  everyone  can  enjoy. 
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Afterword  –  It’s  Not  All  Bad 
 
The  bulk  of  this  dissertation  deals  with  the  threat  of  alienation  that  I  take 
to  be  the  central  practical  problem  facing  the  Extreme  Claim  Reductionist.  As 
such,  the  reader  could  be  excused  for  thinking  that  ECR  is  all  doom  and  gloom. 
But  this  is  not  so.  I  focused  on  the  alienation  problem  because  of  its  philosophical 
interest  and  practical  urgency.  The  various  positive  upshots  and  silver  linings  of 
ECR  are,  if  not  necessarily  less  interesting,  at  least  less  pressing;  it  is  easier  to 
deal  with  good  things  than  bad  ones.  But  it  is  worth  spending  some  time  on 
those  upshots  now — not  just  to  provide  a  relief  from  pessimism,  but  because 
understanding  them  will  be  an  important  part  of  any  fully­worked­out  strategy 
for  living  with  ECR. 
In  what  may  be  the  most­quoted  bit  of  Reasons  and  Persons ,  Parfit  says  this 
about  his  experience  with  reductionism: 
 
Is  the  truth  depressing?  Some  may  find  it  so.  But  I  find  it  liberating, 
and  consoling.  When  I  believed  that  my  existence  was  such  a  further  fact,  I 
seemed  imprisoned  in  myself.  My  life  seemed  like  a  glass  tunnel,  through 
which  I  was  moving  faster  every  year,  and  at  the  end  of  which  there  was 
darkness.  When  I  changed  my  view,  the  walls  of  my  glass  tunnel 
disappeared.  I  now  live  in  the  open  air.  There  is  still  a  difference  between 
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my  life  and  the  lives  of  other  people.  But  the  difference  is  less.  Other 
people  are  closer.  I  am  less  concerned  about  the  rest  of  my  own  life,  and 
more  concerned  about  the  lives  of  others. 
When  I  believed  the  Non­Reductionist  View,  I  also  cared  more  about 
my  inevitable  death.  After  my  death,  there  will  no  one  living  who  will  be 
me.  I  can  now  redescribe  this  fact.  Though  there  will  later  be  many 
experiences,  none  of  these  experiences  will  be  connected  to  my  present 
experiences  by  chains  of  such  direct  connections  as  those  involved  in 
experience­memory,  or  in  the  carrying  out  of  an  earlier  intention.  Some  of 
these  future  experiences  may  be  related  to  my  present  experiences  in  less 
direct  ways.  There  will  later  be  some  memories  about  my  life.  And  there 
may  later  be  thoughts  that  are  influenced  by  mine,  or  things  done  as  the 
result  of  my  advice.  My  death  will  break  the  more  direct  relations  between 
my  present  experiences  and  future  experiences,  but  it  will  not  break 
various  other  relations.  This  is  all  there  is  to  the  fact  that  there  will  be  no 
one  living  who  will  be  me.  Now  that  I  have  seen  this,  my  death  seems  to 
me  less  bad.  1
 
1  RP  p.  281 
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Parfit  is  not  an  Extreme  Claim  Reductionist;  he  is  agnostic  between  the  Extreme 
and  Moderate  Claims.  But  I  believe  that  the  liberatory  experiences  he  describes, 
or  ones  very  close  to  them,  are  available  to  the  ECR  theorist. 
Parfit  claims  that  coming  to  believe  reductionism  has  caused  at  least  two 
positive  changes  in  him.  First,  it  has  made  him  feel  less  separate  from,  and  thus 
closer  to,  other  people.  Second,  it  has  made  him  less  afraid  of  death.  I’ll  consider 
his  claims  in  reverse  order. 
 
Death 
  The  second  change  that  Parfit  describes — becoming  less  worried  about 
death — would  seem  to  be  equally  available  to  the  ECR  theorist,  and  I  have 
already  considered  it  to  a  degree  in  Chapter  One.  If  ordinary  death  is  not 
first­personally  worse  than  going  through  a  teletransporter,  and  going  through  a 
teletransporter  is  not  first­personally  worse  than  ordinary  survival,  then 
ordinary  death  is  not  first­personally  worse  than  ordinary  survival. 
To  banish  death  in  this  way  may  seem  like  a  Pyrrhic  victory.  As  Parfit 
notes,   when  we  come  to  believe  reductionism,  we  do  not  learn  that  duplication, 2
teletransportation,  or  death  give  us  much  of  what  we  wanted  out  of  ordinary 
2  “When  I  come  to  see  that  my  continued  existence  does  not  involve  this  further  fact,  I 
lose  my  reason  for  preferring  a  space­ship  journey  [to  Teletransportation].  But,  judged 
from  the  standpoint  of  my  earlier  belief,  this  is  not  because  Teletransportation  is  about  as 
good  as  ordinary  survival.  It  is  because  ordinary  survival  is  about  as  bad  as,  or  little 
better  than,  Teletransportation.  Ordinary  survival  is  about  as  bad  as  being  destroyed 
and  Replicated”  ( RP  p.  280). 
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survival.  Instead,  we  learn  that  ordinary  survival  does  not  give  us  what  we 
wanted  out  of  it.  If  we  think  that  we  were  rational  to  want  something  more  from 
ordinary  survival  than  it  in  fact  has  to  offer  and  correct  to  believe  that  death  is 
bad  because  it  deprives  us  of  what  we  wanted,  then  reductionism  implies  that 
survival  is  as  bad  as  we  thought  death  was. 
If  it  were  indeed  a  fact  that  survival  is  as  bad  as  most  people  take  death  to 
be,  it  would  be  a  horrifying  one.  Anyone  who  could  believe  it  wholeheartedly 
would  probably  be  driven  out  of  their  mind.  Fortunately,  it  is  probably  not  a  fact. 
Rather  than  being  mistaken  about  the  acceptability  of  survival,  we  are  probably 
mistaken  about  the  badness  of  death.  We  cannot  rationally  want  more  from 
survival  than  it  has  to  offer,  in  part  because  it  is  impossible  that  it  could  have 
offered  more,  and  so  we  should  not  be  upset  that  death  does  not  offer  it  either. 
This  impossibility  claim  may  sound  too  strong.  Parfit  believes  that  there 
might  have  been  a  deep  further  fact  about  identity,  even  though  there  is  not.   There 3
might,  for  example,  have  been  Cartesian  souls.  Be  this  as  it  may,  I  doubt  that  any 
further  fact,  regardless  of  depth,  could  have  been  enough  to  make  survival 
matter  in  the  way  that  we  want  it  to.  As  I  argued  briefly  in  Chapter  One,  the  R 
relation  would  probably  be  the  best  candidate  for  what  matters  even  if  there  were 
a  deep  further  fact  about  identity.  We  would  not  be  better  off  if  there  were 
Cartesian  souls,  base­level  brute  facts,  or  anything  else. 
3  RP  pp.  227 – 228 
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Perhaps  it  sometimes  makes  some  sense  to  wish  for  impossible  things. 
Maybe  it  makes  some  sense  to  wish  that  Gödel’s  incompleteness  theorems  were 
false  so  that  there  could  be  hope  for  a  single  formal  system  that  could  describe  all 
of  mathematics.  But  in  the  case  of  survival,  it’s  not  even  clear  that  we  know  what 
it  is  that  we  want.  When  I  want  to  survive  in  the  distinctly  first­personal  way,  4
what  I  want  is  for  myself  to  continue  to  exist.  I  want  to  still  be  here  in  a  way  that  is 
more  demanding  than  the  continued  existence  of  my  soul  or  even  a  brute 
identity  fact  seems  prepared  to  guarantee.  When  I  step  back  and  think  on  what  it 
is  that  I  want,  my  desire  seems  not  only  impossible  but  fundamentally 
misconceived.  What  it  is  that  I  want  is  something  that  I  cannot  clearly  imagine  or 
describe,  since  I  cannot  imagine  or  describe  a  way  things  could  be  that  would 
satisfy  my  desire.  I  believe  that  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  be  disappointed  that 
such  a  desire  would  be  frustrated.  It  makes  much  more  sense,  and  is  much  easier, 
to  become  less  afraid  of  death  rather  than  becoming  disappointed  in  survival. 
 
Friendship 
Parfit’s  other  claim  is  that  his  belief  in  reductionism  has  caused  him  to  feel 
less  self­involved  and  more  concerned  with  other  people.  This  change  might 
seem  to  be  less  available  to  the  Extreme  Claim  Reductionist.  If  R  had  mattered,  it 
would  be  clear  how  we  could  feel  for  others  in  the  same  way  that  we  feel  about 
4  As  opposed,  for  example,  to  wanting  to  survive  for  the  reasons  that  my  death  would 
cause  a  great  deal  of  pain  and  shut  off  the  possibility  for  a  great  deal  of  happiness. 
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our  own  pasts  and  futures,  because  we  can  have  ties  very  much  like  the  R 
relation  to  other  people.  I  can  have  memories  of  shared  experiences,  intentions 
for  shared  projects,  and  so  on.  But  the  Extreme  Claim  says  that  R  does  not  matter 
in  the  right  way.  Perhaps,  though  the  Moderate  Claim  Reductionist  can  break 
through  their  glass  tunnel,  the  ECR  theorist  is  doomed  to  retreat  within  it. 
I  believe  that  this  pessimistic  conclusion  is  too  strong.  It  is  true,  as  I  have 
maintained  throughout  this  dissertation,  that  ECR  undermines  our  justification 
for  such  things  as  partial  benevolence,  loyalty,  gratitude,  and  so  on.  But  it  would 
be  a  mistake  to  think  that  every  aspect  of  things  like  our  friendships  and 
relationships  depends  entirely  on  such  things. 
ECR  says  that  nothing  matters  in  the  way  that  we  mistakenly  take  the 
deep  further  fact  about  personal  identity  to  matter.   This  definition  shouldn’t  be 5
taken  to  mean  that  all  values  or  attitudes  that  people  think  of  as  depending  on 
personal  identity  are  valueless  or  irrational.  Some  of  these  values  or  attitudes 
might  have  other  grounds,  or  people  might  be  mistaken  for  tending  to  ground 
them  entirely  in  identity.  I  believe  that  friendship,  to  take  the  paradigmatic 
example  of  care  beyond  the  self,  is  one  such  case. 
Suppose  you  were  to  learn,  as  Bertrand  Russell  once  hypothesized,  that 
the  world  had  come  into  existence  five  minutes  ago,  with  all  apparent  memory 
5  I  put  it  in  these  terms  rather  than  talking  about  “the  way  that  a  the  deep  further  fact 
about  personal  identity  might  have  mattered”  because,  as  I  say,  I  do  not  think  that  any 
facts  could  have  mattered  in  the  right  way.  The  extreme  claim  can  only  be  defined  in 
relation  to  what  I  have  come  to  believe  is  likely  a  confused  set  of  beliefs. 
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and  history  just  as  it  is  now.   The  news  would,  no  doubt,  be  very  disturbing. 6
Learning  that  the  world  is  only  five  minutes  old  would  be  very  similar  in  terms 
of  normative  consequences  to  learning  the  truth  of  ECR,  at  least  in  the 
backwards­looking  direction.  (If  ECR  seems  less  shocking,  I  think  it  is  only 
because  the  view  is  abstract  and  difficult  to  understand  and  believe,  whereas  we 
can  understand  immediately  what  it  would  mean  for  the  world  to  have  only  just 
come  into  existence.) 
In  the  five­minute­old  world,  you  would  never  have  met  any  of  your 
friends  (or  “friends”),  though  by  hypothesis  you  could  be  sure  that  they  were  out 
there  and  that  they  would  seem  to  remember  you  when  you  next  saw  them. 
Assuming  you  could  get  past  the  shock  of  learning  that  the  world  was  new,  how 
would  you  react  to  your  friends  when  you  saw  them?  Or  how  should  you? 
Let  me  invent  two  friends  for  you,  cobbled  together  from  some  of  my 
own.  Eric,  or  so  you  thought  this  morning  before  learning  the  true  age  of  the 
world,  has  been  your  friend  since  childhood.  You’ve  been  with  each  other 
through  good  times  and  bad,  and  he’s  helped  you  through  some  of  the  hardest 
times  in  your  life.  Over  the  years,  you’ve  grown  different — new  personalities, 
new  priorities,  new  perspectives — to  the  point  that  you  no  longer  really  enjoy 
one  another’s  company  except  insofar  as  it  reminds  you  of  the  bond  that  you 
share.  Then  there’s  Fiona.  Fiona  and  you  don’t  have  much  of  a  shared  history, 
6  The  Analysis  of  Mind  pp.  159 – 160 
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but  every  time  you  see  each  other  there’s  a  certain  electricity — the  conversation 
flows  freely,  and  you  both  feel  energetic,  happy,  and  alive. 
I  think  that  learning  that  the  earth  is  only  five  minutes  old  might  well 
threaten  the  foundations  of  your  friendship  with  Eric.  You  might  decide  that 
there  is  no  compelling  reason  to  see  him  or  otherwise  maintain  the  friendship  in 
the  absence  of  your  shared  history.  But  it  should  not  threaten  your  friendship 
with  Fiona  very  much  at  all.  It  is  true  that  much  of  what  we  take  to  be  important 
in  many  of  our  relationships  with  other  people,  as  I  argued  in  the  case  of  Arthur 
and  Andrew  in  Chapter  Two,  does  seem  to  depend  on  things  that  would  be 
threatened  by  ECR  or  by  the  five­minute  hypothesis.  But  plenty  survives.  When 
you  next  saw  Fiona,  even  though  you  would  know  that  you  had  never  met  her 
before,  I  expect  that  you  would  still  feel  the  same  electricity,  connection,  and 
bond  that  you  would  seem  to  remember.  And  why  wouldn’t  you?  None  of  these 
feelings  or  attitudes  depend  for  their  justification  on  anything  about  a  shared 
history  or  anything  of  that  sort.  They  are  just  pleasant,  fulfilling  ways  that 
another  person  makes  you  feel.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  she  can  engender  these 
feelings  in  you  seems  to  make  her —the  her  that  exists  now,  detached  from  any 
history—a  worthy  object  of  friendly  and  affectionate  feelings. 
I  don’t  want  to  overstate  my  case  here,  lest  I  undermine  the  work  of 
Chapter  Two.  Many  of  our  attitudes  and  cares,  including  some  of  our  attitudes 
about  our  friends,  projects,  and  so  on,  will  be  left  without  needed  justification. 
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But  others  will  be  unaffected.  Some  will  be  left  without  unneeded  justification. 
And  coming  to  recognize  that  these  attitudes  and  cares  never  needed  any 
justification  of  the  sort  we  might  have  demanded  might  be  the  most  hopeful  and 
freeing  consequence  of  accepting  ECR. 
 
Freedom 
Many  of  our  attitudes  seem  to  require  a  certain  sort  of  normative 
cognition  in  order  to  be  warranted.  It  is  unwarranted  and  irrational  to  despair 
over  something  that  we  see  is  not  bad  or  to  feel  guilty  when  we  know  we  haven’t 
done  anything  wrong.  It  is  likewise  unwarranted  to  feel  happiness  or  relief  at 
bad  news  (though  perhaps,  if  hedonism  is  true,  it  is  still  in  another  way  good  to 
feel  happiness  in  such  cases).  Other  attitudes  do  not  seem  to  have  such  a 
requirement.  I  enjoy  eating  peaches,  and  I  don’t  have  to  believe  that  peaches  are 
good  for  my  enjoyment  to  be  rational.  It  is  the  same  with  the  way  that  I  enjoy 
being  with  friends.  More  controversially,  it  might  be  this  way  with  art.  And  so 
on. 
I  do  not  have  any  worked­out  theory  of  precisely  which  attitudes,  cares, 
and  feelings  demand  some  normative  cognition  in  order  to  be  appropriate,  but 
plenty  seem  not  to.  And  there  are  many  more  that,  though  they  may  make  such  a 
demand,  and  though  that  demand  may  not  be  rationally  satisfiable,  we  are 
inclined  or  adept  enough  to  adopt  without  the  experience  of  alienation  being  too 
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painful.  It  is  easy,  for  example,  to  have  feelings  of  gratitude  or  vengefulness  even 
without  believing  that  people  can  be  truly  responsible  for  past  actions,  and  in 
fact  it  is  hard  not  to.  To  the  extent  that  accepting  ECR  expands  the  space  that 
these  various  attitudes,  cares,  and  feelings  take  up,  it  can  help  to  free  us  from  the 
felt  responsibility  of  always  reacting  in  the  right  ways  to  the  right  things. 
An  analogy:  When  we  first  get  into  philosophy  and  learn  about  reasons  to 
be  skeptical  about  one  thing  or  another — morals,  say,  or  numbers — the 
knowledge  is  quite  troubling.  But  as  we  learn  how  the  same  sorts  of  skeptical 
arguments  can  be  applied  across  the  board  to  things  like  intentionality,  the 
existence  of  an  external  world,  and  so  on,  the  news  starts  to  lose  its  bite.  Maybe 
we  should  be  skeptical  of  morality,   but  if  morality  isn’t  clearly  in  any  more 7
danger  than  math,  basic  empirical  facts,  our  ability  to  have  beliefs  about  the 
external  world,  and  so  on,  then  it  is  much  less  tempting  to  fall  into  a  nihilistic 
despair  (or  abandon). 
It’s  similar  (though  not  too  similar)  in  the  case  of  ECR.  The  Extreme  Claim 
is  an  extreme  claim.  It  shrinks  the  normative  realm  almost  beyond  recognition. 
This  shrinking  has  at  least  two  hopeful  effects.  First,  as  I’ve  argued  with 
friendship,  the  stuff  that  survives  is  brought  into  sharper  relief,  and  we  can 
expect  it  to  become  a  bigger  part  of  our  lives.  Second,  so  much  of  our  ordinary 
perspective  is  upended  that  we  are  given  a  unique  opportunity  to  reshape  it.  To 
7  I  don’t  think  we  should,  but  nevermind. 
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a  large  extent,  as  I  have  argued,  this  reshaping  will  be  alienating;  we  can’t  and 
shouldn’t  try  to  be  the  sorts  of  people  that  care  in  all  the  right  ways  about  all  the 
right  things.  But  once  we’ve  dropped  that  expectation,  why  not  have  a  little  fun 
with  it? 
It  would  be  frivolous,  we  might  ordinarily  think,  to  throw  oneself  into  the 
world  of  exploitation  cinema,  crosswords,  etc.  (Or  professional  wrestling.)  This 
might  be  so.  But  ECR  shows  us  that  many — though  definitely  not  all — pursuits 
are  similarly  frivolous.  We  should,  to  the  extent  that  we  are  able,  pursue  the 
more  worthy  pursuits;  we  should  do  what  we  can  to  combat  suffering  and  build 
a  better  world.  But  we  always  knew  that.  In  accepting  ECR,  we  can  hopefully 
come  to  see  how  a  wide  variety  of  relationships,  cares,  projects,  and  so  on  are  at 
least  no  worse  than  many  others  that  we  might  have  otherwise  felt  compelled  to 
value  or  pursue. 
Thomas  Nagel  says  this  about  the  experience  of  the  Absurd:  “If  sub  specie 
aeternitatis  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that  anything  matters,  then  that  doesn’t 
matter  either,  and  we  can  approach  our  absurd  lives  with  irony  instead  of 
heroism  or  despair.”   It’s  not  quite  that  easy  for  the  Extreme  Claim  Reductionist. 8
Things  still  matter.  There  is  still,  for  example,  state­given  reason  to  prefer  irony 
over  despair  if  you  can  manage  it.  More  generally,  it  matters  a  great  deal  how  we 
take  the  news  that  ECR  is  true.  Some  ways  of  taking  it  might  cause  us  and  the 
8  “The  Absurd”  p.  727 
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people  around  us  a  great  deal  of  suffering.  Others  might  not.  Still,  lots  of  things 
we  probably  thought  mattered  don’t,  or  they  don’t  matter  in  the  way  that  we 
might  have  thought  they  did.  If,  as  I  argued  in  Chapter  Three,  we  ought  to 
commit  ourselves  to  disjointedness,  contradiction,  and  alienation — if  we  should 
build  for  ourselves  and  come  to  inhabit  a  new  normative  kayfabe — then  we 
might  have  reason  to  hope  that  this  kayfabe,  along  with  all  the  projects,  values, 
attitudes  and  relationships  that  it  recommends,  will  fit  us  better  than  our  old 
beliefs  did.  That  is  what  I  hope,  at  any  rate. 
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Appendix  –  No  Easy  Way  Out 
 
In  Chapter  Three,  I  give  general  arguments  that  we  should  not  attempt  to 
escape  the  Reasons  Alienation  engendered  by  Extreme  Claim  Reductionism 
(ECR)  and  even  by  everyday  life.  In  this  appendix,  I  give  specific  arguments 
against  existing  attempts  to  answer  the  problem  of  alienation  for 
consequentialists  and  reductionists  about  personal  identity.  
For  the  impartialist  consequentialist,  objective  impartial  good  is  what 
matters  full  stop,  and  hence  what  warrants  care.  But,  as  I  have  argued,  what 
matters  full  stop  will  not  (and  cannot  and  should  not)  be  what  the  impartialist 
consequentialist  actually  cares  about.  The  case  is  similar  for  the  ECR  theorist.  In 
both  cases,  the  gaps  between  what  actually  matters  and  actual  care  will  be  much 
bigger  than  the  small  fissures  that,  using  the  exercise  I  suggested  in  Chapter 
Three,  I  argued  exist  for  most  people.  If  the  exercise  worked,  you  should  be 
skeptical  that  it  is  possible  to  focus  on  even  these  small  fissures  without 
experiencing  some  alienation,  and  all  the  more  skeptical  that  it  would  be  possible 
for  the  impartialist  consequentialist  or  the  ECR  theorist. 
Nevertheless,  as  I  have  noted,  some  philosophers  have  argued  that 
consequentialism  need  not  be  alienating.  Following  Siderits,   I  will  classify  these 1
arguments  as  either  “direct”  or  “indirect.”  Taking  paradigm  examples  of  each 
1  Personal  Identity  and  Buddhist  Philosophy  (henceforth  PIBP )  pp.  135 – 137 
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strategy,  I  will  argue  that  neither  works  in  the  way  it  intends  to.  Then,  turning 
my  attention  entirely  to  personal  identity,  I’ll  argue  against  Siderits’s  own 
“hybrid”  response  to  the  personal  identity  version  of  the  alienation  objection. 
 
Railton’s  Indirect  Response 
The  indirect  response  to  the  alienation  objection  to  consequentialism  holds 
that  when  we  do  something  that  we  know  will  have  badly  suboptimal 
consequences,  we  can  often  console  ourselves  with  the  knowledge  that  the  act 
stemmed  from  good  character,  healthy  motivations,  or  similar.  So  consoled,  we 
will  be  free  from  alienation. 
Peter  Railton  defends  the  indirect  response  by  way  of  thought  experiment. 
His  central  example   is  of  a  man,  Juan,  who  in  a  time  of  stress  takes  an  extra  trip 2
to  visit  his  wife  Linda  instead  of  donating  the  cost  of  the  ticket  to  Oxfam.  As 
Railton  imagines  the  case,  donating  the  money  would  result  in  better 
consequences.  But,  if  Juan  had  had  the  sort  of  character  that  resulted  in  him 
donating  the  money,  he  would  have  accomplished  far  less  good  in  his  life. 
Railton  stresses  that  the  point  is  not  that  forgoing  the  trip  would  damage 
Juan’s  character — if  that  were  so,  it  might  in  fact  be  worse  in  consequentialist 
terms  for  him  to  give  the  money  to  Oxfam.  What  Juan  does  really  is  wrong  by 
2  “Alienation,  Consequentialism,  and  the  Demands  of  Morality”  p.  159 
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consequentialist  lights.   But  it  is  in  some  sense  necessitated  by  Juan’s  having  the 3
best  sort  of  character  for  him  to  have — the  sort  of  character  that,  we  can  suppose, 
Juan  has  developed  over  a  long  lifetime  lived  just  as  a  consequentialist  would 
recommend. 
Railton’s  claim  looks  to  be  that,  even  if  Juan  is  a  consequentialist,  there  is 
still  no  reason  for  him  to  experience  any  alienation  over  his  decision  to  visit  his 
wife  Linda.   Perhaps  thinking  the  implication  obvious,  he  does  not  (as  far  as  I  can 4
see)  give  further  argument  for  it.  But  one  can  see  how  such  an  argument  might 
go. 
One  might  argue  as  follows: 
 
1) “Ought”  implies  some  sense  of  “can.” 
2) John’s  character  is  such  that  he  truly  cannot  give  the  money  to  Oxfam  in  the 
relevant  sense. 
3  As  I  read  Railton,  this  passage  from  a  few  pages  earlier  (pp.  157 – 158)  must  be  meant  to 
apply  to  cases  like  Juan’s:  “The  objective  act­consequentialist  would  thus  recommend 
cultivating  dispositions  that  will  sometimes  lead  him  to  violate  his  own  criterion  of  right 
action.  Still,  he  will  not,  as  a  trait­consequentialist  would,  shift  his  criterion  and  say  that 
an  act  is  right  if  it  stems  from  the  traits  it  would  be  best  overall  to  have  [...]  Instead,  he 
continues  to  believe  that  an  act  may  stem  from  the  dispositions  it  would  be  best  to  have, 
and  yet  be  wrong  (because  it  would  produce  worse  consequences  than  other  acts 
available  to  the  agent  in  the  circumstances.)” 
4  I  don’t  know  if  Railton  ever  makes  the  claim  as  explicit  as  I  am  doing  here,  but  I  don’t 
believe  that  I  am  putting  words  in  his  mouth.  The  stated  aim  of  the  paper  is  to  show  that 
act  consequentialism  need  not  be  seriously  alienating,  and  the  case  of  Juan  and  Linda  is 
positioned  as  the  final,  decisive  piece  of  evidence  for  that  claim. 
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3) Thus,  John  is  not  required  to  give  the  money  to  Oxfam  and  need  not  feel  in  any 
way  alienated  for  failing  to  do  so.  5
 
I  do  not  believe  that  this  sort  of  argument  can  work.  There  is  no  single 
sense  of  “can”  which  could  simultaneously  make  premises  1  and  2  true,  and  if 
there  is,  it  would  only  be  enough  to  secure  Juan’s  action  a  very  weak  sort  of 
permissibility  that  we  should  not  expect  to  free  him  from  feelings  of  alienation. 
The  mere  psychologically  impossibility  of  willing  some  action  can  never  provide 
a  satisfying  excuse  so  long  as  the  action  presents  itself  as  possible.  Even  if  Juan 
could  not  in  fact  summon  the  willpower  to  donate  to  Oxfam,  he  surely  views 
donation  as  an  option  that  he  might  conceivably  choose.  And  this  could  well  be 
enough  to  give  rise  to  powerful  feelings  of  alienation  when  he  does  otherwise. 
Reflecting  on  akratic  actions  in  our  own  lives  should  be  enough  to 
convince  us  of  this  point.  I  have  often  found  myself  doing  things  that  I  believe  to 
be  wrong  even  knowing  that  I  might  be  psychologically  unable  to  will  myself  to 
do  otherwise.  Avoiding  all  animal  products  at  every  meal  is  one  example  among 
many.  In  these  situations,  the  weakness  of  my  will  never  seems  to  provide 
anything  like  a  satisfying  excuse.  Indeed,  reminding  myself  of  my  weak  will  is 
likely  to  make  me  feel  worse  rather  than  better!  This  would  be  true  even  if,  like 
5  This  argument  would  seem  to  contradict  Railton’s  earlier  admission  that  actions  like 
Juan’s  are  in  fact  wrong  by  even  the  sophisticated  consequentialist’s  lights,  but  dropping 
that  admission  would,  if  anything,  strengthen  the  case  for  the  indirect  response. 
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Juan,  I  had  had  a  very  good  reason  to  put  myself  in  a  position  where  I  would  be 
psychologically  unable  to  do  the  right  thing. 
But  perhaps  no  such  ought­implies­can  argument  is  needed.  Perhaps — 
and  I  suspect  that  this  is  Railton’s  own  view — reflecting  on  the  ultimate 
desirability  of  the  character  traits  that  necessitate  his  acting  wrongly  should  just 
straightforwardly  be  enough  to  clear  Juan’s  conscience.  “I  ought  to  give  this 
money  to  Oxfam,”  thinks  Juan,  “but  it  is  good  to  have  the  character  of  a  loving 
husband,  and  it  is  precisely  that  character  trait  that  is  making  me  spend  my 
money  on  a  trip  to  visit  my  wife.”  He  stops  there,  satisfied,  and  buys  the  ticket 
without  any  feelings  of  doubt  or  alienation.  This  sort  of  picture  has  substantial 
prima  facie  plausibility,  but  I  believe  that  it  ultimately  implies  a  confused  notion 
of  what  it  is  like  to  act  for  a  reason. 
Here  is  what  it’s  like  to  act  for  reason:  You  see  that  you  can  make  a  change 
in  the  world,  the  change  seems  to  be  worth  making,  and  you  make  it.  It  might 
look  like  I’m  making  a  bold  claim  here,  but  I  don’t  mean  to  be.  From  Aristotle   to 6
Anscombe   to  Davidson   to  Dancy,   and  even  perhaps  to  Hume,   I  think  that  just 7 8 9 10
6  “Every  craft  and  every  line  of  inquiry,  and  likewise  every  action  and  decision,  seems  to 
seek  some  good”  ( Nicomachean  Ethics  p.  1). 
7  “Intentional  actions,  then,  are  the  ones  to  which  the  question  '  Why  ?  '  is  given 
application,  in  a  special  sense  [...];  positively,  the  answer  may  (a)  simply  mention  past 
history,  (b)  give  an  interpretation  of  the  action,  or  (c)  mention  something  future.  In  cases 
(b)  and  (c)  the  answer  is  already  characterized  as  a  reason  for  acting  [...]  and  in  case  (a)  it 
is  an  answer  to  that  question  if  the  ideas  of  good  or  harm  are  involved  in  its  meaning  as 
an  answer”  ( Intention  p.  24). 
8  “A  reason  rationalizes  an  action  only  if  it  leads  us  to  see  something  the  agent  saw,  or 
thought  he  saw,  in  his  action­some  feature,  consequence,  or  aspect  of  the  action  the 
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about  every  theory  of  motivation  that  I’ve  come  across  can,  with  some  finagling, 
be  made  to  fit  this  general  model.   11
If  Juan  were  to  take  himself  to  be  acting  for  a  reason  in  the  way  that  I 
describe,  he  would  not  find  much  comfort  in  the  knowledge  that  the  character 
traits  which  determine  his  action  are  good  ones  to  have,  because  his  character 
does  not  directly  provide  him  with  his  reasons  for  action;  he  would,  after  all,  still 
be  acting  for  a  bad  (or  at  least  insufficiently  good)  reason!  And  I  believe  that  that 
is  exactly  what  is  happening  in  Juan’s  case;  he  is  acting  for  a  reason  that  he 
judges  to  be  a  bad  one,  or  at  least  an  insufficiently  good  one.  There  is  no 
impossibility  in  acting  for  a  reason  that  one  sees  as  bad  (or  insufficiently  good).  I 
agent  wanted,  desired,  prized,  held  dear,  thought  dutiful,  beneficial,  obligatory,  or 
agreeable”  (“Actions,  Reasons,  and  Causes”  p.  685). 
9  “[N]ormally  there  will  be,  for  each  action,  the  reasons  in  the  light  of  which  the  agent 
did  that  action,  which  we  can  think  of  as  what  persuaded  him  to  do  it”  ( Practical  Reality 
p.  1). 
10  “‘Tis  obvious,  that  when  we  have  the  prospect  of  pain  or  pleasure  from  any  object,  we 
feel  a  consequent  emotion  of  aversion  or  propensity,  and  are  carry’d  to  avoid  or  embrace 
what  will  give  us  this  uneasiness  or  satisfaction”  ( A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature  2.2.3.3,  p. 
266).  Of  course,  Hume  thinks  that  it  is  passion,  and  not  reason,  that  ultimately  moves  us. 
But  I  intend  the  word  “seems”  in  its  broadest  possible  sense,  so  that  the  fact  that  the 
prospect  of  a  pain  or  pleasure  excites  aversion  or  propensity  might  count  as  a  way  of 
seeming  worth  realizing  or  avoiding.  If  this  is  unconvincing,  see  footnote  11  below. 
11  Perhaps  I  am  being  too  bold  here.  Perhaps  some  passions­first  Humeans  would  reject 
even  this  cautious  formulation,  even  with  its  (intentionally  broad)  appeal  to  “seemings.” 
If  so,  I  can  think  of  two  responses.  First:  Isn’t  there  still  something  different  and  strange 
about  making  weighty  decisions  based  on  the  desirability  of  the  character  traits  that  are 
pushing  one  around — something  that  one  ought  to  be  able  to  account  for  in  one’s  theory 
of  action?  Second,  in  case  the  first  doesn’t  work:  If  a  theory  can’t  explain  how  one  could 
act  for  a  reason  in  my  intentionally  broad  sense,  well  then  so  much  the  worse  for  that 
theory. 
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do  it  all  the  time,  and  I  suspect  that  many  other  people  do  too.  But  it  is  inherently 
alienating. 
Still,  Railton  seems  to  think  that  Juan  should  be  immediately  placated  by 
the  knowledge  that  his  action  stems  from  a  desirable  character  trait.  I  do  not  see 
how  this  can  be  true  if  Juan  takes  himself  to  be  acting  for  a  reason;  isn’t  there 
something  disquieting  in  the  thought  that  the  reasons  on  which  one  acts  are  no 
good?  For  Juan  to  be  immediately  placated,  his  psychology  must  be  very  strange 
indeed.  Rather  than  acting  for  a  reason — even  a  bad  one — he  must  be  doing 
something  else  entirely.  Perhaps  he  looks  inside  himself,  picks  out  the 
psychological  and  characterological  traits  that  he  judges  to  be  good,  and  follows 
their  commands  blindly  wherever  they  lead.  Perhaps  he  doesn’t  even  bother  to 
look  inside,  and  unreflectively  follows  the  nudgings  of  his  drives.  His 
consequentialist  beliefs  are  thus  utterly  abstract  to  him,  and  except  when  he 
wheels  them  out  to  mollify  any  potential  guilt,  they  have  nothing  whatsoever  to 
do  with  his  practical  life.  He  believes  that  consequentialism  describes  the  reasons 
we  have  to  act,  but  he  never  acts  for  those  reasons,  and  is  apparently  unbothered 
by  this  fact!  For  Juan,  the  moral  facts  and  practical  life  are  entirely  divorced. 
Juan’s  is  a  bizarre  sort  of  human  agency — one  that  might  not  deserve  the  name 
“agency”  at  all. 
I  do  not  of  course  mean  to  suggest  that  we  can  never  take  the  source  or 
nature  of  some  inclination  as  a  reason  for  action.  If  I  believe  that  jealousy  is 
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unhealthy  and  tends  to  mislead,  I  might  take  the  fact  that  jealousy  inclines  me 
towards  some  action  as  a  reason  not  to  perform  the  action,  either  because  I  hope 
to  reform  my  jealous  nature  or  because  I  suspect  that  the  action  is  likely  to  end 
up  having  been  a  bad  one  for  reasons  that  I  do  not  currently  see.  (I  might  have 
this  suspicion,  for  example,  because  I  know  that  when  I  am  jealous  I  tend  to  jump 
to  incorrect  conclusions  about  other  people’s  motives.)  There  is  nothing  wrong, 
alienating,  or  irrational  about  this  form  of  reasoning.  But  it  is  not  what  is 
happening  in  Juan’s  case.  As  the  case  is  described,  he  is  not  taking  his  character 
as  a  loving  husband  to  provide  (or  even  indicate  the  presence  of)  a  reason  to  visit 
his  wife.  He  is  not  trying  to  reinforce  his  character  by  visiting  his  wife,  and  he 
does  not  believe  that  his  character  is,  in  this  case,  a  good  guide  to  right  action. 
Juan  treats  his  character  not  as  a  reason  but  as  a  tool  with  which  to  convince 
himself  that  acting  wrongly  and  for  a  bad  reason  is  unproblematic.  It  is  not  and 
cannot  be  up  to  the  task. 
My  aim  in  this  section  has  been  to  show  that  the  indirect  strategy  cannot 
make  consequentialism  non­alienating,  but  as  usual,  my  arguments  apply 
equally  well  to  any  indirect  approach  to  ECR.  Though  I  am  not  sure  that  ECR,  by 
itself,  implies  that  consequentialism  is  true,  I  do  believe  that  it  implies  some  form 
of  impartialism  and  that  it  pushes  us  in  a  consequentialist  direction.  Juan  could 
have  been  a  non­consequentialist  ECR  theorist  and  my  argument  that  his  indirect 
strategy  is  necessarily  alienating  would  apply  straightforwardly.  In  fact,  the 
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arguments  would  apply  even  if  ECR  implied  an  ethical  theory  entirely  unlike 
Juan’s  consequentialism.  This  is  because  the  indirect  strategy  fails  in  the 
consequentialist  case  not  because  of  any  particular  features  of  consequentialism 
but  because  the  strategy  attempts  to  allow  us  to  feel  justified  or  excused  in  taking 
actions  that  are  are  contrary  to  what  we  believe  we  have  decisive  reason  to  do. 
As  I  have  argued,  this  is  an  impossible  task. 
Before  moving  on  to  the  direct  and  hybrid  responses,  I  want  to  emphasize 
that  all  I  take  myself  to  have  shown  in  this  section  is  that  the  indirect  approach, 
whether  to  consequentialism  or  ECR,  is  alienating.  This  claim  does  not  imply  that 
we  should  avoid  indirect  approaches.  For  one  thing,  as  I’ll  continue  to  argue,  all 
available  responses  to  ECR  are  necessarily  alienating.  But  even  if  the  indirect 
approach  turned  out  to  be  the  most  alienating  alternative  (which  I  suspect  that  it 
may  be),  that  wouldn’t  mean  that  we  should  not  take  it.  Alienation  can  be 
painful  and  disconcerting,  but  it  is  not  the  worst  thing  that  can  happen  to  a 
person.  I  would  much  rather  live  a  rich,  involved,  and  alienated  life  than  a 
stunted  one  in  good  faith — to  say  nothing  of  my  effect  on  the  people  around  me. 
Thus  we  should  reject  the  indirect  approach  as  a  cure­all,  but  we  should 
keep  it  in  mind  when  we  turn  our  attention  to  the  difficult  practical  problem  of 
what  to  do  in  the  face  of  ECR  or  any  of  our  other  alienating  convictions. 
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Scarre’s  Direct  Response 
Indirect  approaches  recommend  that  we  should  have  no  worries  about 
acting  in  ways  that  are  not  warranted  by  the  actual  reasons  at  play  so  long  as 
those  actions  are  necessitated  by  or  in  line  with  a  desirable  sort  of  character, 
personality,  motivational  profile,  etc.  The  reasoning  is  that  attempting  to  always 
act  and  care  in  the  most  warranted  way  leads  to  alienation,  stunted  character 
and,  ultimately,  bad  action  down  the  line.  I  have  argued  that  acting  contrary  to 
what  we  know  that  the  reasons  recommend  (likewise  caring  or  valuing  things 
which  we  know  do  not  to  matter)  is  inevitably  alienating.  In  the  face  of  this 
gloomy  conclusion,  we  may  stop  and  wonder  whether  Railton  et  al  are  too  quick 
in  recommending  an  indirect  strategy — is  it  really  so  hard  to  do  and  care  in  the 
right  way  for  the  right  reasons? 
The  most  optimistic  direct  strategy  that  I  have  seen  is  Scarre’s.   On  his 12
view,  it  is  a  mistake  to  believe  that  utilitarian  ends  are  too  distant  to  care  about 
and  promote  without  alienation.  He  believes  that  the  mistake  rests  in  the 
tendency  of  philosophers  to  conceive  of  “impersonal  utility”  as  something  above 
and  beyond  and,  most  importantly,  disconnected  from  the  individual  moments 
of  happiness  and  suffering  that  it  comprises.  If  that  were  what  utility  were  like,  it 
might  be  impossible  to  genuinely  care  about;  but  of  course  it  isn’t  like  that.  All  of 
those  individual  moments  of  happiness  and  suffering  are  constitutive  parts  of 
12  Given  in  his  Utilitarianism ,  ch.  8. 
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impersonal  utility,  and  they  are  paradigmatically  things  of  a  sort  that  we  can  care 
about  and  promote  or  prevent  in  good  faith. 
So  far  as  all  that  goes,  Scarre  is  undoubtedly  right;  everything  that  goes 
into  impersonal  utility  is,  in  principle,  something  that  anyone,  including  the 
utilitarian,  should  be  able  to  care  about  in  good  faith.  This  simple  point  is  a 
welcome  corrective  to  views  that  cast  anything  approaching  utilitarian  practical 
reasoning  as  psychologically  impossible  and  seem  to  hold  that  the  best  thing  to 
do  in  the  face  of  the  truth  of  utilitarianism  is  to  plug  one’s  ears  and  never  think 
about  the  matter  again.   But  he  goes  much  too  far,  I  think,  in  declaring  a  way  out 13
of  the  alienation  problem. 
On  Scarre’s  reckoning,  maximizing  impersonal  utility  will  require  one  to 
sacrifice  their  ordinary  ends  rarely  enough  that  direct  utilitarianism  is  available 
to  all  but  the  “morally  lazy.”   I  see  two  problems  with  this  line  of  argument. 14
First,  and  most  obvious,  is  the  apparent  fact  that  promoting  impersonal 
utility  and  promoting  one’s  ordinary  ends  come  apart  more  frequently  than 
Scarre  seems  to  suppose.  It  is  true  enough  that  we  (often)  know  what’s  good  for 
ourselves  and  our  friends  better  than  we  do  for  strangers  and  that  we  (often)  are 
in  a  position  to  provide  those  things  more  effectively  or  with  less  effort  than  we 
13  I’ve  had  the  privilege  of  looking  at  an  unpublished  paper  by  my  colleague  Andrew 
Ingram  which  argues  that  approaches  like  Railton’s  undermine  the  revolutionary  weight 
that  a  utilitarian  ethics  should  carry  in  a  world  containing  so  much  suffering  and 
inequality.  I  agree  with  his  view  wholeheartedly. 
14  Utilitarianism  p.  203 
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could  provide  them  to  strangers.  In  a  world  of  equal  wealth  but  diverging  taste, 
everyone  would  be  better  off  buying  their  own  sandwiches.  But  when  my  ten 
dollars  could  feed  another  person  for  a  week,  it’s  not  so  obvious  that  I’d  be 
maximizing  utility  by  spending  it  on  a  roast  pork  Italian.  Of  course,  as  I  noted 
earlier,  there’s  good  reason  to  believe  that  constant  self­sacrifice  is  suboptimal  in 
the  long  term  for  almost  everyone,  so  maybe  I  really  should  buy  myself  a 
sandwich  every  now  and  then  so  as  to  stay  happy  and  productive.  If  this  is  so, 
then  utilitarianism  seems  like  it  should  at  least  be  less  alienating  than  is  often 
supposed.  This  brings  me  to  my  second  line  of  argument  against  Scarre’s  direct 
strategy. 
Often,  promoting  one’s  own  ends  coincides  with  promoting  interpersonal 
utility  only  because  of  human  weakness  in  one  form  or  another;  decision  fatigue, 
hunger,  stress,  tiredness,  and  so  on  all  sap  our  willpower  and  render  us  less  able 
to  act  well.  Recall  Railton’s  example  of  Juan.  As  we  originally  imagined  the  case, 
Juan’s  decision  to  visit  his  wife  really  was  wrong  by  consequentialist  lights,  but 
we  can  just  as  easily  imagine  that  it  was  the  right  thing  to  do.  Perhaps  this 
missed  trip  would  be  the  nail  in  the  coffin  of  Juan’s  relationship,  the  resulting 
divorce  would  send  him  spiraling  into  alcoholism,  and  so  on.  In  this  case,  taking 
the  trip  would  actually  be  the  best  thing  he  could  do;  giving  the  money  to  Oxfam 
would,  by  consequentialist  lights,  be  a  well­intentioned  mistake.  Since  it  is  right 
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by  consequentialist  lights  for  Juan  to  visit  his  wife,  perhaps  he  can  do  so  without 
experiencing  any  guilt  or  alienation.  But  I  do  not  think  that  he  can. 
For  Juan  to  visit  his  wife  as  a  good  faith  consequentialist,  he  must  visit  her 
for  the  reason  that  by  doing  so  he  is  protecting  their  relationship  and  his  mental 
health  so  that  he  can  best  promote  impersonal  utility  in  the  long  run.  I  argued 
against  Railton’s  indirect  view  that  for  Juan  to  act  in  good  faith  he  would  have  to 
somehow  take  the  fact  that  some  generally­good­consequence­producing  feature 
of  his  psychology  or  character  nudged  him  in  the  direction  of  some  action  as  a 
reason  to  do  that  action,  and  that  this  is  nothing  like  what  it  is  like  to  act  for  a 
reason,  especially  for  a  consequentialist.  In  this  new  case,  Juan  is  doing  better  in 
at  least  one  respect,  because  at  least  when  he  visits  his  wife  in  order  to  be  better 
able  to  promote  impersonal  utility  in  the  future  he  is  acting  for  what  he  takes  to 
be  a  good  reason.  But  it  is  an  indirect,  alien  sort  of  reason  in  comparison  to  an 
ordinary  everyday  reason  like  “it  would  be  good  to  see  my  wife.”  It  is  not  just,  as 
Williams  would  put  it,  that  Juan’s  concern  for  impersonal  utility  is  “one  thought 
too  many;”   it’s  that  this  new  thought  replaces  the  old  one  and  forces  Juan  to  act 15
on  an  alien  reason. 
Scarre  may  be  right  that  utilitarians  can  sometimes — even  often — 
promote  the  goods  of  themselves  and  people  close  to  them  in  good  faith  as  parts 
of  impersonal  utility.  But  they  cannot  always  do  so.  Often,  utilitarians  will  have 
15  “Persons,  Character  and  Morality”  p.  18 
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to  do  things  that  one  would  ordinarily  do  out  of  partial  care  or  self­interest  only 
as  indirect  means  to  impersonal  utility.  But  this  is  very  different  from  what  it  is 
ordinarily  like  to  act  out  of  partial  care  or  self­interest,  and  it  seems  likely  that  it 
would  be  difficult  or  impossible  to  act  in  this  way  consistently  without  slowly 
eroding  one’s  relationships  and  mental  health,  thus  undermining  impersonal 
utility  in  the  long  run. 
On  top  of  these  two  objections  is  a  more  fundamental  one.  Scarre’s 
arguments  purport  to  show  that  the  “impersonal”  part  of  consequentialism 
should  not  bother  us.  As  such,  to  the  extent  that  they  are  effective,  they  are  most 
effective  as  defenses  of  consequentialisms  like  Moore’s  that  only  come  drastically 
apart  from  commonsense  morality  because  they  are  impartial  in  that  they  focus 
on  the  impersonal  good  rather  than  on  some  more  particular  set  of  ends.  For  the 
hedonistic  utilitarian  or  the  ECR  theorist,  common  sense  needs  to  be  revised  not 
just  by  making  it  impartial  but  by  eliminating  entire  swaths  of  purported  sources 
of  value — lives  as  wholes,  desert,  etc.  Perhaps  I  can  value  my  own  happiness  or 
the  happiness  of  my  friend  as  a  part  of  impersonal  utility.  But  if  there  is  no  value 
in  desert  (contra  Moore  but  pace  the  hedonist  utilitarian  or  ECR  theorist)  then  we 
could  not  reward  or  punish  people  who  have  helped  or  wronged  us  as  a  part  of 
“impersonal  desert”  as  a  hypothetical  Moorean­Scarreian  might  argue.  
Thus,  though  Scarre’s  sophisticated  direct  view  effectively  narrows  the 
effective  scope  of  the  traditional  arguments  against  naive  consequentialism,  it 
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can’t  allow  us  to  completely  avoid  the  dilemma  that  motivates  Railton’s  indirect 
strategy,  especially  if  we  are  hedonist  utilitarians  or  ECR  theorists;  either  we  act 
in  good  faith  and  undermine  our  own  aims  or  we  move  to  an  indirect  response 
and  face  the  alienation  such  a  response  entails. 
 
Siderits’s  Hybrid  Approach  –  Ironic  Engagement 
Siderits  intends  his  hybrid  approach,  which  he  calls  “ironic  engagement,” 
to  combine  the  best  features  of  the  direct  and  indirect  approaches  while  avoiding 
their  difficulties.  Unlike  Railton  and  Scarre,  Siderits  is  concerned  primarily  with 
his  own  brand  of  Reductionism  about  personal  identity  rather  than  with 
consequentialism.  By  “Reductionism,”  which  I  will  follow  him  in  capitalizing 
when  discussing  his  view,  Siderits  intends  something  more  than  I  have  meant  in 
this  dissertation  by  “reductionism.”  On  Siderits’s  Buddhist  Reductionism, 
persons  are  “conventionally”  real  but  “ultimately”  unreal.   The  claim  that 16
persons  are  “ultimately”  unreal  is,  as  I  understand  it,  similar  to  Parfit’s  claim  that 
there  is  no  deep  further  fact  about  personal  identity,  which  I  take  to  be  the 
central  claim  of  reductionism.  To  be  “conventionally  real”  in  Siderits’s  sense  is 
just,  I  think,  to  be  accounted  for  in  a  conventional  conceptual  framework  or 
ontology.  Importantly,  as  I  understand  Siderits’s  position,  he  is  not  so  concerned 
with  what  our  conventions  are  but  about  what  they  should  be. 
16
  PIBP  p.  22 
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So,  on  my  reading,  Reductionism  is  the  combination  of  a  metaphysical 
view — reductionism — with  the  practical  claim  that  we  should  keep  persons  in 
our  conceptual  framework  and  person­regarding  attitudes  in  use.  If  we  accept 
the  metaphysical  view  but  reject  the  practical  claim,  then  we  are  in  Siderits’s 
terms  Eliminativists. 
It  is  tempting  to  identify  Siderits’s  Reductionism  with  Parfit’s  Moderate 
Claim  and  his  Eliminativism  with  Parfit’s  Extreme  Claim,  as  Siderits  himself 
comes  close  to  doing.   I  believe  that  this  is  a  mistake.  For  Siderits, 17
person­regarding  attitudes  are  not  justified  because  they  are  “close  to”  the 
ultimate  truth  or  anything  like  that.  Person­regarding  attitudes  are  justified  only 
indirectly,  generally  on  the  basis  of  the  utility  of  adopting  person­regarding 
attitudes.  For  example,  he  writes: 
 
I  identify  with  and  care  about  my  future  states  because  my  having  learned 
to  do  so  better  insures  that  there  will  be  fewer  pains  among  them.  I 
identify  with  my  present  preferences  and  projects  because  these  should  be 
17  At  a  minimum,  he  thinks  that  Reductionism  implies  the  Moderate  Claim:  “If  the 
Extreme  Claim  were  true,  there  would  turn  out  to  be  no  middle  ground  between 
Non­Reductionism  and  Eliminativism:  either  persons  are  ultimately  real,  or  else  all  our 
person­regarding  attitudes  are  rationally  unjusitifiable.  Thus  a  Reductionist  must  deny 
the  Extreme  Claim  and  hold  instead  a  Moderate  Claim,  to  the  effect  that  if  Reductionism 
is  true,  then  mitigated  forms  of  the  four  features  [of  personhood — interest  in  one’s  own 
survival,  egoistic  concern  for  one’s  future  states,  holding  persons  responsible  for  their 
past  deeds,  and  compensation  for  one’s  past  burdens — ]may  be  grounded  in  facts  about 
the  impersonal  entities  and  events  that  persons  just  consist  in”  ( PIPB  p.  72).  His  “four 
features”  are  borrowed  from  Marya  Schechtman. 
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seen  as  resulting  from  a  process  of  self­revision  that  likewise  better 
promotes  maximization.  I  identify  with  my  past  pains  because  doing  so 
facilitates  appropriation  of  my  present  properties,  which  is  necessary  if 
self­revision  is  to  be  ongoing.  18
 
There  is  nothing  here  with  which  the  ECR  theorist  needs  to  disagree.  On  Parfit’s 
original  explicit  usage,  the  Extreme  Claim  says  that  we  have  no  reasons  for 
partial  care  for  our  own  futures.  On  my  extended  reading  of  the  claim,  it  says 
that  nothing  else  matters  in  any  of  the  ways  that  the  deep  further  fact  of  identity 
is  ordinarily  taken  to  matter.  As  I  understand  both  of  these  versions  of  the 
Extreme  Claim,  they  are  views  about  standard,  direct,  object­given  reasons  and 
values.   There  is  no  reason  I  can  see  that  the  ECR  theorist  could  not  adopt  (or, 19
better,  try  to  cause  or  allow  themselves  to  adopt  or  maintain)  person­regarding 
attitudes  for  exactly  the  reasons  that  Siderits  says  we  should.  Thus  my  ECR 
theorist  is  not  committed  to  full  Sideritsian  Eliminativism,  and  can  happily  be  a 
Reductionist.  Since  the  ECR  theorist  can  be  a  Reductionist,  they  can  apply  the 
18  PIBP  p.  78 
19  I  don’t  think  I  depart  from  Parfit  here.  At  the  time  of  Reasons  and  Persons ,  he  does  not 
(so  far  as  I’m  aware)  have  the  language  of  standard,  non­standard,  object­given,  and 
state­given  reasons.  But  I  suspect  that  his  analysis  of  the  ECR  theorist  would  be  exactly 
parallel  to  his  analysis  of  the  sophisticated  egoists  and  consequentialists  he  discusses  the 
first  part  of  the  book.  These  sophisticated  egoists  and  consequentialists,  like  Railton’s 
Juan,  nourish  certain  sorts  of  character  for  egoist  (or  consequentialist)  reasons.  Just  as  we 
could  nourish  certain  sorts  of  character  for  these  reasons,  we  could  nourish  certain 
person­regarding  attitudes. 
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ironic  engagement  strategy  without  revision. 
Siderits  explains  his  strategy  by  way  of  an  analogy  to  civic  pride.  He 
imagines  himself  as  an  “urbanist” — a  reductionist  about  cities — who  recognizes 
the  utility  of  adopting  and  maintaining  city­regarding  attitudes  and  civic  pride 
while  also  denying  the  ultimate  reality  of  cities  and  recognizing  that  he  might 
just  as  well  have  been  born  elsewhere.  Since  his  reasons  for  feeling  pride  in  his 
city  have  absolutely  nothing  to  do  with  the  city  itself,  he  imagines  himself  feeling 
alienated;  just  like  in  the  personal  identity  case,  the  worry  is  that  “having  a  life  is 
not  the  sort  of  thing  one  can  choose  as  a  means  to  further  some  separate  end.”  20
The  “ironic  engagement”  that  Siderits  recommends  to  his  imagined 
sophisticated  urbanist  looks  something  like  Pascalian  habituation: 
 
I  should  reflect  on  what  it  is  about  this  place  that  I  particularly  enjoy  and 
appreciate,  and  begin  to  dwell  on  these  features.  Then  I  should  share  the 
fruits  of  these  reflections  with  my  neighbors,  some  of  whom  will  no  doubt 
respond  with  their  own  suggestions  of  valuable  features  to  add  to  my  list 
[...]  All  of  this  is,  I  think,  perfectly  consistent  with  my  urbanism.  And  it  is 
hard  to  see  how  the  feeling  I  come  to  have  in  the  end  is  not  the  genuine 
article.  21
 
20  PIBP  p.  133 
21  PIBP  p.  137 
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In  spite  of  successfully  cultivating  these  feelings,  Siderits  imagines  himself 
holding  on  to  his  knowledge  of  the  truth  of  urbanism.  This  knowledge  allows 
him  to  take  an  “ironic  distance”  from  his  feelings  of  civic  pride,  but  apparently 
does  not  induce  alienation. 
Extending  the  example  to  the  case  of  personal  identity  is  straightforward 
enough:  Rather  than  cultivating  civic  pride  by  reflecting  on  the  best  aspects  of 
our  hometown,  we  cultivate  care  for  personal  projects,  friendships,  and  so  on  by 
working  at  them  diligently  and  reflecting  frequently  on  what  we  value  about 
them.  Eventually,  “the  activity  begins  to  take  on  a  life  of  its  own,  so  that  what 
was  initially  valued  only  extrinsically  now  has  intrinsic  value  for  me.”   22
Siderits  anticipates  what  seems  like  the  correct  objection  to  make  at  this 
point:  The  fact  that  feelings  of  civic  pride  and  a  belief  in  urbanism  can  coexist 
does  not  mean  that  they  are  comfortably  compatible:   “Pride,”  says  his  imagined 23
interlocutor,  “involves  the  sense  that  one  is  somehow  ennobled  through  one’s 
relation  to  the  thing  in  which  one  takes  pride.  How  can  the  urbanist  rationally 
maintain  that  they  derive  value  from  their  relation  to  a  fiction?”  He  responds 
that  “to  take  pride  in  something  is  to  be  disposed  to  do  such  things  as  praising  it, 
defending  it  against  its  detractors,  seeking  to  correct  its  flaws,  and  the  like.  This 
22  PIBP  p.  137 
23  He  says  “logically  compatible,”  which  I  think  may  mean  something  like  “rationally 
compatible,”  though  I’m  not  sure  ( PIBP  p.  137).  Regardless  of  how  the  “logically”  should 
be  read,  what  ought  to  matter  is  whether  or  not  a  belief  in  urbanism  can  exist  alongside 
civic  pride  without  engendering  alienation,  which  is  why  I  say  “comfortably”  instead. 
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is  what  feeling  proud — feeling  ennobled  by  one’s  relation  to  the  object — 
ultimately  amounts  to.”  24
This  response  seems  insufficient.  Pride,  if  it  does  not  include  a  cognitive 
component  as  a  constitutive  part,  at  least  requires  an  appropriate  cognitive 
accompaniment  if  we  are  to  be  able  to  believe  it  warranted.  It  may  be  possible  to 
feel  genuine  civic  pride  if  one  does  not  believe,  as  by  hypothesis  the  urbanist 
does  not,  that  one  is  “ennobled  through  one’s  connection”  to  one’s  city,  just  as  it 
may  be  possible  to  feel  genuine  fear  in  response  to  something — a  movie,  a  flight, 
a  clown — that  one  does  not  believe  is  actually  dangerous.  But  without  those 
beliefs,  or  with  contrary  beliefs,  reflection  will  show  us  that  our  pride  or  fear  is 
unwarranted  and  irrational.   25
That  is,  even  if  Siderits  is  right  and  all  that  pride — and  likewise  friendship, 
love,  self­concern,  feelings  of  responsibility,  first­personal  anticipation,  and  so 
on — amount  to  are  cognitively  neutral  dispositions,  that  is  not  enough  to  prove 
his  point.  The  mere  coexistence — even  the  stable  coexistence — of  an  attitude 
together  with  beliefs  that  render  that  attitude  unwarranted  by  one’s  own  lights  is 
not  enough  to  free  a  person  from  alienation.  It  is  in  large  part  because  a  person 
believes  their  attitude  to  be  unwarranted  by  their  own  lights  that  they  experience 
alienation! 
24  PIBP  p.  137 
25  The  scary  movie  case  might  be  different  from  the  civic  pride,  flying,  and  clown  cases, 
since  we  might  want  to  deny  that  our  reaction  to  the  scary  movie  is  really  fear  or  that  if  it 
is  fear  it  is  unwarranted.  But  no  matter. 
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It  might  be  objected  that  I  am  requiring  Siderits  to  succeed  on  my  terms 
rather  than  his  own.  Again,  Siderits  characterizes  the  alienation  objection  as  the 
claim  that  “having  a  life  is  not  the  sort  of  thing  one  can  choose  as  a  means  to 
further  some  separate  end,”   and  if  someone  comes  to  have  the  life,  cares,  and 26
projects  they  do  through  cultivation  and  habituation  and  do  not  attempt  any 
extrinsic  or  instrumental  justification,  it  might  be  that  they  are  not  alienated  in 
precisely  this  sense.  But  while  it  is  true  that  the  ironic  engagement  strategy, 
unlike  Railton’s  indirect  strategy,  does  not  force  us  to  have  or  justify  the  cares 
that  we  do  by  appeal  to  their  indirect  consequences,  it  seems  to  do  so  only  by 
imagining  that  we  do  not  need  to  have  or  justify  them  for  any  reason  at  all! 
Imagine  an  urbanist  who  asks  themselves  what  reason  they  have  for 
taking  pride  in  their  city.  If  the  urbanist  is  a  Railtonian,  they  might  say  that  they 
are  proud  of  their  city  because  having  such  pride  will  have  good  consequences. 
As  we  have  seen,  this  is  the  wrong  kind  of  answer.  The  Sideritsian  urbanist  will 
not  make  this  mistake.  If  they  do  not  simply  remain  silent,  they  will  say  that  they 
are  proud  of  their  city  because  of  its  parks,  its  sandwiches,  its  barbecue,  its 
culture.  This  answer  is  in  one  way  an  improvement,  because  these  at  least  look 
like  reasons  of  the  right  kind.  But  because  they  are  an  urbanist,   they  will 27
recognize  that  they  are  not,  in  the  end,  reasons  at  all.  In  one  way,  it  is  better  to 
have  an  attitude  for  which  one  knows  one  cannot  claim  warrant  than  to  have  an 
26  PIBP  p.  133 
27  Or  an  “Extreme  Claim  urbanist,”  perhaps. 
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attitude  which  one  mistakenly  believes  can  somehow  be  indirectly  warranted 
because  of  its  consequences.  But  neither  situation  is  good,  and  both,  given  honest 
reflection,  have  the  potential  to  alienate. 
It  might  also  be  objected  that  I  am,  as  Siderits  cautions  against, 
committing  the  genetic  fallacy,   arguing  that  the  fact  that  the  ironically  engaged 28
reductionist  has  the  cares  and  projects  they  do  because  of  habituations  renders 
these  cares  and  projects  irrational  or  alien.  But  the  genesis  of  the  reductionist’s 
cares  and  projects  is  not  the  reason  that  their  cares  and  projects  are  irrational  and 
alien;  the  two  have  nothing  to  do  with  one  another.  In  fact,  in  my  view, 
knowledge  that  one  came  to  have  certain  cares  and  projects  because  of 
cultivation  and  habituation  should  not  by  itself  even  be  enough  to  induce  the 
mild  “ironic  distance”  that  Siderits  suggests  it  will.   This  is  because  the  genesis 29
of  cares  and  projects  provides  them  with  a  causal  explanation,  but  not  a  justifying 
explanation.  For  the  ECR  theorist,  there  is  no  explanation  that  can  do  the  work  of 
justifying  their  person­regarding  cares  and  projects  in  the  appropriate  way. 
An  analogy:  I  was  chronically  ill  for  the  majority  of  my  teenage  years. 
During  that  time,  because  I  lacked  the  energy  to  do  much  else,  I  watched  a  lot  of 
movies,  and  I  ended  up  watching  some  of  my  favorites  probably  dozens  of  times. 
I  still  love  most  of  these  movies,  even  if  I  haven’t  seen  them  for  over  a  decade.  I 
know  that  the  cause  of  my  extreme  fondness  is  probably  that  I  spent  so  much 
28  PIBP  p.  137 
29  PIBP  p.  137 
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time  enjoying  them  when  I  was  younger.  But  that  has  nothing  to  do  with 
whether  my  love  is  justified .  My  justification  depends  on  the  reasons  for  which  I 
love  these  movies,  if  I  have  any — things  like  characters  or  or  shots  or  scenes  or 
melodies  or  performances.  Of  course,  as  I  have  grown,  my  tastes  have  changed, 
and  I  might  decide  upon  a  re­watch  that  the  various  features  that  I  once  thought 
made  some  movie  good  in  fact  do  the  opposite.  In  this  case,  I  would  decide  that 
my  love  of  the  movie  was  unwarranted,  and  if  I  kept  loving  the  movie  in  spite  of 
myself  I  might  do  so  with  “ironic  distance.” 
It  is  the  same  in  the  case  of  personal  identity.  It  is  not  the  fact  that  I  have 
developed  my  cares  and  projects  through  years  of  habituation  that  makes  my 
cares  and  projects  unwarranted.  It  is  the  much  more  straightforward  fact  that  the 
objects  of  my  care  do  not  warrant  care  and  my  projects  do  not  warrant  being 
pursued. 
 
Ironic  Engagement  and  Kayfabe 
In  spite  of  my  criticisms  of  Siderits’s  ironic  engagement  strategy,  I  view  it 
as  a  practical  improvement  on  the  indirect  and  direct  strategies  that  it  is  meant  to 
replace.  Unlike  the  indirect  strategist,  the  ironic  engagement  strategist 
understands  that  merely  recognizing  the  utility  of  a  belief  or  the  desirability  of  a 
motivation  is  not  (or  should  not  be)  enough  to  allow  a  person  to  form  the  belief 
or  act  on  the  motivation  in  good  faith.  Unlike  the  direct  strategist,  the  ironic 
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engagement  strategist  recognizes  that  it  is  not  always  desirable  or  even  possible 
to  bear  the  full  import  of  the  normative  facts  in  mind.  But  like  the  indirect  and 
direct  strategists,  the  ironic  engagement  strategist  believes  that  there  is  a  way  out 
of  alienation.  In  this  they  are  mistaken. 
As  a  practical  matter,  the  biggest  advance  that  Siderits  makes  over  Railton 
and  Scarre  is  that  he  recognizes  that  maintaining  person­regarding  attitudes  and 
projects  alongside  a  belief  in  Reductionism  is  an  ongoing  Pascalian  project.  This 
is  undoubtedly  so.  But  he  goes  wrong  in  thinking  that  it  is  the  sort  of  project  that 
a  single,  unified,  unalienated  agent  can  undertake.  Maintaining  person­regarding 
attitudes  and  believing  in  Reductionism — or  at  least  ECR — isn’t  like  walking  and 
chewing  gum.  It’s  like  chewing  sugary  gum  while  looking  at  your  insulin 
injector.  It’s  like  walking  on  a  broken  hip.  A  more  complete  strategy  needs  to 
acknowledge  this  necessary  fracturing  and  say  something  about  how  to  deal 
with  it.  My  own  kayfabe  strategy,  outlined  at  the  end  of  Chapter  Three,  is  an 
attempt  to  do  just  that. 
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